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ABSTRACT 
 
Andrew Davis: The Problem of Sovereignty: Nations, Corporations and Power Relations 
(Under the direction of Lawrence Grossberg) 
 
 The contemporary moment is characterized by a multitude of crises, which I argue are 
the result of the historical transformation of sovereignty. While sovereignty exerts itself 
through different forms in different socio-historical contexts, it is fundamentally a question 
of the organization, relations, mechanisms, and operations of power. Within the context of 
the United States in the 21st century, the question of sovereignty is best addressed in relation 
to two narratives that are commonly offered to explain this context and its multiple crisis. 
The first—neoliberalism—understands the current era as being characterized by the 
reorganization of economic, political and social life to operate according to market forces. 
The second—fascism—is theorized primarily as an ideology or particular type of political 
regime, and is often used in popular discourse as a slur against one’s political adversaries, 
regardless of their actual politics.  
This dissertation reframes these narratives in order to provide a better understanding 
of the current moment. Regarding neoliberalism, I turn our attention away from “the market” 
to the dominance of the business corporation in the organization of social and power 
relations. The current moment is better understood as the era of corporism—a condition 
whereby economic, political and social relations are organized according to the sovereignty 
of the business corporation in relation to the nation-state. This is supported by an 
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examination of three institutions/phenomena (i.e. ALEC, DARPA and the Singularity) that 
indicate the assertion of corporate sovereignty in 21st century America. 
I then turn to the question of fascism, considering a set of theories that do not usually 
inform political scholarship in order to demonstrate the continued relevance of understanding 
the crises we face as a form of fascism, without lapsing into unfounded name-calling. This is 
supported by a re-examination of ALEC, DARPA and the Singularity, and an examination of 
the private military and security industry (PMSI), that indicate the fascist character of these 
forces of corporate sovereignty. By reframing these narratives, I demonstrate the 
transformation of power relations between the U.S. nation-state and legal form of the 
business corporation as a crisis in the transformation of sovereign power. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE STATE OF DISUNION 
 
 To suggest that we are in the midst of a crisis seems simultaneously understated yet 
hackneyed. It can often feel as though we are bearing witness to an unprecedented 
multiplication and intensification of crises—political, economic, racialized, gendered, 
ecological, religious—that can only be resolved (or, more accurately, temporarily 
ameliorated) in an expedient fashion before the next crisis demands attention. In order to 
understand these crises, we develop narratives about where we are and how we got here; we 
deploy concepts and theories to make sense of our collective failure to solve our most 
pressing concerns. In the following pages, I unpack two narratives that are commonly 
deployed to explain the contemporary moment and its multiple crises.  
The first of these—neoliberalism—conceptualizes the current era as being broadly 
characterized by the reorganization and realignment of economic, political and social life to 
operate according to the workings of the market, with “market” understood as the realm of 
free, competitive economic activity. I challenge this narrative by arguing that, with a few 
exceptions, much of the scholarship on neoliberalism does not do enough to account for the 
role of the corporation, the institution that has had (and continues to have) a dominant role in 
constructing, shaping and determining economic markets. I argue that the concept of 
neoliberalism (while useful in many respects) is insufficient for understanding the role of the 
corporation in the current moment. Following the lead of Carolyn Hardin, I argue that the era 
commonly referred to as neoliberal is better understood as the era of corporism—a 
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contextually-specific cultural relation between the nation-state and the corporation whereby 
rights, security and even individual subjectivities are framed primarily in reference to the 
rights, security and status of the corporation as a legally-recognized person. 
The second narrative I unpack is that of fascism. While a substantial body of work 
has been dedicated to theorizing fascism, use of the term fascist in public discourse to 
account for crises in American political and cultural life is woefully disconnected from 
theory. More often than not, the term is used to accuse one’s political and cultural adversaries 
of right-wing or vaguely authoritarian actions, agendas or impulses. Regrettably, such 
indiscriminate usage has hindered our ability to recognize actual instances of fascism when 
they do appear. As such, I revisit theories of fascism that do not often inform the work found 
in political theory in order to demonstrate the continued relevance of understanding the crises 
we face as a form of fascism. 
The crises of the current moment are not unprecedented; they are the rearticulation of 
crises (equally multiple and intense) that were ostensibly resolved in other moments. 
Looking back, the modern era can be thought of as an agglomeration of overlapping crises, 
the temporary resolution of which assures their reappearance in other contexts. So much of 
the work of cultural studies (the tradition of which I consider my research to be part) are 
attempts to grapple with the multiple, overlapping crises that characterize particular socio-
historical contexts. Within this perspective, Lawrence Grossberg has suggested that “the 
contemporary conjuncture is, above all, characterized by struggles over the very possibilities 
of modernity” (“Modernity and Commensuration”, 297). While I agree that many of the 
contradictions and struggles of this conjuncture are overdetermined by crises of modernity, 
the research that forms the basis for my argument here suggests that the contemporary 
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conjuncture is also characterized by a crisis of sovereignty that both precedes and exceeds the 
question of modernity. 
 The concept of sovereignty has evolved over time (Bartelson), with two 
understandings of the term currently dominant in scholarly literature. Work on international 
relations relies extensively on what is referred to as the Westphalian model of sovereignty, 
which (taking as its starting point the Peace of Westphalia in 1648) defines sovereignty in 
terms of the right of a given nation-state to govern its internationally-recognized territory and 
population without interference from other nation-states (Glanville). Critical theoretical 
work, on the other hand, often invokes the work of Giorgio Agamben, who (working from 
the early legalistic work of Carl Schmitt) defines sovereignty as the authority to create the 
ban—the exception to law—and the authority to abandon sovereign responsibility to a 
population in order to preserve the security of the political community. In other words, the 
sovereign is the one who can establish and transgress the “boundaries of law” (Joshua Barkan 
7).  
In the following pages, I follow an understanding of sovereignty that runs counter to 
both of these. Working from the later metaphysical considerations of Schmitt and the earlier 
work of Thomas Hobbes, I understand sovereignty in older, religious terms of “the highest, 
legally independent, underived power” (Schmitt, Political Theology 17). Sovereignty is 
understood in this sense as the network—the very totality—of power within which dominant 
institutions (e.g. nation-states, corporations, inter- and supra-national organizations) vie for 
and negotiate over ultimate authority in a variety of overlapping spatio-temporal contexts 
within a global system of economic production, distribution and consumption, political and 
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social institutions, and cultural practices, as well as legal frameworks. Sovereignty is the 
authority over the conditions of possibility within the world. 
 This understanding of sovereignty is treated in more detail in Chapter 3. What is 
important to consider at this moment are the crises that lead me to such an understanding. As 
demonstrated in the following pages, when considering the cultural, economic and political 
crises of the current era, my attention is consistently drawn back to two of the dominant 
institutions of modernity—the nation-state and the business corporation—and what the 
relationship between these two institutions can tell us about where we are and how we got 
here. Indeed, the evolution of this relationship over the course of modern history speaks not 
only to this crisis of sovereignty writ large, but also to the multiplication of this crisis into the 
various overlapping crises that characterize the contemporary conjuncture. In order to 
contextualize this, let us consider a particular crisis that is evidenced by the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election. Although this election does not necessarily constitute a crisis in and of 
itself, it does represent a turning point in a particular crisis of what is often referred to as the 
era of neoliberalism. Moreover, it gestures toward the conceptual and theoretical tools 
required to better understand the transformation of power relations in the present moment.  
 The United States of America has found itself woefully ill-equipped to grapple with 
the ramifications of the 2016 presidential election cycle. For those pleased with the outcome, 
the election initially seemed to have resolved a crisis of American democracy by bringing 
into the Oval Office a president willing to dismantle the status quo, bring populist 
representation back to the process of federal governance, and secure American interests 
against those of its global competitors. Why have Trump’s most ardent supporters not 
become disillusioned given the administration’s failure to achieve its campaign promises 
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(e.g. repealing the Affordable Care Act and building a wall at the U.S./Mexico border), its 
consistent inconsistency on issues of national security and economic policy (e.g. recent 
waffling on disarmament talks with North Korea and economic sanctions against Chinese 
businesses), and its outright reversal on issues important to its electoral base (e.g. 
reconsidering withdrawal from the Trans Pacific Partnership, as well as increased deficit 
spending and foreign military entanglements)? For many others, however, the election raised 
many questions about our national culture that we seem unprepared to answer, and 
challenged many deeply-held assumptions about the strength of American democracy. How 
are we supposed to interpret this election cycle, which subjected us to (and made us complicit 
in) a barrage of vitriol from Democratic and Republican candidates alike? What are we to 
make of that constant onslaught of accusations ranging from the demonstrable (i.e. that 
particular candidates were temperamentally unfit, misogynist, or criminally negligent) to the 
blatantly-false-yet-somehow-still-believable-to-some-segments-of-the-population (e.g. that 
particular candidates were running a child sex ring out of the basement of a pizza parlor or 
had family members responsible for the Zodiac murders and the Kennedy assassination)? 
What integrity is left to the American electoral process in the wake of confirmation from 
U.S. intelligence agencies of Russian interference in the general election through acts of 
cyberespionage intended to discredit one of the candidates, and the purchasing of ad space on 
social network platforms designed to exacerbate partisan factionalism among the American 
electorate (Isaac and Shane; United States, Office of the Director of National Intelligence)?1 
Did the 2016 election cycle—for many, an ignominious reality-TV-sideshow—finally reveal 
                                                 
1 The irony of American outrage over Russian interference in the election given the history of U.S. intelligence 
agencies interfering in the domestic workings of other nation-sates is duly noted. That history, however, is 
beyond the scope of the argument at hand. 
6 
 
(in profound yet profoundly banal and occasionally petty ways) the vicious, atavistic 
weirdness that lies in the dark heart of American political culture? 
Well, yes and no. On the one hand, there is cause for legitimate concern. We are in 
the midst of a crisis. Demagoguery, authoritarian populism, racism, xenophobia, misogyny, 
misinformation, and outright lies seem to have won the day. However, nothing can be gained 
from lapsing into apocalyptic melodrama (however understandable such a reaction might be). 
Take a step back; take a deep breath; assess the lay of the land. Because the only surprising 
thing about this election is the fact that so many Americans were surprised. The bare tragi-
comic fact of the matter is that we should have seen this coming. As Nicos Poulantzas once 
noted, “Marx, following Hegel, said that history can sometimes repeat itself: but what the 
first time was tragedy, is the second time farce. The formulation is striking, but it is true in 
one sense only: There are such things as black comedies” (Poulantzas 358). While Poulantzas 
was referring to the rise of classical Fascism, his observation is equally useful for beginning a 
conversation about the contemporary crisis of American political life.2 The crisis with which 
we are now confronted is, in fact, not entirely new (even if quite novel). It is the 
reappearance of historical forces that have (in various articulations) plagued the U.S. nation-
state from the colonial era through the Cold War up to the present moment.3 
                                                 
2 Capitalizing the term “fascism” when referring to classical Fascism (i.e. Mussolini’s regime and Nazism) yet 
leaving it lower-case when referring to fascism as a general phenomenon is consistent with the work on fascism 
in political theory. 
 
3 Articulation refers to the contingent convergence of particular forces (i.e. of culture, economics, politics and 
social problems) in a socio-historical context to produce contradictions of power that are constitutive of a crisis. 
Additionally, articulation refers to the analytic practice of assembling a context that highlights the contingent 
convergence of particular forces that characterizes a specific conjuncture. As such, “articulation can be 
understood as a way of characterizing a social formation without falling into the twin traps of reductionism and 
essentialism” (Slack 113). 
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 In fact, two of the major themes of the 2016 election constitute the stark reappearance 
(albeit in rearticulated forms) of problems from centuries past—one, a problem that is 
commonly mistaken as being relatively recent in its development; the other, a problem that is 
commonly mistaken as having been overcome by a previous generation. The former—
corporate sovereignty—refers to the influence of corporate capitalism within and against the 
workings of democratic politics and governance, with such influence enabled by the 
evolution of the relationship between the nation-state and the legal form of the business 
corporation over the course of modern history; the latter is the problem with which 
Poulantzas was concerned: fascism.  
The issues of corporate sovereignty and fascism arose in public discourse during the 
election cycle, but without much significance or seriousness attached to them. Accusations 
regarding Hillary Clinton’s relationship to Wall Street and the corporate elite were bandied 
about only slightly more frequently than claims that Donald Trump is, in essence, a fascist. It 
would not be difficult to demonstrate the relevance of corporate sovereignty to the 2016 
election by pointing to Clinton’s political record of advancing a neoliberal agenda favorable 
to the corporate and financial elite, or by drawing attention to Trump’s history of suspect 
business dealings through his corporate network. Nor would it be difficult to demonstrate the 
relevance of fascism to the election by simply comparing the traits Trump exhibits, the 
values he embodies, the policies he advocates and the things he says with the commonly-
accepted characteristics of classical Fascism—and then be done with the matter. This was, in 
fact, done during the election by politicians, journalists and comedians alike (“Donald 
Trump’s Fascist Week”; Kassam). 
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But to focus on the actions of individuals is to miss the systemic character of the 
problem. The issue here is not the behavior of particular people. Clinton’s political record 
and Trump’s personal business dealings are not in-and-of-themselves significant. They gain 
significance only when considered within the socio-historical context of cultural, economic 
and political developments. Corporate sovereignty is about the mechanisms and operations of 
a system of power that creates the conditions of possibility for people and institutions to 
behave in specific ways. And characterizing the current president as a fascist misses the point 
on two counts: 1) it repeats a mistake that is all-too-common in American political life: the 
branding of one’s political adversaries as “fascist”; and 2) it mistakes the effects for the 
causes. The upsurge of racist, anti-democratic authoritarian populism that is only partially 
responsible for the election of Donald Trump is better understood as the effect of the 
mechanisms and operations of corporate sovereignty that have characterized power in the 
U.S. nation-state since long before 2016 and will (in all likelihood) far outlast this particular 
presidency.   
I believe that fascism is better analyzed through corporate sovereignty, the evolving 
relationship between the nation-state and the legal form of the business corporation—a 
relationship that has shaped political, economic and cultural life in the United States for its 
entire history. This development—specified and concretized in the following pages—has 
largely produced the crisis we are now experiencing. The crisis of American democracy in 
the present moment is not about any one election cycle; it is about the mechanisms by which 
a corporate oligarchy comprised of political and economic elites construct and assert power 
through a system of crony capitalism, partisan politics and technocracy. Martin Gilens and 
Benjamin Page demonstrated the existence of such a system through an analysis of public 
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policy debates and decisions, concluding that while “economic elites and organized interest 
groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on United States 
government policy” (Gilens and Page 565), “the preferences of the average American appear 
to have only a miniscule, near-zero, statistically non-significant impact on public policy” 
(Gilens and Page 575). Of course, it is not sufficient to simply cite one study as evidence for 
one’s argument. That is what the following pages are for: to trace out—for all we have are 
traces—the particular mechanisms and operations of this system of power. 
We need to broaden our focus (both historically and contemporaneously) in order to 
understand how this system came to be and how it currently functions. What are the 
mechanisms and operations by which the power embodied in such a system currently 
organizes and overdetermines society? In order to assess the historically- and culturally-
specific mechanisms and operations of power within the context of the U.S. nation-state, I 
propose connecting corporate sovereignty and fascism in an analysis that addresses the 
epochal origins, organic overdeterminations and conjunctural articulations of power in 21st-
century America.4 The current crisis of representative democracy in the United States is best 
understood as the resolution of a crisis of corporate sovereignty into a conjunctural form of 
fascism, with such a transformation gesturing towards a potential transformation in the much 
longer transformation of sovereignty itself. 
                                                 
4 The term “organic” is often used to refer to the “epoch” (i.e. long-term historical periods such as Modernity). 
I, however, understand the organic as a level of abstraction between the conjuncture and the epoch. A 
comprehensive explanation of my use of the terms “organic” and “conjunctural” is offered in Chapter 1. In the 
most basic (though admittedly not simple) terms, “organic” refers to the historical development of multiple 
crises that call particular conjunctures “into existence in the first instance” (Grossberg, “Wrestling with the 
Angels” 4). “Conjuncture” refers to “the terrain on which a struggle ‘over a new reality’ is carried out” on a 
level of abstraction “between the particular situation and the epoch” (ibid), with such a struggle (in my use of 
the term) being overdetermined by a crisis. 
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This statement requires an explanation of a particular vocabulary and set of research 
practices that have come to be identified with the intellectual project of cultural studies, as 
enacted at the now-defunct Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of 
Birmingham in England. Chapter 1 explains the practice of my own argument—conjunctural 
analysis—as a way of thinking through the mechanisms and operations of power as they 
become articulated through the crises and contradictions that characterize a particular 
conjuncture. This chapter enumerates the concepts (e.g. context, articulation, conjuncture, 
organic) taken up by cultural studies, and then explains the practice of conjunctural analysis 
as informed by the practical application of these concepts.  
Following Chapter 1, my argument is divided into two parts. Part I (comprised of 
Chapters 2 and 3) seeks to transform our understanding of the contemporary conjuncture 
from being characterized as neoliberal to functioning as an era of corporism in order to 
demonstrate how corporate sovereignty operates as an organic form through which an 
epochal crisis of sovereignty overdetermines this conjuncture. Chapter 2 discusses how the 
contemporary conjuncture is generally characterized in critical scholarship as the era of 
neoliberalism. I demonstrate that neoliberalism is of limited analytical value in that it does 
not include a sufficient account of the role of the corporation in the development of the crisis 
that now confronts us. The chapter then considers corporism as being better suited to the task 
at hand, providing a reading of the “neoliberal era” that focuses on the relationship between 
the nation-state and the legal form of the business corporation. Chapter 2 concludes with an 
historical overview of the evolution of the relationship between the nation-state and the 
corporation in the United States in order to demonstrate how we arrived at the era of 
corporism. This history traces the organic construction and assertion of corporate sovereignty 
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in the United States, through which the crisis of sovereignty overdetermines the current 
conjuncture.5  
Chapter 3 develops this further by explaining how corporate sovereignty and 
sovereignty have been conceptually developed in scholarship, allowing me to situate my 
argument within existing debates about both the nature of sovereignty and the role of the 
corporation in contemporary society, while also providing an entry point for considering 
corporate sovereignty as a contextually-articulated field of forces. If we cannot properly 
analyze these mechanisms and operations, we have little ground for offering practical 
solutions to the contradictions of democratic governance with which we are now faced, and 
to the emergent mode of power organizing them. 
I then address three “signposts” that indicate the assertion of corporate sovereignty in 
the era of corporism and demonstrate how the crisis of sovereignty manifests conjuncturally 
through the articulation of particular relations of force. They ultimately lend support to my 
argument that the mechanisms and operations of corporate sovereignty in the current context 
are being potentially resolved into a conjuncturally-specific mode of fascism. Each of these 
signposts represents a particular institution or phenomenon (i.e. the American Legislative 
Exchange Council, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the Singularity) 
that exemplifies a particular relation of force that, taken together, constitute corporate 
sovereignty as an organic form and fascism as a conjuncture. By relation of force, I mean a 
vector in a network of power that encompasses a particular set of culturally-specific yet 
analytically-abstracted practices and phenomena (e.g. political-economy, technology, desire). 
                                                 
5 This is not to suggest that sovereignty is the only crisis that overdetermines the current conjuncture, just the 
crisis most pertinent to my argument. If one were (for example) concerned with the current state of race 
relations in the United States, slavery would constitute a potential crisis. 
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The first signpost is the role of the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) 
in American governance. Formed in 1973, ALEC is legally a 501(c)3 non-profit charitable 
organization. While ALEC claims that it is a non-partisan, democratically representative 
organization, the right-wing make-up of its legislative membership and the veto powers held 
by its corporate membership tell another story. Practically speaking, ALEC is a consortium 
of corporate executives and mostly right-wing state legislators who meet privately to draft 
“model legislation” that is then introduced into state legislatures. Exploiting both the 
federalist system of governance expressed in the 10th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
and the process for amending the Constitution as established in Article 5, ALEC has been 
able to advance a legislative agenda on the state level—including minimum wage caps, 
restrictions on local and county governments, right-to-work laws, voter ID requirements, 
limitations on women’s reproductive rights, shifting public money to private schools, and 
Stand Your Ground laws—that the political right has been unable to enact on a federal level. 
I will argue that such actions constitute a political-economic force of corporate sovereignty, 
with ALEC playing a dominant role in redesigning the relationship between the corporation 
and the nation-state whereby corporate executives exert a dominant influence over public 
policy and the configuration of the government. 
The second signpost is the role of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) in the corporate and academic development of technology. Established in 1957 as 
the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), DARPA serves as the research-and-
development (R&D) and venture capital arm of the Department of Defense (DoD). For the 
past sixty years, DARPA has financed a significant portion of the major scientific and 
technological innovations in the United States, thereby playing a dominant role in 
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determining which types of research and development will be pursued in both academic and 
corporate labs. The myth of technological progress in America relies heavily on promoting 
the image of the entrepreneur and private economic investment, with the nation-state as an 
impediment to capitalist development and technological innovation. Most of this 
technological innovation, however, is enabled and at least partially funded by DARPA for 
the benefit of both corporate capital and the military. Moreover, major Silicon Valley 
corporations such as Facebook and Google have recently redesigned their own facilities in 
the image of DARPA: retooling and reorganizing their R&D labs to function more like 
DARPA by focusing on a wide array of high-risk/high-return projects with both military and 
consumer applications, using short-term contracts for employees working on these projects to 
incentivize quick turn-around, and developing research collaborations with universities. This 
is being achieved, for example, through the work of Regina Dugan—former chief of 
DARPA—who served as head of Google’s Advanced Technology and Projects Group before 
going to Facebook in April 2016 to run the company’s R&D lab (Guynn, “Facebook’s ‘Area 
404’”; Guynn, “Facebook’s Secret Building”; Miller; Patterson). I will argue that the 
organization of technological development by DARPA constitutes a technological/ 
technocratic force of corporate sovereignty, with the agency and its corporate partners 
responsible for redesigning the relationship between the military and the corporation 
whereby military forces become corporatized and technology corporations become 
increasingly militarized.  
The third signpost is what is referred to in futurist discourse as the Singularity—the 
belief that humanity is rapidly approaching an event horizon in which machine intelligence 
(i.e. artificial general intelligence) will surpass human intelligence, thereby making humanity 
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biologically obsolete. The term was popularized in a technological context by science-fiction 
author Vernor Vinge, who predicted that “the Singularity will occur when technological 
progress powered by self-improving artificial intelligence (A.I.) becomes so rapid that it 
speeds beyond our ability to foresee or control its outcomes” (Bailey 46). Today, many 
futurists and corporate executives actually advocate for the onset of the Singularity, while 
also working on technologies to mitigate the obsolescence of humanity that will supposedly 
follow in its wake. Relatedly, in addition to developing A.I., major technology corporations 
are also working to solve the problem of human mortality—through nanotechnology and the 
uploading of human consciousness into computer networks—so as to make deities of these 
men and the corporations they lead. In this sense, the Singularity (as a metaphysical, 
corporate and social principle) constitutes a desiring force of corporate sovereignty, with 
those working to actualize the Singularity responsible for redirecting our socio-psychological 
desire for immortality into a corporate network of artificial intelligence.  
 It is important to bear in mind that the division of these forces (i.e. of political 
economy, technology and desire) is purely analytic. The work of ALEC is as much a 
question of desire as it is of political economy. The work of DARPA is as much a question of 
political economy as it is of technology. The push for the Singularity is as much a question of 
technology as it is of desire. The analytical distinction between these forces is secondary to 
their utility in allowing us to grapple with the contradictions and crises of power with which 
we are confronted in the current context. What constitutes them as functioning as a particular 
crisis of sovereignty is their articulation to each other as a set of contradictions that 
characterize a mode of power in the evolution of the relationship between the legal form of 
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the business corporation and the nation-state. The purpose of discussing these signposts is to 
indicate the potential for the current conjuncture to be resolved by a (re)turn to fascism. 
Part II (comprised of Chapters 4 and 5) considers fascism as a conjunctural 
articulation of the force relations that characterize corporate sovereignty as an organic form. 
Chapter 4 explains the dominant ways in which fascism has been understood (both 
theoretically and in popular usage) and considers how these understandings have prevented 
us from recognizing the re-appearance of fascism in the context of 21st-century America. 
This explanation demonstrates the utility of marginalized theories of fascism for an analysis 
(presented in Chapter 5) of the connection between fascism and corporate sovereignty in the 
current conjuncture, and brings these theories to bear on three signposts (i.e. ALEC, DARPA 
and the Singularity) in order to better understand the relationship between the U.S. nation-
state and the legal form of the corporation than has been previously offered in scholarship, 
while focusing on the political-economic, technological/technocratic and socio-psychological 
dimensions of this relationship. These dimensions are important for the argument at hand 
because they demonstrate the analytical utility of considering fascism conjuncturally—as a 
set of relations between forces that comprise a mode of power (Deleuze)—rather than as an 
ideology or political movement. In this sense, I will demonstrate that ALEC and similar 
organizations represent an inverted re-articulation of fascist political economy. By inverted 
re-articulation, I mean that the forces of political economy that characterized classical 
Fascism now operate in an inverted manner. That is, in the context of classical Fascism, the 
forces of political economy operated through the organization of national corporations under 
the control of the Italian nation-state. All political-economic functions (e.g. industrial 
production, labor, distribution) were centralized in the nation-state through the establishment 
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of corporations that operated in a semi-autonomous manner. In the context of the 
contemporary U.S. nation-state, political-economic functions are largely organized within 
private corporations, which then utilize the federalist system of governance to organize the 
nation-state through state legislatures, as opposed to the U.S. Congress. The relationship 
between the nation-state and the business corporation has been inverted, but (as will be 
demonstrated) the fascist character of this relationship remains.  
The role of DARPA in the corporate development of technology represents a 
distributed re-articulation of fascist relations of technology/technocracy. By distributed re-
articulation, I mean that the forces of technology and technocracy that characterized classical 
Fascism have been distributed outward from the nation-state through the network of 
multinational corporations whose technological innovations organize social life in the United 
States. Under classical Fascism (particularly the Nazi regime in Germany) the chaos and in-
fighting that characterized both the bureaucracy and party apparatus was largely mitigated by 
technocrats working across competing departments to unify technological production for the 
purposes of war production. In the contemporary context, technological and technocratic 
operations originate in a single agency of the DoD but are then distributed through private 
corporations for the purposes of both war production and the production of consumer 
technologies that increasingly determine the organization of social relationships. While the 
operations of technocracy and technological production have been distributed, the fascist 
character of these operations remains.  
Finally, the Singularity represents a universalized re-articulation of fascist desire. By 
universalized re-articulation, I mean that the forces of socio-psychological desire that 
characterized classical Fascism have become universalized from the rebirth of a racialized 
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national community through the nation-state to the rebirth of humankind (those who can 
afford it, at least) through artificial general intelligence as structured through the business 
corporation. Both of these articulations center on the problem of human mortality, with the 
risk of ontologizing particular identities and communities. Whereas classical Fascism sought 
immortality for the supposed national community while recognizing the inherent mortality of 
individuals, what we are dealing with now is the desire to make individuals immortal through 
networked computing systems and the transnational corporate form, with no concern for the 
nation. While the manifestations of socio-psychological desire have become universalized, 
the fascist character of these manifestations remains. 
This leads to an examination of the potential emergence of a newly dominant 
institution of power that represents the total convergence of the nation-state and the 
corporation. This consideration of the private military and security industry (PMSI)—as 
suggested by my analysis addresses of fascism (as the inverted, distributed and universalized 
conjunctural re-articulation of particular forces of political economy, technology/technocracy 
and desire) and corporate sovereignty (as an organic form)—suggests how these forces might 
evolve into a more unified and totalized form of corporate sovereignty and fascism made 
one. Ultimately, my discussion of fascism calls into question our current understandings of 
corporate sovereignty, and demonstrates the need to reframe the relationship between the 
nation-state and the legal form of the business corporation, and the mechanisms and 
operations of power that characterize such a relationship. These problems converge in the 
understanding that we are dealing with a reorganization of sovereignty from that of the 
modern nation-state to that of transnational corporations—those nations with/in/out a state. 
This ultimately leads to a consideration of sovereignty itself—which I argue is always 
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already both corporate and a substitute for divine authority—as it pertains to the ways we 
conceive of (and concede to) forms of ultimate authority, and the ways in which we might 
want to resist such authority so as to construct new articulations, new modes of being-in-
relation with the world and each other.  
But to get to there from here, it is first necessary to map out the path this argument 
takes—to explain the analytical framework on which my argument is constructed. This 
requires a consideration of the cultural studies project of conjunctural analysis. 
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CHAPTER 1: A DEMONSTRATION OF CALCULATIONS, OR, CULTURAL 
STUDIES AS CONJUNCTURAL ANALYSIS 
 
Our method is not a principle based on fixed procedures; it is a method which is  
based on certain basic theoretical principles but really determined by the individual  
case and the individual situation. [The conditions that make an analysis effective] are  
different from case to case, and although they lead to certain valid technical  
generalizations, these mean little compared with the basic principle that the technique  
in every individual case has to be derived from the individual case and each  
individual situation, while at the same time one does not lose sight of the total  
analytical process. […] [W]hat that means, ‘to ‘analyze,’ remains obscure. (Reich,  
Character Analysis 6-7) 
 
 
Introduction 
 Our inability to come to terms with the present conjuncture stems partly from 
academic predilections for disciplinary boundaries, theoretical and methodological 
preferences, and object-oriented analyses. This chapter presents an alternative to such 
predilections as found in the anti-discipline of cultural studies, which is concerned above all 
else with questions of power. The mechanisms and operations of power differ from context 
to context, thus requiring a question-oriented (as opposed to object-oriented) mode of 
analysis. Though Wilhelm Reich was speaking specifically about the practice of 
psychoanalysis, the above quote is strikingly relevant to the question of method in cultural 
studies for a number of reasons. Analytically speaking, cultural studies begins with a 
commitment to “radical contextuality” (Grossberg, “Wrestling with the Angels” 2)—an 
understanding of reality as being contingently relational, complex, and always open to 
alteration. Each question or problem with which we are concerned is necessarily 
overdetermined and characterized by an open complexity wherein particular forces, objects, 
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people, etc., exist in contingent—non-essential, non-universal, yet also not relative—
relations. As such, our mode of analysis must be determined by a commitment to 
understanding specific relations within specific contexts, instead of being determined by a 
particular theoretical or methodological commitment. In this way, “cultural studies is always 
making itself up, reconfiguring itself, in response to the changing configurations of power 
and the changing possibilities of struggle and resistance, possibility and transformation” 
(Grossberg, “Wrestling with the Angels” 1). Cultural studies—as the practice of conjunctural 
analysis—sets as its problematic a contextual system of relations of force characterized by 
complexity, contingency and overdetermination.6 
Cultural studies reconfigures itself analytically from context to context through the 
practice of conjunctural analysis—“analysis which is historically and contextually specific. 
An exploration of the assemblage, coming together or articulation of particular forces, 
determinations or logics at specific times and spaces” (Barker 382). Different contexts can be 
overdetermined by the same vectors of force, but the ways in which these forces become 
articulated to each other (and the mechanisms and operations by which these forces manifest) 
depend on the historical and social conditions of the context itself. This chapter is dedicated 
to explaining this practice, as well as the applicability of conjunctural analysis to better 
understanding the crises of political life in the United States, by explaining the concept of 
conjuncture as developed in Marxist theory and cultural studies scholarship, the practice of 
conjunctural analysis within cultural studies, and finally the relationship between the 
conjunctural and the organic.  
                                                 
6 Problematic refers to “the objective internal reference system” of a concept or theory that serves as a 
framework for the “questions commanding the answers given by” that concept or theory (Louis Althusser qtd. 
in Joshua Barkan 14). In framing the questions, such a reference system consequently limits the possible 
answers that can be generated by a given concept or theory, thus overdetermining their potential utility. 
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Conjuncture as Concept  
 The concept of conjuncture originated as a key political concept in Marxist theory. 
“As Marx and Engels [thought through] complex and historically transforming social 
relations in the perspective of a revolutionary praxis, they consistently [aimed] to produce a 
concrete, non-reductionist analysis of specific conjunctures and constellations […] and their 
structural conditions” (Koivisto and Lahtinen 268). This concept was developed by later 
Marxist theorists as a means of specifying “the changing forms and contingent interactions of 
the historical process, while remaining nonetheless anchored in a longer-term hypothesis 
about the general nature of process in the modern epoch” (Justin Rosenberg qtd. in Callinicos 
355). The purpose of developing the concept was in part an attempt to grapple with the 
“manifest misalignment” between “classical deterministic and economistic Marxist models 
of change” and the political realities of the 20th century (Rustin 18). The development of the 
concept of conjuncture is due largely to V. I. Lenin, Antonio Gramsci, Louis Althusser and 
Nicos Poulantzas—all of whom were concerned with the conjuncture as both an object for 
concrete, historical-materialist analysis, and a point of political intervention.7 I will consider 
the general contributions of each of these authors in order to demonstrate the primary 
components, benefits and shortcomings of this strand of Marxist thought, with an eye to how 
they have shaped cultural studies and its practice of conjunctural analysis.  
For Lenin, the analytical and political value of conjuncture is located in its ability to 
assess “different converging or opposing tendencies” in specific historical circumstances and 
                                                 
7 There are (as noted in Koivisto and Lahtinen) other understandings of the concept in Marxist theory, 
primarily: 1) as being comprised of ephemeral surface-level phenomena with the structure of capitalist 
production being essential; and 2) in a narrow, economistic sense as being purely descriptive of a particular 
historical moment. Additionally, conjuncture is understood in business and economics as “the mechanical 
interaction of law-like cycles,” and is used to analyze investments, policies, historical cycles and crisis 
management (Jessop 12). These perspectives have no bearing, however, on the use of conjuncture in cultural 
studies. 
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to weigh “their relative importance” (Koivisto and Lahtinen 268), especially for the 
development of revolutionary political strategies capable of exploiting the fractures produced 
by “inter-imperialist rivalry” (Lenin qtd. in Ahmad 49). For the purposes of my particular 
argument, imperialism refers not just to the actions of nation-states (as Lenin would have 
argued), but to the actions of and rivalry between nation-states and other forms of 
sovereignty (including the legal form of the business corporation).  
 This emphasis on understanding particular social circumstances in order to develop 
practical political strategy carries over into the work of Gramsci, for whom conjunctures are 
particularly useful in examining organic movements in the historical development of 
capitalism. Gramsci offers an understanding of conjuncture as being both complex and 
particular to a specific formation which (although specifically economic in Gramsci’s 
understanding) is also dependent “on cultural dimensions of the social order [for] 
maintaining” or disrupting “regimes of class domination and subordination” (Rustin 19). The 
utility of the concept is most visible when there appears to be a hegemonic struggle, with 
hegemony understood as “a field that is constantly traversed by shifting strategies seeking to 
produce consent, contain dissent and, last but not least, use force to produce consent” 
(Clarke, “Of Crises and Conjunctures” 350).  
This perspective is useful in as much as it focuses our attention on two distinct yet 
interrelated problems: the organic development of capitalism; and the mechanisms and 
operations by which forms of power organize social relations through consent and (when 
necessary) force. In regards to the second point, there is (for Gramsci) an inextricable 
connection between consent and coercion as they relate to the crises and contradictions that 
overdetermine a conjuncture. This leads to an understanding of conjuncture in terms of “a 
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war of positions (of temporary alliances at multiple sites of struggle)” in the continual 
reorganization of power relations (Grossberg, “Does Cultural Studies Have Futures?” 13). 
From this perspective, a conjuncture is the level of abstraction at which “‘antagonistic forces 
organize’ and struggle over a ‘new reality’” (Koivisto and Lahtinen 269). In this sense, the 
conjuncture serves as a starting point for analyzing a specific context of power relations, 
provides the means for understanding the interrelation between levels of analytical 
abstraction, and keeps us focused on the strategies that are most amenable to political 
intervention. 
 Althusser extends Gramsci’s understanding of a conjuncture to the overdetermination 
of social relations by multiple forces that are not necessarily or inherently economic. 
Althusser argued that conjuncture is the central political concept in Marxist theory because it 
serves as an “explanatory model [that presupposes] an ever-shifting interrelationship between 
contending and interdependent social forces” (Rustin 19). What this means is that 
conjuncture is a valuable analytical tool because it allows us to think through the complexity 
of multiple forces and relations of power that, although interrelated, are not necessarily 
connected in an essential manner; they are contingent, pliable, and capable of being 
manipulated. This is because social forces are at once over- and under-determined in 
complex, contingent and multi-layered convergences that cannot be explained by “models of 
linear causal” economic determinism (ibid). For Althusser, a conjuncture is overdetermined 
by a general contradiction that manifests in different ways through the complex interrelations 
of various social forces; this contradiction operates in an historically-situated “structure in 
dominance,” while also being a “characteristic feature of [the] history” of class struggle 
(Koivisto and Lahtinen 271). The connection between a contextually-situated contradiction 
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and the longer history of class struggle marks the relation between the conjunctural and the 
organic, in so much as organic developments brings a particular conjuncture into being as the 
attempt to resolve a crisis through contextually-specific articulations of various force 
relations.  
This connection is central to the work of Poulantzas, who understood the conjuncture 
as the concrete situation of class struggle (in a particular historical and social context) in 
relation to a particular nation-state. Put simply, different regimes and crises can display 
similar features in different historical periods. “A concrete analysis of present conjunctures” 
is necessary in order to determine the ways in which these features operate within a particular 
crisis or regime, as well as which political strategies might work to intervene in that crisis or 
reformulate that regime (Poulantzas 358).  
What has come out of the long tradition of Marxist thinking is an understanding of 
conjuncture as indicating 
‘the exact balance of forces, [the] state of overdetermination of the contradictions at  
any given moment to which political tactics must be applied.’ Unlike conjuncture in  
the sense of fluctuation [or in the sense of ephemeral surface-level phenomena],  
eminently compatible with various teleological philosophies of history, the concept of  
conjuncture in its developed form is decisively anti-teleological, as well as firmly  
opposed to economic or class-reductionism. Social changes, also of a structural type,  
take place in and through conjunctures with many determinations. As an analytical  
tool, the concept of conjuncture can expand the capacity to act politically by helping  
to examine the conditions of a political intervention in their complexity, that is, to  
trace the displacements and condensations to different sorts of contradictions, and  
thus open up possibilities for action. (Koivisto and Lahtinen 267) 
 
 The uptake of conjuncture in cultural studies begins with Stuart Hall, whose work is 
based on (but moves decidedly beyond) the contributions of Gramsci, Althusser and 
Poulantzas. Hall’s understanding begins with the imperative to look reality unflinchingly in 
the face, regardless of our theoretical presuppositions or political inclinations—to figure out 
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where we are, how we got here, and how to re-articulate present conditions to make better 
futures. Hall considered a conjuncture to be at once political, cultural, ideological and 
economic, rather than as determinately or predominantly economic. This move beyond the 
economic preoccupation of Marxist theory attempts to “grasp the ‘condensation’ of the 
contradictions that ‘are moving according to very different tempos’ in the ‘particular 
historical moment’ that ‘defines a conjuncture’” (Koivisto and Lahtinen 274). For cultural 
studies, a conjuncture is characterized by “the accumulation and condensation”—the fusing 
“into a ruptural unity”—of various and different problems and contradictions within an 
existing social order, not just political ones (Hay, Hall and Grossberg 16). Moreover, a 
conjuncture is “a point where different temporalities—and more specifically, the tensions, 
antagonisms and contradictions which they carry—begin to come together” (Clarke, “Of 
Crises and Conjunctures” 342). As Hall reminds us, it is also where these temporalities 
fracture—with all their tensions, antagonisms and contradictions. 
 The conjuncture, then, must be understood in relation to the organic—a level of 
abstraction between the conjuncture and the epoch wherein multiple crises that call particular 
conjunctures “into existence in the first instance” develop historically (Grossberg, “Wrestling 
with the Angels” 4).  For the purposes of my argument, what connects a conjuncture to the 
level of the organic is the existence of a crisis by which organic forces characterize the 
contradictions of a particular conjuncture. The organic “makes the concept of conjuncture 
into a more specific, contextually-grounded concept” because thinking in terms of organic 
forms and forces requires us to grapple with what is actually occurring in a particular context 
if we are to have hope of remaking it (ibid).  
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The analytical move to the conjuncture is intended to help us confront the multiplicity 
of determinations and contradictions at work in a specific historical formation. Confronting 
these determinations and contradictions helps us understand both the articulation of organic 
forces within which a conjuncture operates and by which a crisis calls a conjuncture into 
existence. This, in turn, helps us understand how the conjuncture operates within organic 
formations and epochal transformations. In analytical terms, “thinking conjuncturally 
involves ‘clustering’ or assembling elements into a formation. However, there is no simple 
unity, no single ‘movement’ here, evolving teleologically” (Stuart Hall qtd. in Koivisto and 
Lahtinen 275).  
Rather than seeking causal or deterministic explanations of historical (i.e. organic) 
transformation in a generalized canon of theories and concepts, cultural studies focuses on 
the mechanisms and operations of power within specific contexts and employs a variety of 
concepts and theories based on their analytical value for that context. “Concepts—whether 
old or new—too often allow us to think we understand the world before we do. We must use 
concepts but only and always in conversation with the demands of the material realities of 
the actual” (Grossberg, “Cultural Studies and Deleuze-Guattari, Part 1” 19).  
A conjuncture is constituted by, at, and as the articulation of multiple, overlapping,  
competing, reinforcing, etc., lines of force and transformation, destabilization and  
(re-) stabilization, with differing temporalities and spatialities, producing a potentially  
but never actually chaotic assemblage of articulations of contradictions and  
contestations. Thus, it is always a kind of totality, always temporary, complex, and  
fragile, that one takes hold of through analytical and political work. (Grossberg,  
Cultural Studies in the Future Tense 41). 
 
A conjuncture, then, is not something that exists as an object independently of its 
construction through analytical choices—choices which are at once epistemological and 
political. Epistemologically speaking, conjunctural analysis presupposes that “knowledge is 
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understood as an act within the world rather than a representation of the world” (Grossberg, 
Cultural Studies in the Future Tense 57). We assemble a conjuncture through the articulation 
of contingent, contradictory and fluid forces that converge in a particular problematic or set 
of problematics in relation to an organic crisis. This type of intellectual practice requires a 
“conjunctive logic of multiplicity” which can account for the contradictory complexity of the 
operations of power on people’s lives (Grossberg, “Learning from Stuart Hall” 6). The 
mechanisms and operations of power upon material reality are socially and historically 
provisional. “Specific historical moments are the site of entanglements between multiple 
formations and tendencies,” thus requiring of analysis a serious consideration of the ways in 
which “the residual and the emergent” forces become articulated to “the dominant struggles” 
of the context instead of focusing solely on those dominant struggles (Clarke, “Of Crises and 
Conjunctures” 340). The political character of conjunctural analysis arises from this 
understanding as a commitment to construct knowledge that tells a compelling narrative 
about the complexity of reality (while always recognizing the inevitable failure of such a 
project)—all with the expressed goal of producing change in the world. These are the 
epistemological and political foundations on which the project of conjunctural analysis as 
understood within cultural studies is built. 
The great value of a conjunctural perspective is not simply that it allows us to analyze 
complex determinate relations within specific socio-historical contexts (although it certainly 
does allow this), but that such analysis can serve as a basis for understanding the relation of 
the conjunctural to organic transformations in ways that avoid essentialism, teleological 
determinism, and economic reductionism. Within the context of my argument, this type of 
perspective allows me to analyze the question of power in the United States in the 21st 
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century as a conjuncturally rearticulated organization of forces of political economy, 
technology and desire into what I will eventually describe as an organic form of corporate 
sovereignty within the epochal transformation of sovereignty writ large. This dissertation, 
then, functions as a form of conjunctural analysis, which necessitates an explanation of the 
move from conjuncture as a concept to conjuncture as a mode of analysis. 
Conjunctural Analysis 
 As with the concept of conjuncture, there are variations between Marxist and cultural 
studies versions of conjunctural analysis. Marxist conjunctural analysis tends to be more 
temporal and causal in orientation. For both Gramsci and Althusser, it is an attempt to 
understand the causes and movements of problems within a conjuncture while remaining 
“anchored in a general theory of the abstract tendencies of the capitalist mode of production” 
(Callinicos 355) Cultural studies, on the other hand, understands that the abstract tendencies 
of capitalist production are only one factor in the development of organic forms as indicative 
of epochal transformations (i.e. long-term historical developments such as “Modernity”). 
They are also only one factor in the operations and mechanisms of power as they affect “the 
ordinary lives of located and embodied subjects” (Stacey 45).  
 This is what characterizes conjunctural analysis as the work of exploring the 
articulation of particular forces into assemblages, with an eye to identifying “how the balance 
of forces is being worked on, shaped, directed in the search for a ‘solution’ and a ‘way 
forward’” (Clarke, “Still Policing the Crisis?” 125). 8 Conjunctural analysis, then, is a 
                                                 
8 Articulation refers to “the contingent connection of different elements that, when connected in a particular 
way, form a specific unity,” with elements understood as ideas, things, words, institutions, practices, and/or 
affects (Slack and Wise 127). Assemblage refers to “the ways that these practices, representations, experiences, 
and affects articulate to take a particular dynamic form […] a particular constellation of articulations that 
selects, draws together, stakes out and envelops a territory that exhibits some tenacity and effectivity” (Slack 
and Wise 129). 
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theoretical-analytical-political practice (Gunkel), guided by a conjunctive logic wherein 
“each additional clause transforms the meanings and effects of all the previous ones” 
(Grossberg, Cultural Studies in the Future Tense 17). Taken together, these considerations 
direct us to the major components and operations of conjunctural analysis: context, 
articulation, problematic, and a concern with political utility. 
 It is this notion of context that indicates the strength of conjunctural analysis as 
practiced in cultural studies over that of Marxist traditions. To focus on a context is to be 
concerned with the “specificity of particular practices” in socio-historical locations (Slack 
117). Within the practice of conjunctural analysis, a context is constructed through the 
process of “radical contextuality” (Grossberg, “Standing on a Bridge” 318)—the analytical 
mapping of the relations of force that produce certain conditions of power within a closure of 
social reality. “The work [of radical contextuality] is done by historical specificity, by 
understanding what is specific about certain moments, and how those moments come 
together, how different tendencies fuse and form a kind of [temporarily sustained] 
configuration of contradictions” (Hall and Back 664). As an object of analysis context refers 
to the historically specific, concrete yet contingent “organization—by power—of the social 
formation as a configuration of unequal positions and relations” (Grossberg, “Does Cultural 
Studies Have Futures?” 3). 
 Analytically speaking, the context is constructed as an assemblage (i.e. a specific yet 
contingent unity of ideas, practices, etc.) through the practice of articulation. In a basic sense, 
“articulation can be understood as the contingent connection of different elements that, when 
connected in a particular way, form a specific unity” (Slack and Wise 152). But this 
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understanding carries with it a multiplicity of implications—theoretical, epistemological and 
political. Theoretically speaking, articulation can be thought of as a theory of contexts, and a 
way of making and remaking them—a way of thinking about social formations without 
lapsing into forms of reductionism or essentialism (Slack). Epistemologically, articulation 
serves two purposes. First, the practice of articulation helps to fragment perceived unities in 
order to demonstrate how social structures are comprised of “correspondences, non-
correspondences and contradictions” (Slack 113). The articulation of an assemblage “begins 
by discovering the heterogeneity, the difference, the fractures in” what is perceived to be 
whole.  (Grossberg, Cultural Studies in the Future Tense 22). In other words, articulation 
begins with the dis-articulation of relations that have been made to seem normal, essential 
and/or necessary. Second, articulation becomes a project of reassembling those relations into 
different unities that can produce (however temporary and contingent) other (and hopefully 
more equitable and productive) possibilities for social relations. This practice of re-
articulation serves as an attempt to resettle “the social, political, economic and cultural 
contradictions in any particular” context in order to analyze the conjuncture (“Editorial” 5). 
Articulation, then, is the epistemological process of dis-articulation and re-articulation. In 
this sense, articulation is a method not only of cultural studies, but also a method of 
constructing reality—“the project of looking at the continuous production of relations which 
are never guaranteed in advance” and, as such, are open to contestation and intervention 
(Grossberg, “Cultural Studies and/in New Worlds” 4). This speaks to the political 
implications of articulation, whereby articulation becomes a strategy for pushing to the 
forefront the mechanisms and operations of power in a given social formation in order to find 
tactics for intervening in and contesting those mechanisms and operations (Slack).  
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 But in and of themselves, articulations do not constitute a context as a conjuncture. It 
is only when these articulations are considered as overdetermined lines of force in an 
assemblage of power that they can be said to constitute a conjuncture. Epistemologically, the 
conjuncture trains our focus on the ways in which “an organization of power is being 
constructed through the disarticulation and rearticulation of relations” (Grossberg, Cultural 
Studies in the Future Tense 24). After all, power is constantly being (re)produced in different 
contexts under different conditions through different mechanisms and operations; it is 
“complexly and contradictorily organized, along multiple axes and dimensions that cannot be 
reduced to one another” (Grossberg, Cultural Studies in the Future Tense 29). As such, 
modes of power are themselves assemblages of mechanisms, operations and terrains of 
struggle within and through which force relations can be articulated anew into different 
contexts, which highlights the necessity of maintaining a commitment to radical contextuality 
throughout the process of analysis. 
 The analytical assembling of the problematic “is what constitutes the conjuncture” in 
that the problematic reproduces the accumulated and condensed articulations of force of a 
crisis as articulated to a particular context. Although the problematic is determined through 
the process of conjunctural analysis, “what constitutes the unity of the conjuncture then is its 
problematic(s), which [are] usually lived (but not necessarily experienced per se) as a social 
crisis of sorts” (Grossberg, Cultural Studies in the Future Tense 41). One’s understanding of 
the problematic determines the questions on can ask about “the messy and complex political 
realities of the world,” as well as the methods and types of empirical evidence that are 
required to grapple with those questions (Grossberg, Cultural Studies in the Future Tense 
52). To say that a conjuncture is constituted by a problematic is not to say that a problematic 
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is the essence of a conjuncture; any problematic is the result of a choice of how to analyze 
the articulation of contradictions and crises that become “lived as a singular political crisis or 
struggle” (ibid). The construction (at once epistemological and political) of the problematic 
determines the socio-historical context one then seeks to further analyze.  
 The insistence on radical contextuality—as a simultaneous working-through of 
context, articulation and problematic—leads to an understanding of conjunctural analysis as a 
methodological framework for mapping and constructing conjunctures through practices of 
dis- and re-articulation, the purpose of which is to “configure a larger structure of 
relationships, contradictions and contestations” (Grossberg, “Modernity and 
Commensuration” 313).9 A conjuncture is not an historical moment but a “condensation, an 
accumulation of tendencies, forces, antagonisms and contradictions” (Clarke, “Of Crises and 
Conjunctures” 341). This type of analysis immerses us in the complexity of contingently 
articulated relations in hopes of mapping out the fractures, gaps and uncertainties of existing 
power relations.  
Mapping a conjuncture makes it possible to begin to see where and how interventions  
might be desirable and successful, and how different interventions might influence  
change in one direction or another. […] In this way, cultural studies acknowledges  
that scholarship does more than merely report on or describe what is supposedly  
already out there, but always necessarily intervenes in the production of knowledge  
about the struggles that constitute the social formation, thereby contributing  
potentially to cultural change. (Slack and Wise 218) 
 
This is not to suggest, however, that the politics of cultural studies (as the practice of 
conjunctural analysis) are presupposed (Grossberg, Cultural Studies in the Future Tense). 
Instead, the political commitment of conjunctural analysis is the “attempt to understand and 
intervene into the relations of culture and power” (Grossberg, “Cultural Studies and/in New 
                                                 
9 Again, “structure” is understood here as a system of processes rather than as an object. 
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Worlds” 2), while constantly placing “our own assumptions, observations and values to the 
test of empirical complexities and political possibilities” (Grossberg, “Cultural Studies and 
Deleuze-Guattari, Part 1” 12). Conjunctural analysis is a strategic, tactical and (hopefully) 
logistical politics without guarantees—one that takes stock of the relational complexity of the 
terrain of power, the points of weakness among lines of force that characterize the terrain, the 
available resources for exploiting those weaknesses, and the moves necessary for 
(re)producing vectors of force in ways that do not reproduce the existing power relations of 
subordination and domination—always with a self-reflexive humility that recognizes our 
own positions as limited, contingent and open to revision in light of new evidence and better 
perspectives. The world is complex and messy and will never fit neatly into the conceptual, 
theoretical or methodological constructs we try to impose upon it. No single author, no single 
book, no single theory, and no single method can adequately answer the questions with 
which conjunctural analysis demands that we grapple. Our work should be done in 
conversation. And we must approach that collective work with an openness to trying out 
different approaches and (more importantly) with a willingness to be proven wrong, to fail 
and be forced to try again with a different approach. Questions of power are more important 
than our pet theories, our pet methods, or our egos.10 
                                                 
10 Thanks to my friend, colleague and collaborator Megan Wood for many productive conversations that helped 
me clarify these ideas. 
Of course, significant criticisms have been levied against cultural studies and (by proxy) conjunctural analysis 
for espousing this type of knowledge production. First, cultural studies has been accused of having no method, 
in that “conjunctural analysis is by itself too general a procedure to yield distinctive results” (Couldry 579). I 
hope that the preceding pages have demonstrated that conjunctural analysis is in fact a concrete methodological 
framework for constructing “a history [or, better yet, histories] of the present” (Hall and Back 664); this is a 
framework that remains necessarily open so as to accommodate a multiplicity of methods, depending on what is 
necessitated by the given conjuncture. As with theory, methods should be chosen according to their usefulness 
in relation to our problematics and contexts. If we refuse to fetishize theory, why would we fetishize a particular 
method or methods?  
Second, conjunctural analysis has been criticized for focusing too heavily on the nation-state as an object of 
analysis—for defining a conjuncture first and foremost by the geographical boundaries of a nation-state. While 
this might be true of conjunctural analysis within an explicitly Marxist tradition, work within cultural studies 
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A Note on the Role of Theory and Method in Cultural Studies 
 Although the roles of theory and method within cultural studies have been addressed, 
I find it necessary to conclude this chapter with the following observations. Too often, the 
move between theory, method and empirics in analysis is enabled by a conceptual and/or 
disciplinary leap of faith that allows us to avoid a certain level of intermediary work—the 
demonstration of the calculations involved in such a move, as well as their epistemological 
and political implications. This tends (however unintentionally) to reinforce a fetishization of 
theory in critical intellectual work, and of method in empirical work. Instead, conjunctural 
analysis is based on the presupposition that theory is both a “toolbox” (Hall, “Stuart Hall—
Interview 2” 768) and a “necessary delay or detour” rather than an object or goal in and of 
itself (Hall, “Cultural Studies and Its Theoretical Legacies” 283). It serves to 
 
                                                 
stands as a refutation of this criticism (Clarke, “Of Crises and Conjunctures”; Clarke, “After Neoliberalism?”; 
Gilroy, After Empire; Gilroy, Against Race; Gilroy, There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack; Gilroy, The Black 
Atlantic; Grossberg, Caught in the Crossfire; Grossberg, Cultural Studies in the Future Tense; Grossberg, We 
Gotta Get Out of this Place; Hall, Hard Road to Renewal; Hall et al.; Hall, Massey, and Rustin; McRobbie, The 
Aftermath of Feminism; McRobbie, Feminism and Youth Culture; Morris, Identity Anecdotes; Morris, Too Soon 
Too Late; Newman and Clarke; Rustin; Slack and Wise). While much of this work is defined by national 
formations and state politics, it does not focus on the nation-state to the exclusion of other institutions and 
phenomena. While certainly considerate of the role of the nation-state or national formation, cultural studies has 
consistently since its origination engaged with other problematics—including (but not limited to) race (Gilroy, 
Against Race; Gilroy, There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack), the African diaspora (Gilroy, The Black 
Atlantic), globalization and discourses of multiculturalism (Gilroy, After Empire), popular culture (Grossberg, 
We Gotta Get Out of this Place; Morris, Identity Anecdotes;  Morris, Too Soon Too Late), cultural attitudes 
toward and treatment of youth (Grossberg, Caught in the Crossfire), modern philosophy (Grossberg, Cultural 
Studies in the Future Tense), populism (Hall, Hard Road to Renewal), crime (Hall, et al.), gender and feminism 
(McRobbie, The Aftermath of Feminism; McRobbie, Feminism and Youth Culture), the discursive formation of 
publics (Newman and Clarke), finance (Rustin), and technology (Slack and Wise), to name just a few. 
But this criticism has implications beyond simply the practice of cultural studies. To ignore or even downplay 
the significance of the nation-state is to grossly misunderstand modernity, as well as the crises that 
overdetermine particular conjunctures. The nation-state and the business corporation are the dominant 
institutions of modernity. The state has played (and continues to play) a central role in capitalist development in 
the modern era (Ahmad). To downplay its significance is to leave oneself incapable of understanding the crises 
we face and (consequently) of being able to construct viable solutions to those crises. As such, cultural studies 
(as the project of conjunctural analysis) must at least grapple with the specter of the nation-state, even if it is not 
afforded a privileged status in our analyses. This critique regarding the centrality of national formations has a 
second dimension beyond nation-state. Cultural studies is often accused of having a limited, geographically-
bounded understanding of space and place. However, the works of Doreen Massey, Paul Gilroy and John 
Clarke have done much to rethink space in a way that does not consider places as closed, bounded entities. 
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ground our engagement with what newly confronts us and to let that engagement  
provide the ground for retheorizing. Theory is thus a practice in a double sense: it is a  
formal conceptual tool as well as a practicing or ‘trying out’ of a way of theorizing. In  
joining these two senses of practice, we commit to working out momentarily,  
temporarily ‘objectified’ theories, moments of ‘arbitrary closure,’ recognizing that in  
ongoing analysis of the concrete, theory must be challenged and revised. (Slack  
114) 
 
We must adapt methods and theories to historical realities. As importantly, we must also 
recognize our theories and methods as the products of those historical realities. 
 From a cultural studies perspective, there can be no theory qua theory; even that 
which professes to be so must be recognized as contextually contingent in the sense that any 
theory is only ever the product of the complexities, crises, contradictions, over- and under-
determinations, and human practices of the socio-historical context within which it is 
developed. Any theory “which calls itself The [Theory] of anything whatsoever must be 
suspected a priori of erecting a false totality [or certainty] based on dubious absolutes which 
will serve only to mask and reinforce” the concentrations of power that conjunctural analysis 
aims to expose and undermine (P. L. Wilson 16). Moreover, there can be no commitment to 
any particular method because such a commitment presupposes that different problematics 
can be analyzed in the same way. The type of critical intellectual work that cultural studies 
strives for is “committed to the detour through theory even though it is not theory driven” 
(Grossberg, “Cultural Studies and/in New Worlds” 2). It is also committed to finding 
appropriate methods as suggested by the demands of the specific context under analysis. It 
necessarily follows, then, that theory and method are mutually constitutive, developing “in 
relation to the changing epistemological positions and political conditions as well as 
providing guidance for strategic intervention” (Slack 113). 
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 What I am suggesting here is that theory and method can be articulated into each 
other rather than being transposed onto each other; they are imbricated rather than additive; 
they are a product of the specific work at hand rather than a set of pre-existing frameworks 
that can be transplanted from one analytical terrain to another. This is not to suggest that any 
form of conjunctural analysis will be completely novel. On the contrary, it draws upon pre-
existing theories, methods and analyses in order to construct a narrative about “what’s old, 
what’s new—and what’s rearticulated” in a given conjuncture (Grossberg paraphrasing 
Gramsci in Hay 87). Nor is conjunctural analysis intended to refer only to that conjuncture. It 
is a way of demonstrating the overdetermination of a particular context by organic 
formations in epochal transformation. 
 In this way, conjunctural analysis (at its best) can produce “machinic [rather than 
structural] theor[ies] of power” (Grossberg, “Cultural Studies and/in New Worlds” 7)—
machinic theories that are capable of limited redeployment across contexts and/or levels of 
abstraction so as to constantly re-theorize the rearticulated problematics that characterize the 
organization of power. Whereas a structural theory of power emphasizes hierarchical social 
formations as relatively static, a machinic theory considers power in systemic, processual 
terms as contextually-articulated organizations of force relations. Conjunctural analysis is a 
way of answering Marx’s imperative to move between levels of abstraction in order to get 
from the empirical to the concrete in a specific socio-historical context—always with the 
question of power in mind. Specifically related to my argument, this type of analytical 
practice helps us understand contemporary operations and mechanisms of power in a way 
that characterizing the current era as neoliberal cannot. This is demonstrated in the following 
pages. 
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CHAPTER 2: NEOLIBERALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS11 
 
Introduction 
 Our inability to come to terms with the current state of affairs is due in part to the 
stories we tell about where we are and how we got here, the way we explain the context 
within which current crises operate and out of which they developed. This chapter addresses 
what has become a dominant narrative in critical scholarship and public discourse concerning 
the political, economic and social transformations and crises of the past few decades—a 
narrative centered on the concept of neoliberalism. After briefly describing the concept/story, 
I then identify some of the shortcomings of this narrative in order to shift the conversation 
from neoliberalism to an understanding of corporism. I define what is meant by corporation 
and explain how this definition allows us to understand the contemporary conjuncture as 
corporist rather than neoliberal. The chapter concludes with a history of the changing 
relationship between the U.S. nation-state and the legal form of the corporation to 
demonstrate: 1) the necessity of understanding the contemporary conjuncture as corporist 
rather than neoliberal; and 2) the construction and assertion of corporate sovereignty in the 
United States. 
 
                                                 
11 Portions of Chapters 2 & 3 were presented (in another form) to the annual meeting of the Association of 
American Geographers (AAG) in San Francisco, CA, in March of 2016 as: Davis, Andrew, and Carolyn 
Hardin. “Overcoming the State-Market Dichotomy: Neoliberalism as Corporate Sovereignty.” Some of the 
research and initial writing of what would become the section “Neoliberalism” was done by Hardin. It has, 
however, been added to and significantly rewritten by myself for inclusion here. 
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Neoliberalism 
A wealth of scholarship in the past few decades argues that we are living in the era of 
neoliberalism. What this actually means varies; it can be understood alternately as the logic 
of governmentality (a la Foucault) “that arises as the [political] projection of the rules and 
regulations of market competition” (Gago 176), as a set of policies and structural reforms 
enacted through national governments and international organizations, or as a mode of 
entrepreneurial subjectivation.12 This narrative most often posits neoliberalism as a top-
down, free-market and anti-state “agenda developed by economists, put into practice by 
corporations, governments, and international financial institutions, and embodied in policies 
of deregulation, financialization, and the gutting of the welfare state” (A. Davis 173).13 In 
many ways, the term has come to refer to almost any set of cultural, economic and/or 
political transformations occurring since the 1970s. 
Despite the variety of ways in which the term is conceptualized (and the variety of 
disparate phenomena to which it now refers), William Davies offers a useful understanding 
of both the historical development of neoliberal economic thought/practices and the core 
characteristics shared across the various literatures concerning neoliberalism. Davies traces 
the foundations of neoliberal thought to the works of Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek 
who (among others) sought to rethink economic liberalism in response to a variety of drastic 
developments in the wake of the Great Depression, including “the rise of corporations, trade 
                                                 
12 Those interested in a more detailed overview of neoliberalism should consult Colin Crouch’s The Strange 
Non-death of Neoliberalism, David Harvey’s A Brief History of Neoliberalism, and Kean Birch’s We Have 
Never Been Neoliberal. 
 
13 Although this narrative acknowledges the role of business in the practical application of such policies, it does 
not account for the central role of the business corporation in the current conjuncture beyond positing it as 
fundamentally opposed to the functions of the nation-state. It must be noted that recent scholarship has begun to 
unsettle the state/market dichotomy of the dominant narrative (Birch; Crouch; Gago; Hardin; Panitch and 
Konings), but this trend is still nascent.   
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unions, social policies, regulation and state socialism,” as well as “protectionism, 
macroeconomics, the New Deal in the United States and totalitarianism in Europe” (Davies 
311). These developments troubled economic liberals, who sought a solution in retheorizing 
the “price system of the market” as a foundation for the political freedom they saw as being 
under threat (ibid.). In 1947, Hayek founded the Mont Perelin Society, a think tank dedicated 
to formulating non-socialist principles for organizing society. Unlike many of the people who 
would later develop neoliberal ideas and policies, Mises and Hayek considered themselves to 
be political liberals (in the classic sense) and believed that political liberalism depended on 
free markets. 
Neoliberal thought has developed in various ways in different countries since then. 
From the 1930s through the 1950s, German ordo-liberalism was a dominant school of 
thought concerning market forces and political relations, especially in Europe. This position 
is characterized primarily by a belief that political rights are best guaranteed by competition 
in the free market, with the nation-state required “to enforce a competitive order” (Davies 
312). By the 1970s, neoliberal thought had come to be dominated by an American variation 
developed by economists at the Chicago School of Economics, primarily Milton Friedman 
and George Stigler. The position of the Chicago School at the time was characterized by a 
“resolute belief in the capacity of economics to explain all forms of human behavior, whether 
inside or outside markets” (Davies 313), along with a belief in the efficiency of monopoly 
and a deep skepticism concerning government intervention.14 The crises of Keynesianism 
and Fordism in the 1970s shifted this position into a “new paradigm of economic policy-
making” (first in the United States and United Kingdom, then exported to countries such as 
                                                 
14 Friedman and Stigler’s views on monopoly are indicative of a tendency within certain variations of 
neoliberalism to espouse a free-market rhetoric while advocating for policies that actually hinder free markets. 
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Chile) whereby the nation-state should be mobilized to restore profit rates through 
legislation, privatization, deflationary and monetary policy, and the weakening of labor and 
trade unions (Davies 314). 
Michel Foucault is largely responsible for bringing the term neoliberalism into critical 
theory. For Foucault, neoliberalism should be understood as the complete transformation of 
personal and social life according to logics of enterprise and economic performance (The 
Birth of Biopolitics). Neoliberal social life is, in this sense, regulated by private and non-state 
actors for the assurance of competitiveness and inequality, which are seen as guarantors of 
order and freedom. By the 1990s, the term neoliberalism had been “adopted principally by 
the critics of a perceived free market orthodoxy which was spreading around the world under 
the auspices of the ‘Washington Consensus’” to refer to any number of phenomena, 
including (but not limited to) financialization, deregulation, increased support of the financial 
sector by the state, and the further dismantling of social protections and public institutions 
(Davies 309).  
Since the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, which called into question the success 
of neoliberal ideology without actually leading to the rejection of neoliberal policies and 
practices, there has been a sort of conceptual crisis among scholars to refine and redefine the 
term. This has resulted in part in a multiplication of the confusion around the analytical value 
of neoliberalism as an effective tool for explaining and challenging contemporary cultural, 
economic and political problems. As noted by Rajesh Venugopol, “neoliberalism is now an 
overloaded and unwieldy term that occupies a fluid and growing terrain that expands and 
contracts arbitrarily across several dimensions, but which increasingly lacks firm foundations 
in real world referents” (171). 
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Despite the various positions within and critical understandings of neoliberalism, 
William Davies has identified several core characteristics that are shared across the various 
literatures. First, neoliberalism is understood as a “modernizing force” inspired by Victorian 
liberalism and its understanding of political freedom as linked with industrialization, 
capitalism and representative governance (310). Second, it is characterized by a drive to 
marketize, neutralize or reinvent the activities and institutions that are external to the market 
(e.g. universities, labor and trade unions, public administration). Third, neoliberalism views 
the state as an active force in the production and reproduction of “the rules of institutions and 
individual conduct” to accord with the “ethical and political vision” of marketization (ibid.). 
Finally, “competitive activity, that is, the production of inequality” forms the core of 
neoliberal ethics and politics (ibid.). 
These characteristics converge in what Carolyn Hardin and I have argued is the 
analytical core of neoliberalism: the changing relationship between the nation-state and the 
market. While disagreements over the multiple, contingent, polymorphic and contradictory 
nature of neoliberalism abound, there seems to be nearly universal acceptance of 
neoliberalism as being fundamentally about this relationship. This assumption plays out in a 
number of ways across the critical literature, beginning with Foucault, who distinguished 
between the German ordo-liberalism and American neoliberalism mentioned above. The 
German variant of neoliberalism argued for a reversal of liberal governmentality, such that 
the state operates “under the supervision of the market rather than a market supervised by the 
state” (Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics 116). American neoliberalism, on the other hand, 
argues for the total subordination of the nation-state (as well as other non-market institutions 
and phenomena) to the market. For Foucault, this is as much (if not more) a question of the 
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production of particular forms of subjectivity as it is about the production of an economic 
and political system.  
In regards to this question of subjectivity, Foucault traces the transformations of 
liberalism and neoliberalism to arrive at the figure of homo oeconomicus— the biopolitical 
subject of labor and “the analytical grid of economic activity” (Foucault, The Birth of 
Biopolitics 226). Within the context of liberalism, homo oeconomicus stands as “the partner 
of exchange and the theory of utility based on a problematic of needs” (ibid); with the 
transformation to neoliberalism, this subject acquires status as what is now commonly known 
as prosumer—the confluence of production and consumption into a single subject. Within 
neoliberalism, homo oeconomicus becomes “an entrepreneur of himself [sic] […] being for 
himself his own capital, being for himself his own producer, being for himself the source of 
[his] earnings” (ibid). This subject status, coupled with the inseparability of homo 
oeconomicus from civil society, indicates the culmination of the neoliberal project of trying 
“to use the world market economy and the typical analyses of the market economy to 
decipher non-market relationships and phenomena which are not strictly and specifically 
economic but what we call social phenomena” (Foucault. The Birth of Biopolitics 240).  
 Beyond questions of subjectivity, Foucault’s arguments concerning the overtaking of 
the state and the society by market forces has fueled a generation of scholars seeking to 
document the success of market logic. For example, Wendy Brown uses Foucault as a 
starting point to chronicle the economization of spheres and activities previously considered 
to reside outside the realm of the market, especially as they relate to the nation-state. For 
example, Brown considers bureaucratic best practices that have found their way from the 
business world into the workings of government and non-governmental organizations 
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(NGOs), replacing political decision-making with market logic. These practices “represent 
not merely the intimacy, but the consolidation of government, business, and knowledge 
endeavors into” a mode of power that is determined by market logic (Brown 141). This 
subtle but widespread “marketization of the political sphere” is the neoliberal triumph of the 
market over representative democracy (Brown 39). 
 Another use of the term neoliberalism to describe the current conjuncture focuses on 
the “Washington Consensus” mentioned above. This refers to the structural adjustments 
imposed on nations by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank; in the 
critical literature, this is characterized as the marketization—the imposition of market rule—
on less powerful and traditionally socialist nation-states in the Global South (Venugopal). 
Even those arguments that reject the totalizing frameworks offered by Foucauldian and 
“Washington Consensus” applications of neoliberalism replicate the nation-state/market 
dichotomy described herein. While Aihwa Ong aims to dismantle the notion of 
“‘Neoliberalism’ writ large” by highlighting the contingency of the term to various contexts 
(14), her argument envisions neoliberalism as a “technology of government” enacted as an 
exception (or with exceptions) to the norm of market logic or market-oriented policy 
objectives (Ong 3). But neoliberalism is still, from this perspective, understood as being 
about the evolving relationship between traditional concerns of the nation-state (i.e. 
government, territory and sovereignty) and the introduction of market-driven calculations, 
even if the relationship varies in different contexts.  
 An impressive variety of work has used neoliberalism as a framework to examine 
phenomena as diverse as the reconstitution of class relations (Harvey), a transnational 
community of thought leaders (Mirowski), and the entrepreneurial practices of migrant 
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communities in Buenos Aires (Gágo). There are many disagreements and confusions over 
neoliberalism, but they all seem to agree on the fundamental relationship between the nation-
state and the market. This near total acceptance of a dichotomy between the nation-state and 
the market brings with it a number of related assumptions. First, because neoliberalism is 
fundamentally about the changing relationship between the market and the state (in 
particular, the marketization or overtaking of the state by the market), the nation-state is 
assumed to be different from and opposed to the market. The state is assumed to have been at 
one point an insulated domain of sovereignty unrelated to and/or unbesmirched by the 
market. Marxist political-economic analyses have demonstrated time and again, however, 
that the nation-state is never independent from the economy. Second, the market is assumed 
to be a verifiable thing that encapsulates economic (especially capitalist) imperatives. But 
“the market” is a bloated and untenable analytical construction that consistently escapes 
empirical verification and critical scrutiny. The abstracted notion of the market is based not 
only on an imagined continuity between ancient bazaars and the processes of production and 
exchange within contemporary capitalism, but also on a homogenized understanding of 
capitalism that cannot account for the sheer diversity of practices at work in the economy. 
This entrenchment of the nation-state/market dichotomy in discourses on 
neoliberalism is captured quite poignantly by Rajesh Venugopal as he considers the breadth 
of conceptual issues carried within the term: 
 Does neoliberalism imply a contraction of the state vis-à-vis the market, or just a  
different kind of state that promotes and works at the behest of markets? Is  
neoliberalism a depoliticized and technocratic fetishization of the market, or is it a  
deeply political agenda of class rule and neo-colonial domination? Is it a Leviathan  
that bludgeons its way around the world, or is it a far more subtle, mutating,  
localized, contingent force that works by transforming individual subjectivities? Is  
neoliberalism an absolute final state of being, or is it a relative category, describing a  
direction of travel? Does it represent a radical, ‘paradigmatic’ departure, or is it a far  
46 
 
more modest recalibration of state-market relations with more continuities than  
discontinuities with the pre-neoliberal past? (166) 
 
We cannot answer these questions without first reframing the story we tell about where we 
are and how we got here. None of the accounts of neoliberalism discussed above deal in any 
significant manner with the institution that is responsible for constructing both markets and 
the framework of representative governance in the first place: the corporation. I am not the 
first to suggest that the literature on neoliberalism needs a more robust account of the 
corporation. Colin Crouch has argued that it is corporations (and not the market) that are 
overtaking the state. Kean Birch claims that contracts between corporations (and not market 
interactions) are the economic prime mover. But both still rely on an understanding of the 
contemporary moment as being the era of neoliberalism. If we are to take the role of the 
corporation seriously, we are better served in jettisoning neoliberalism in favor of a corporist 
understanding of the current conjuncture. The following section explains why. 
To Corporism 
As I have argued elsewhere, neoliberalism may have “outlived its usefulness as an 
analytical mechanism for understanding the processes, policies, and practices of 
contemporary capitalism. It is too amorphous, all-encompassing, and ahistorical at this 
point—what is the distinct character of the term if we see it everywhere, in every mode of 
public, private, and common life, even those we claim to resist or operate in opposition to 
it?” (A. Davis 174-5).  
While I am concerned with the phenomena addressed in the literature on 
neoliberalism, I hope to regain a sense of conceptual clarity that has been muddled by our 
reliance on the concept of neoliberalism. In this understanding of the current era, the nation-
state and the economy (often conflated with the nebulous and transcendent “market”) are 
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posited as distinct, even opposed entities. The predominant popular (as opposed to critical) 
understanding of the dichotomy between politics and economics posits the nation-state as a 
somewhat-necessary evil that inhibits freedom within the market, which is itself posited as 
the guarantor of individual freedom and social betterment. The economy, moreover, is 
naturalized in popular discourse in such a way as to foster the belief that market economics is 
a fundamental and morally-sanctioned mode of organizing social relations. Both critical and 
popular discourse tend to construct a fictional dichotomy between politics and economics, 
wherein the nation-state and the economy exist independently of (and at odds with) one 
another. But such a distinction is empirically incorrect; it is the construct of analytical, 
disciplinary and even political distinctions that are themselves artificial. There is a recursive, 
mutually-reinforcing relationship between the economic and the political. As such, the 
project of cultural studies (as the practice of conjunctural analysis)—with its emphasis on 
relationality, contingency and radical contextuality—is better suited than much of the work 
on neoliberalism for analyzing the contemporary conjuncture.  
 Marc Eisner’s The American Political Economy: Institutional Evolution of Market & 
State explicitly argues against the neoliberal characterization of a divide between the market 
and the state. Eisner argues that the nation-state/economy distinction prevents us from 
understanding that the nation-state and the economy are fundamentally intertwined.15 There 
is an empirically-demonstrable mutual evolution of the American nation-state and the 
economy in relation with one another. Moreover, this relation is not always (or even 
regularly) antagonistic. The dichotomy between the economy and the nation-state that 
                                                 
15 Eisner is not only author to highlight the mutually-constitutive relations between politics and economics. For 
example, Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation and Aneesh Chopra’s The Innovative State are indicative of 
a strong critique of the state/market dichotomy often overlooked in the literature on neoliberalism. 
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dominates current theory and popular understanding stems from the conflation of the market 
with the economy as a whole. The market, however, is simply one economic variable—
fictional or (at most) ambiguous, heterogeneous and unverifiable—even though we tend to 
treat it as if it were the fixed center of political and economic policy (Eisner). The distinction 
between politics and the economy-as-market is not based on empirical phenomena, but rather 
on analytical choices and political agendas. To this must be added a disciplinary dimension 
resulting from 
the professionalization of the social sciences in the late nineteenth and twentieth  
centuries. Political economy [which, until that time, had understood nation-state and  
economy as being mutually constitutive] was fractured into several disciplines, most  
importantly, economics and political science. Increasingly, economists focused on  
market behavior, a world of voluntary exchanges populated by rational utility  
maximizers and governed by the price mechanism. Most political scientists, in  
contrast, studied political power, coercion, conflict, and the rules and formal  
institutions that translate political demands into public policies. While this division of  
labor may have served some important disciplinary functions, it reinforced an illusion  
that there is a clear market-state dichotomy, a line of demarcation between separate  
realms of human action governed by their own internal logics. (Eisner 5-6) 
 
 And while this long preceded neoliberalism, it indicates the historical precedents that 
in many ways set the stage for current debates about the relation between economics and 
politics. In order to dispel ourselves of this political, analytical and disciplinary fiction, we 
need to cultivate an evolutionary and relational understanding of political economy—one 
“concerned with the relationships between public and private institutions as they change in 
historical time,” with particular emphasis on “those moments of crisis that have occurred 
periodically over the course” of modern history (Eisner 5). We need a conjunctural approach 
to questions of political economy, and a re-articulated understanding of the relationship 
between the nation-state and the economy as being mutually constitutive. And, I suggest, we 
must reframe this relation as that between the nation-state and the corporation. What appears 
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as a nation-state/market dichotomy is, in fact, a nation-state/corporation matrix of power 
relations. 
Neoliberal scholarship has largely ignored one of the most significant factors of the 
contemporary context: the relationship between the nation-state and the business 
corporation.16 As noted by Colin Crouch (2011), scholarship on neoliberalism needs a more 
adequate theorization of the role of the corporation in the transformations and crises that 
characterize the current era. What are generally referred to as characteristics of neoliberalism 
(e.g. deregulation, privatization, the gutting of the welfare state, the economization of non-
economic factors) are all outcomes of the evolution of American corporate capitalism—the 
“privileged position and subjectivity [of the capitalist corporation] relative to ownership and 
means of production” (Miron, p. 179), relative to labor, relative to the organization of social 
relationships, relative to economic markets, and (most significantly) relative to the functions 
of the nation-state. Kean Birch has even suggested that “neoliberalism is better defined as a 
financialized system of corporate monopoly” (Birch, p. 84).  
 In a general sense, the term “corporation” refers to a legally-recognized association of 
individuals—the existence, rights and liabilities of which are independent from those of the 
individuals who comprise its membership. A corporation can take form as a business 
enterprise, a non-profit charitable organization, a think tank, a municipality, or an academic 
institution, to name a few. For the purposes of the argument at hand, I use the term 
“corporation” to refer to a privately-owned limited liability capitalist business endeavor that 
                                                 
16 Too often, the term “corporation” is invoked in a way that does not recognize the variety of corporate forms. 
In the following pages, I use the term to refer specifically to privately-owned business corporations, some of 
which are publicly traded on stock exchanges and some of which are close-held by a small number of 
individuals with no public issuance of stock. I am not referring here to non-profit, public, municipal or 
academic corporations. The one exception to this is my discussion of ALEC, which is legally a non-profit 
charitable corporation.  
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has been legally established through articles of incorporation, which may or may not be 
publicly traded on a stock exchange.17 
The corporation as a legal institution has a much longer history than is generally 
assumed. While some scholars trace the origin of the legal form of the corporation to the 
Roman Empire prior to the introduction of Christianity (Williston), others trace it to the 
establishment of the Aberdeen (Scotland) Harbour Board and the Corporation of London in 
1136—concurrent with the recognition of the “legitimacy of private property” by the Vatican 
(Truitt xv). Specifically concerning the business corporation, the oldest one still in existence 
is Stora Enso—a Swedish company established in 1347 (Truitt). However one chooses to 
date its origins, the corporation predates both capitalism and the modern nation-state; neither 
would have developed in the ways they have without the legal existence of the corporation. 
Indeed, it is the business corporation itself that has determined, more than any other 
institution, the development of political and economic power in American modernity. 
The alternative narrative presented here indicates the necessity of understanding this 
not as the era of neoliberalism, but the era of “corporism” (Hardin 215)—a contextually-
specific cultural relation between the nation-state and the corporation whereby rights, 
security and even individual subjectivities are framed primarily in reference to the rights, 
security and status of the corporation as a legally-recognized person—as the defining 
characteristic of the contemporary conjuncture. In Carolyn Hardin’s estimation, corporism is 
actually the “‘neo’ in neoliberalism” (199). I extend this term to mean not only a cultural 
relation, but a political and economic one, as well, specifically as it relates to the struggle of 
                                                 
17 The one exception to this is when I refer to the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), which is 
legally a non-profit charitable organization. However, my use of the term still applies to ALEC in that its 
agenda is determined and its membership is comprised in part by executives from business corporations.  
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American society to redefine itself in the wake of the recent global economic crisis and the 
ongoing domestic political crisis. For these reasons, the following section presents a corporist 
(rather than neoliberal) narrative of the relationship between the United States government 
and the legal form of the business corporation over the pasty fifty years. Such a narrative 
historicizes this relationship as an organic form of corporate sovereignty in so much as the 
evolution of the relationship has overdetermined the (re)production and (re)articulation of 
cultural, economic and political power relations in the current conjuncture. The following 
section expands on Hardin’s work by tracing the historical developments that got us to this 
era of corporism. It also provides a basis for considering how this political, cultural and 
economic relation (i.e. corporism) developed out of the construction and assertion of 
corporate sovereignty in the United States. 
A Corporist History of the United States18 
 This section provides an historical framework for my argument that any 
understanding of power within the context of American modernity must provide an analytical 
account of the relationship between the nation-state and the legal form of the corporation. 
The colonial corporations that financed and organized European (most notably, British) 
expansion into North America (e.g. the Virginia Corporation and the Massachusetts Bay 
Corporation) established the framework of governance that became state legislatures, which 
in turn granted the geographically- and temporally-limited corporate charters of the 19th 
                                                 
18 This history is intended only to indicate general evolutionary trends in the transformation of the relationship 
between the nation-state and the corporation as a way of contextualizing the analysis in Chapter 5. A wide 
variety of existing research covers this transformation in detail (Abbot; J.T. Adams; Beatty; Berle and Means; 
Bowman; Brewster; Burns; Cook, Jr.; J. P. Davis; Dewey; Domhoff; Drucker; Eisner; Gomory and Sylla; 
Handlin; Hurst; Lipartito and Sicilia; Livingston; Marris; McBride; McDermott; Micklethwait and Wooldridge; 
Mueller; Roy; Sciulli; Scott; Seavoy; Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism; Sklar, The 
United States as a Developing Country; Truitt; Weinstein; Williston). 
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century. Due to a number of key court cases—and culminating in the expanded scope of the 
14th Amendment in the decades following the Civil War—these charters paved the way for 
corporate control over large sectors of finance, economic production and organization, and 
technological development, resulting in the conditions of power we now experience.  
 Rather than assume a stable corporation, I want to offer a genealogy comprised of 
four distinct yet overlapping eras that define the evolution of the corporate form in the United 
States, especially in relation to the nation-state: 1) the era of nation-building (i.e. the colonial 
era through the mid-19th century)—characterized by colonialism, imperialism and the 
formation of the nation-state, as well as a crisis of royal sovereignty; 2) the era of monopoly 
capital (i.e. post-Civil War through the early 20th century)—characterized by the transition 
from proprietary capitalism to corporate capitalism (both emergent and consolidated), as well 
as crises of labor and profit; 3) the era of conglomeration (i.e. post-World War II through the 
early 1970s )—characterized by corporate combination and expansion, as well as a crisis of 
capitalism itself; and 4) the era of corporism (i.e. the late 20th and early 21st centuries)—
characterized by the assertion of corporate sovereignty through corporate restructuring and 
the multiplication of global crises. Each of these eras in American history indicates a 
different phase in the construction and assertion of corporate sovereignty as expressed 
through the evolution of the relationship between the U.S. nation-state and the corporation—
with each characterized by differing forms of and contradictions between these two 
institutions.19 
 
 
                                                 
19 My understanding of the relationship between the nation-state and the corporation—and the transformative 
eras of that relationship’s evolution—is informed by the work of historians and legal scholars. 
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The Construction of Corporate Sovereignty, 1: The Era of Nation-building 
 This era of American history was characterized by colonialism, imperialism and the 
formation of the U.S. nation-state, as well as a crisis of sovereignty. Not only did European 
colonization of the Americas coincide with the emergence of the chartered limited liability 
corporation in the 16th and 17th centuries, these corporations were granted charters (first by 
monarchs, then by parliaments) specifically for the purposes of establishing colonial 
monopolies in the Americas (J. P. Davis; Micklethwait and Wooldridge; Truitt). As 
instruments of the royal sovereign desire to create empire, these corporations “were 
organized by wealthy merchants and members of the aristocracy who were given a charter by 
the Crown to undertake their business in designated parts of the world” (Truitt 4). These 
corporations were not, however, simply instruments of business. They were regarded as 
public agencies “to which had been confided the due regulation of foreign trade, just as 
domestic trades were subject to the government of the guilds” (Williston 10). Moreover, 
colonization required the political administration of settlers, leading to early forms of both 
representative governance and international relations “whether directly through national 
governments or indirectly through the medium of commercial corporations” (J. P. Davis 
157). In addition to coordinating efforts between the royal sovereign, the aristocracy and 
private enterprise for the purposes of colonial and imperial expansion, these chartered 
companies developed representative governance within colonial assemblies for the purposes 
of internal organization and management. These colonial assemblies became the template for 
state legislatures and the federated electoral system of representation that characterizes the 
U.S. nation-state. In short, the corporate form became a model of representative governance 
in order to ameliorate the problem of sovereign rule at a distance. 
54 
 
 These colonial corporations were the direct precursors to modern capitalist 
corporations in that they were established on medieval principles of issuing stock to investors 
in order to finance their commercial ventures, and of limited liability, which protects 
investors from any financial liability beyond the amount invested, and any legal liability for 
malfeasance on the part of the corporation. The main reason for combining the sale of shares 
in a corporation with limited liability comes down to the fact that “colonization was so risky 
that the only way to raise large sums of money from investors was to protect them” 
(Micklethwait and Wooldridge 18). In addition to these characteristics inherited from the 
Middle Ages, chartered companies (most notably, the British East India Company) 
developed what is still a defining bureaucratic feature of the capitalist corporation: a tiered 
structure of administration that divides capital and management through the establishment of 
the position of governor (equivalent to the modern Chief Executive Office), a general court 
(equivalent to the modern Board of Directors), a court of directors that was responsible for 
day-to-day operations (equivalent to modern-day middle management), committees that 
functioned as a central corporate office, and departments for accountants, clerks, office 
personnel (referred to at the time as civil servants), finance, accounts, and buying and 
shipping. These chartered companies (with their own administrative bureaucracies and often 
their own private military forces) are an early example of outsourcing to the private sector 
(Truitt). And they were always instruments of empire. 
 The main English corporations involved in the colonization of North America were 
the Virginia Corporation (established by royal charter of James I in 1606), the Massachusetts 
Bay Corporation (established by royal charter of Charles I in 1629), and Hudson’s Bay 
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Company (established by royal charter of Charles II in 1670).20 Colonial settlement of the 
United States and Canada was financed, organized and administered by British corporations. 
Since my argument is concerned exclusively with what is now the United States, this section 
focuses primarily on the Virginia Corporation and the Massachusetts Bay Corporation.  
The royal charter to establish the Virginia Corporation provided monopoly trading 
rights to the company in the geographical area that would become the Virginia Colony. In 
addition to limited liability, a tiered administrative structure, and the ability to raise venture 
capital for its expeditions through the issuance of stock, the Virginia Corporation exhibited 
two additional characteristics that are now standard in the modern capitalist corporation—
namely, “perpetual stock [i.e. the transfer of wealth across generations] and payment of 
dividends” based on corporate profits (Truitt 5). These characteristics contributed to the 
modern construction of the corporate practice in the sense that perpetual stock allows for an 
unlimited life-span, while the payment of dividends underlies corporate concerns with 
quarterly earnings for shareholders.  
The administrative structure of the Virginia Corporation was designed to give share-
holding members voting privileges equal to their shares, a role in choosing company officers, 
and decision-making rights regarding company policies. This “became the basis for the first 
government” in Jamestown in 1619—i.e. “the general assembly of the colony of Virginia”—
which provided “the template for representative democracy throughout British North 
American colonies” (Truitt 5-6). This act of “mutual contract between the ruler and ruled” 
(i.e. the representative accountability of elected leaders to their constituents) against the 
divine right of the royal sovereign continued until 1624, when James I revoked the Virginia 
                                                 
20 Hudson’s Bay Company is “still in existence as the world’s oldest multinational corporation” (Truitt 3). 
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Corporation’s charter and the Virginia Colony became a crown colony under royal sovereign 
authority (Truitt 5). 
 The Massachusetts Bay Colony began in 1620 under very different circumstances as 
an experiment in proto-communism, with communal property and an equal division of 
wealth. A royal charter for the colony was not granted until 1629, when Governor William 
Bradford imposed the rule of private property. As with Virginia, the corporate organization 
of the chartered company in Massachusetts Bay (after the granting of a royal charter) laid the 
foundation for representative democratic government in the colony. The transformation of 
the colony into a colonial corporation had the effect of linking colonial governance with 
economic practices. “Political liberties were inextricably linked with private ownership of 
property in the Virginia and Massachusetts colonies, both having been conceived as 
corporations and modeled on British corporate governance practices” (Truitt 6). Also as with 
Virginia, the Massachusetts charter was later revoked—this time by Charles II in 1684 “for 
encroachment on the royal [sovereign] prerogative in founding Harvard College” (J. H. 
Baker 126).  
 Representative democracy—whether in the form of colonial assembly, state 
legislature or the federal electoral system—was modeled precisely on the corporate form of 
governance discussed here. Colonies were enabled by royal corporate charters; with the 
exception of Massachusetts, they were sovereign-sanctioned corporate monopolies before 
they were colonies and only enabled to become colonies as such because they were 
sanctioned by the royal sovereign through corporate charters. The history of the colonial 
corporation in what became the United States troubles the assumption that some originary 
form of the nation-state in this context predates corporate interests. Instead, the corporation 
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played a foundational role in the establishment of the nation-state as well as sharing the 
burden of building the nation as a federated system of states following the American 
Revolution and the Constitutional Convention. American nation-building relied heavily on 
“chartered corporations, endowed with special monopoly rights, to build some of the vital 
infrastructure of the new country—universities […], banks, churches, canals, municipalities, 
and roads” (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 43). In fact, “one of the less appreciated reasons 
for the rapid rise of the U.S. economy in the nineteenth century in comparison to other 
nations was the relative ease of obtaining a corporate charter in America” (Gomory and Sylla 
102). Between 1790 and 1860, the number of business corporations established in the United 
States greatly exceeded those in any other nation; it most likely exceeded those in all other 
nations combined. This allowed for the establishment of a national economy, with the 
corporation as a vehicle for its emergence and rapid growth. “The United States thus became 
what might be called the first corporation nation (Gomory and Sylla 104). 
 The pervasiveness and centrality of the corporation in the 19th century is owed in part 
to the failure (even unwillingness) of early U.S. states to reign in the form that birthed them 
as colonies. The reason this responsibility fell to the states themselves instead of the federal 
government goes back to deep divisions within the Constitutional Convention regarding the 
location of sovereignty in the new republic; these divisions centered on which institution 
should have the power to grant corporate charters. Although James Madison proposed an 
amendment during the drafting of the Constitution that would give the U.S. Congress power 
to charter corporations in the interest of the nation-state, it was voted down. The issue was so 
contentious that the absence of any discussion about corporations in the Constitution was 
intentional (Rothkopf). Following the establishment of the U.S. nation-state, corporate 
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charters were generally granted by state governments for specific public works projects of 
limited duration, with strict legislative and judicial control over charters and contracts. But 
such control was not an attempt to restrict the corporations as such. It was to fit the legal 
form of the corporation to the experience of nation-building. The first colonies (and, later, 
states) to provide less restrictive corporate laws were precisely those colonies that were 
originally chartered corporations and had faced the most antagonism from the royal 
sovereign over issues of governance. Not only had these states originally existed as 
corporations, but they all “also faced long periods of uncertainty [in regards to the royal 
sovereign] with regard to their legitimacy and rights as corporations” (Kaufman 405). This 
experience led such states (e.g. CT, MA, NY, PA, RI) to open up access to incorporation and 
expand corporate privileges and rights. Of these, Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode 
Island were the first to change “incorporation from tightly controlled and limited to available 
to almost anyone who could afford the incorporation fee and for any purpose” (Kaufman 
402).  
What control did exist was intimately connected with cultural suspicion against the 
paternalist and communalist implications of corporate association, as well as the historical 
connections between the corporation and the royal sovereign. The fact that colonial 
corporations had been able to challenge the authority of the royal sovereign in laying the 
groundwork for the formation of the states themselves cannot, in this regard, be discounted.  
To fit the corporation for American service, the first task was to strip away the  
communal overtones, the garments of special privilege and restrictionism that still  
clung to it. Corporate organization was to be transmuted from the boon of a  
whimsical sovereign into a right which was to be readily available to all. The  
corporation was changed from a body politic into a persona ficta. As a legal person it  
was qualified to bear all the rights with which an age of individualism generously  
clothed persons of flesh and blood. (Chayes v) 
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However, early attempts to subjugate the rights of the corporation to the power of 
government quickly ran up first against the growing power of the capitalist corporation and, 
later, the legal implications of the persona ficta construction of the corporation as a legal 
individual. And although the explicit recognition of the corporation as a persona ficta would 
not occur until the late 19th century “in the context of the Due Process Clause of the XIV 
Amendment” (Chayes vii), the groundwork for such recognition was established with The 
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward in 1819, in which corporations were found by 
the Supreme Court to possess “private rights, so states could not rewrite their charters 
capriciously” (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 45).  
In addition to Dartmouth College, several other Supreme Court decisions altered the 
balance of power—from states to the nation-state—concerning the legal form of the 
corporation. In Head & Armory v. Providence Insurance Co. in 1804, the Court ruled that 
corporations were a creation of common law, and not simply of the charters that states 
granted them, thus further removing corporations from state control. In Bank of the United 
States v. Deveaux in 1809, the Court extended this understanding “to create a universal 
definition of the corporation in American law, which had the effect of preventing state courts 
from developing separate understandings of what constituted a corporation (a first step 
toward the precedence of federal law that would later lead to decisions that would help create 
a national market and economy and thus corporations for continental scale)” (Rothkopf 175). 
Federal influence over corporate charters was extended further in 1819 with the McCulloch v. 
Maryland decision, which allowed the U.S. Congress to “charter corporations to achieve 
constitutionally permissible ends” even though such power had been intentionally left out of 
the Constitution (ibid). The net result of these decisions was to shift the question of 
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sovereignty (in regards to corporations) from the states to the nation-state, which would 
(when considered in conjunction with the persona ficta status of corporations) later shift the 
question of sovereignty to that of the corporation itself. This is the initial stage in the 
construction of corporate sovereignty as an organic crisis of the U.S. nation-state. 
Though the early decades of the 19th century were characterized primarily by strict 
state control over corporate charters, the 1830s were a time of shifting legislative attitudes 
towards the role of corporations both in private enterprise and in relation to the states (and, 
by extension, the nation-state). In 1830, “the Massachusetts state legislature decided that 
companies did not need to be engaged in public works to be granted the privilege of limited 
liability” (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 46). Connecticut followed suit in 1837, when it 
began “to permit incorporation for general business purposes without special legislative 
permission” (Truitt 7). New York state and the federal government granted similar privileges 
in 1860. These changes allowed business corporations to direct not only the course of the 
Industrial Revolution in America but also the large-scale mechanization of agriculture, as 
well as the later shift from proprietary capitalism to the system of corporate capitalism that 
characterized the 20th century and continues to dominate (albeit in an evolved form) the era 
of corporism. 
This history of the colonial era and the first half of the 19th century in the United 
States severely undercuts the notion of the nation-state as an entity somehow distinct from or 
in fundamental opposition to the capitalist corporation. Colonies were founded as 
corporations; corporate governance served as the model for what would become 
representative democracy on the state and federal levels. In this role, corporations challenged 
the royal sovereign, setting up the transferal of sovereignty to the nation-state. Early U.S. 
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restrictions on corporations were not so much about limiting the corporate form as such, but 
about divesting the corporate form of its monarchical and communalist vestiges. In any case, 
the growing economic power of the corporation and changing legislative attitudes about its 
role in nation-building stymied these early restrictions. Moreover, the persona ficta 
construction of the corporation won legal victories that established it in law as beyond the 
reach of the state, at least in limited ways. In other words, this era saw the establishment of 
the corporation as a viable (though interrelated) alternative to the sovereignty of both the 
monarch and the democratic nation-state. In the era of monopoly capital, corporate 
sovereignty grew exponentially as both its economic power and its legal recognition as 
persona ficta grew. 
The Construction of Corporate Sovereignty, 2: The Era of Monopoly Capital 
 The period between 1880 and 1940 marked the end of proprietary capitalism as the 
dominant mode of economic production with the Industrial Revolution. Following James 
Livingston, this era can be characterized “by two distinct but overlapping phases […]: [the] 
emergence, ca. 1890-1920, and consolidation, ca. 1910-1940” of corporate capitalism 
(Livingston 85). In the face of crises related to both labor and the falling rate of profit, the 
reconstruction of “production and distribution under the aegis of the corporation” became a 
way for American capitalists to both “reconstitute their prerogatives and reinstate their 
incomes” (Livingston xv). The emergence of the corporation as the dominant form of 
business organization began shortly after the Civil War, concurrent with the blossoming of 
(in northern states, at least) the Industrial Revolution. 
The preconditions for this vast economic expansion and industrialization were a  
growing population; major improvements in technology […], communications (first  
the telegraph and later the telephone), and transportation (railroads); an open and  
fluid social system with no defined class structures to inhibit upward mobility (except  
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of course for slavery, which had only recently been abolished); abundant natural  
resources (especially land); and ample capital (especially foreign investment) to  
finance business expansion. (Truitt 15). 
 
Of these, the advent of the national railroad system was perhaps the most important 
force in the construction of corporate sovereignty not only because of the transformations it 
caused regarding industry, agriculture and transportation, but also because of the 
transformations it led to in the American financial system, with the introductions of federal 
and state subsidies for railroad construction, bank credit, and corporate finance (Eisner; 
Scott; Seavoy). Indeed, between the 1860s and the 1890s, “Wall Street existed almost 
exclusively to finance the railroads” (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 61). The increase in 
economic scale brought about by the railroad system brought with it novel concerns in 
regards to corporate management and government regulation. Corporations found themselves 
with the need “to develop far more sophisticated managerial structures” in order to deal with 
expansion on a continental scale, the technological innovations required to enable such 
expansion, and labor issues that arose from such expansion (Eisner 44). These changes 
brought about by the railroad system created the necessary conditions for corporations to 
become trusts and monopolies because those types of large-scale, centralized organization 
were the only ones equipped to manage such an enterprise.  
This also led to problems of corporate regulation. The Interstate Commerce 
Commission was established in 1886 because state governments found themselves ill-
equipped to set railroad rates across state lines, which necessitated the intervention of the 
federal government (J. P. Davis). This year also saw the Supreme Court definitively ensconce 
the persona ficta status of the corporation in its ruling on Santa Clara County v. Southern 
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Pacific Railroad, the significance of which on the development of an organic crisis of 
corporate sovereignty cannot be overstated.  
The Court declared without argument that the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.  
Constitution, which guarantees equal protection of the laws (and was originally  
intended to provide protection for actual human beings denied such protection),  
applied to corporations. In 1890, it used this principle to start a series of rulings over  
the next fifty years that were used to strike down economic and often anticorporate  
regulations under the Fourteenth Amendment’s doctrine of substantive due process.  
Fifth Amendment due process and Fourth Amendment protections against  
unreasonable searches were added in 1893 and 1906 respectively. (Rothkopf 181) 
 
These events not only represent the shifting of the question of sovereignty from the states to 
the nation-state, but more so from the nation-state to the legal form of the corporation. 
This age of monopoly capital was moreover spurred on by a concern over economic 
relations between cost, price and investment returns in the expansion of markets; cultural and 
social relations between labor, technology, production and ownership; and political questions 
related to the convergence of these factors. The use of the legal form of the corporation as 
such marked a distinct reorganization of the social form of capitalism whereby labor’s 
control over production (even if only at the level of the shop floor) was abolished through the 
mechanization of production. This reorganization was achieved primarily through the 
consolidation of competing firms and the integration of distinct industries into trusts and 
monopolies, “thus to stabilize prices and reinstate reasonable profits—in other words to use 
the possibilities of the corporate legal form as an answer to such questions” (Livingston 61). 
The period 1898-1902 has been characterized as the “great merger wave,” wherein large 
corporations consolidated in order to avoid anti-trust cases (Eisner 44). The drastic increase 
in mergers at this point (pushed not only by the corporations themselves, but also leading 
bankers such as J.P. Morgan) irrevocably tied corporate industry to the stock market 
(Micklethwait and Wooldridge). But this wave also had other repercussions, leading to the 
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growth of organized labor and populist unrest centered on the question of “the distribution of 
income between profits and wages” (Livingston 93).  
 In addition to the mechanization of production, the great contribution of the corporate 
form to business resulted from the implementation of centralized management, which could 
“direct the entire productive processes of an industry to achieve the lowest possible 
production costs, which in turn improved profits because prices did not have to be reduced, 
there being no [or, at least, very little] competition” (Truitt 19-20). Centralized management 
provided the context for scientific management as “the pure expression of the corporate 
solution to late-nineteenth-century overproduction and class war [over income distribution 
and the rights of collective labor]; for its purpose was to create a new relation between 
workers and the mechanical conditions of work, through which capitalist control of the labor 
process could be effected and labor productivity growth […] guaranteed” (Livingston 93). 
The standardization and expansion of production, coordination of operations under 
centralized management, federal and state subsidies for industry, and consolidation of 
companies into trusts and monopolies further transformed the private-property system of 
capitalism into a “corporate-property system” whereby the corporation-as-legal-individual 
could assert its role—in the form generally referred to as the “modern corporation”—as the 
dominant economic and social institution in the United States (McDermott xiv). 
 The creation of the modern corporation is generally credited to Alfred P. Sloan, who 
became president of General Motors in 1923 (Micklethwait and Wooldridge; Truitt). Among 
Sloan’s innovations were autonomized divisions with decentralized operational mechanisms, 
a growth in market research and marketing, and the centralization of strategy and finance in 
corporate headquarters (Micklethwait and Wooldridge). However, it was not until after 
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World War II that the corporate restructuring introduced by Sloan became the norm for 
corporate organization. The rise of the modern corporate form (i.e. the “multidivisional 
structure” of corporate organization that characterized the era of conglomeration) was 
facilitated by political-economic factors occurring in the decades leading up to World War II 
(Truitt 31). In addition to the professionalization of management, “the symbiosis of large-
scale enterprise and scientific management in the organizational complex of the large 
industrial corporations” (Livingston 95), and the reconciliation of labor to capital through 
technological innovation, the dominance of corporate capitalism was facilitated by the 
government’s roll-back of anti-trust measures that had been implemented in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries. 
 Government intervention during the era of monopoly capital did not represent an 
attempt to reassert the authority of the nation-state over that of the corporation; it was instead 
a nominal response to populist resistance to the growing power of trusts and monopolies. The 
major piece of legislation that emerged in the early part of this era was the Sherman Antitrust 
Act of 1890 (Truitt). Although the law was ostensibly designed to enforce competition, such 
enforcement was not carried out on any serious level until the government break-up of 
Standard Oil in 1911. This was followed by the Clayton Act in 1914, which established the 
Federal Trade Commission, legally prohibited monopolies, and practically enforced anti-trust 
measures (Livingston). Although Theodore Roosevelt, Taft and Coolidge heightened 
government regulation of corporate behavior, the administrations of Harding, Coolidge and 
Hoover encouraged (even facilitated) the recombination of businesses “not as trusts, but in 
more direct and sometimes sophisticated ways—through mergers and acquisitions, 
interlocking directorates, and other business relationships” of similar kind (Truitt 22). The 
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administration of Franklin Roosevelt oversaw the implementation of the Securities Act in 
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act in 1934, but these legislative measures were intended 
for the purposes of economic stimulus instead of “antitrust enforcement against big business” 
(Truitt 23). Although the Wagner Act of 1935 legally recognized the right of labor unions to 
organize and collectively bargain with management, it did not seriously undermine the 
economic or political power of monopoly capital. 
Indeed, this time period was characterized by a lack of enforcement (and a return to 
levels of corporate concentration) comparable to that of the 1880s. The reemergence of 
corporate monopolies during World War II was not simply an exigency of war, but New Deal 
policies that favored corporate capital (Eisner). If the corporation had become the dominant 
economic, political and social institution in the United States by World War I, then the onset 
of World War II positioned the corporation as the only form of business organization capable 
of handling not only the demands of war-time production, but also the demands of a post-war 
restructuring of the global economy. 
The Assertion of Corporate Sovereignty, 1: The Era of Conglomeration 
 In the years following World War II, corporate domination of capitalist production 
was enhanced by two innovations: 1) the multidivisional corporate form, which resulted in 
part from product diversification within war-time monopolies; and 2) the conglomerate, 
characterized by the expansion of corporations into multiple industries—primarily through 
mergers and acquisitions (Dugger; Truitt). Rather than operating through monopolies or 
trusts, this era of corporate capitalism operated through a “federation” model of decentralized 
management structures (Truitt 44). This was due in large part to post-war demands for the 
development of foreign markets that required “the economies of scale promised in large 
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corporate enterprise” (Livingston 86). The utility of the corporation for such global 
expansion was directly linked to the multidivisional form, which provided flexibility, 
efficiency, organizational structure, and the ability to raise capital for economic growth. 
Finance and investment became centralized in corporate headquarters, with divisions valued 
according to their abilities to both reduce product costs through vertical integration and 
maximize profits through horizontal integration and product diversification (Phillips). In this 
way, post-war capitalism was characterized by the “internal capital market” of corporations 
(Phillips 40)—which refers to the construction of markets through contracts between 
ostensibly competing corporations, the accumulation of varying business operations within a 
single corporate ownership structure, and the determination of finance allocation according to 
the performance of divisions within a corporation. 
 Culturally speaking, American-based corporations at this time tended to operate with 
a stakeholder view of balancing claims between different groups so that “for some decades 
after World War II [they] were willing to accept a mix of goals; they aimed for good 
products, satisfied customers, and a good effect on the community and nation, and a steady 
return to shareholders” (Gomory and Sylla 107). This is often characterized as “the corporate 
compromise,” where what was good for large corporations such as General Motors was 
generally considered as being for the benefit of the nation as a while. During this time, the 
relationship between the conglomerated corporation and the nation-state reflected this view. 
With the post-war increase in New Deal policies, the Taft-Hartley Act to rein in the National 
Labor Relations Board, and a “new international order” based on the Marshall Plan, Bretton 
Woods and the General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade (GATT) (Eisner 92), the mid-
twentieth century was an era of close ties between corporations and the U.S. nation-state—a 
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sort of “quasi-benevolent oligopoly” with revolving doors between business and government 
(John Kenneth Galbraith qtd. in Micklethwait and Wooldridge 118). The Cold War 
intensified this mutually-beneficial relationship, with former Ford executives running the 
Vietnam War through the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. 
The major legal/regulatory developments of this era—GATT and the Taft-Hartley 
Act (both from 1947)—reflect an attempt to keep corporate/government ties mutually 
beneficial, and to rein in the political power of labor against business. GATT established “the 
modern global trading system” as a way to establish favorable trade partnerships for U.S. 
corporations in a context of “weak international institutions” (Rothkopf 223). The Taft-
Hartley Act, on the other hand, was a response to growing political campaign contributions 
by labor unions. In addition to banning direct campaign contributions by unions or 
companies, the law also banned any expenditures by these organizations in federal elections 
coming “from their general treasury funds” (Rothkopf 187). Government intervention into 
corporate practices, however, was primarily limited to adjudication through the court system 
for settling contract disputes between independent businesses (Phillips). As such, this era 
constitutes an age of the legal form of the business corporation asserting a level of 
sovereignty in regards to not only the economy, but also public policy and the emerging 
global order. 
This emerging global order was beset with a number of drastic changes toward the 
end of the era of conglomeration that instigated a general crisis of capitalism itself, resulting 
in what is commonly referred to as the era of neoliberalism as discussed in Chapter 2. These 
changes occurred both domestically and internationally. The devaluation of the U.S. dollar—
along with price and wage freezes by the Nixon administration—made U.S. companies less 
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competitive than they had been in previous decades. Rampant inflation, instability in the 
stock market and an energy crisis compounded the situation. In 1971, the dismantling of the 
Bretton Woods Agreement delinked national currencies from the gold standard and the U.S. 
dollar, which led to the commodification of currency, further destabilizing currency and 
finance. Technological progress in communications and computing revolutionized global 
markets in industry, finance and logistics, decentering and distributing economic power in 
the international order. The global supremacy of American corporations was further 
challenged by the “evolution of seaborne commerce in the form of container ships” and air 
transport, both of which lowered shipping costs for companies based in other countries 
(Gomory & Sylla, p. 107). This challenge was exacerbated by the formation of the European 
Common Market (Livingston), as well as the massive expansion of competition from Japan 
enabled by the backing of business by banks and the Japanese government through “support 
and direction, [emphasizing] manufacturing for export” of innovative products, most notably 
consumer technologies (Gomory & Sylla, p. 107). All told, these changes rendered the 
American conglomerate model of corporate organization obsolete, offering a potential 
obstacle to corporate sovereignty at the very moment of its assertion. Not surprisingly, 
however, corporations and the nation-state responded to these crises, ushering in the era of 
corporism. 
The Assertion of Corporate Sovereignty, 2: The Era of Corporism 
Beginning roughly with the crisis of capitalism in the 1970s and continuing through 
today, this era has been one of transformation in response to crises of global capital. 
Corporate transformation in this era has occurred primarily through alterations to companies’ 
“internal management structures” (Truitt 53). This restructuring brought about what is 
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alternately referred to as the “post-modern” corporations (Truitt xv), or the “networked 
corporation” (Truitt 61)—characterized by autonomized operating units that focus primarily 
on technology, knowledge and service work, rather than industry. In the era of 
conglomeration (i.e. post-World War II through the 1960s), American corporate capitalism 
was focused almost exclusively on industrial production in mid-western states. This shifted 
in the era of corporism to technological production in Silicon Valley, service-oriented labor 
across the country, and financial markets in the East, as well as the exponential growth of 
agribusiness and post-Fordist modes of production. The technological shift was due in large 
part to growth in military and defense spending, as well as market growth for networked 
digital consumer technologies. The financial shift was directly linked to a number of factors, 
including the collapse of Bretton Woods, the explosion of financial markets and instruments, 
federal deficit spending, monetary policy and attractive interest rates for finance (Dugger). In 
the era of corporism, the corporation transformed into a portfolio and a brand united around a 
shareholder (as opposed to stakeholder) culture of profit motive. Whereas the conglomerate 
form of corporate organization (as the dominant corporate form following World War II) 
focused on diversification within production for the purposes of long-term stability, the 
networked postmodern corporation of the era of corporism operates as a global supply chain 
and production network that diversifies through mergers, acquisitions and buyouts for 
purposes of corporate expansion and quarterly economic growth. This has led to a paradigm 
wherein “corporate purpose has narrowed down to the immediate bottom line while corporate 
planning and administration have expanded” (Dugger xiv). 
 In addition to these trends, changes in military spending and the federal deficit, and in 
product diversification and the organization of management stand as the “major shifts in the 
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composition of the U.S. economy” during this era (Dugger xi). These changes had a 
profound effect on corporate governance. Whereas a corporation’s Board of Directors is 
ostensibly elected by shareholders, “most members of the board are actually chosen by the 
management team, making the board beholden to management, even though the board is 
supposed to oversee management” (Dugger 12). Moreover, the diffusion of responsibility 
through networked organization allows management to avoid responsibility in many cases, 
while directors and officers are concurrently protected from liability. This type of 
decentralized management structure is supported by a set of interrelated changes: the move 
from individual stockholders to investment firms and pension funds; deregulation and 
computerization of financial markets; the massive increase in the number of multinational 
corporations since 1978; and a global network of tax havens. All of these allow corporations 
to transfer capital quickly and easily across national boundaries to avoid paying taxes in their 
country of origin, thereby reinforcing the need for federal deficit spending. 
 The relationship between the U.S. government and the legal form of the corporation 
shifts from one of mutual reinforcement in the era of conglomeration to massive government 
disavowal of its right to regulate business in the era of corporism, as well as the privatization 
of functions traditionally performed by the nation-state.21 Until the Sebanes-Oxley Act in 
2002, and corporate bailouts following the economic crisis of 2007, government intervention 
was limited primarily to monetary policy, combatting inflation, intervening into labor issues 
in favor of industry, and in regards to social issues—most notably environmental regulation 
and workplace conditions. The Reagan administration in particular dropped enforcement of 
                                                 
21 It is important to note that these changes are due primarily to the financialization of the economy and massive 
increases in military spending, “not to the natural workings of the market” (Dugger xii). The partial 
privatization of the nation-state in the era of corporism has occurred most extensively in military, intelligence, 
policing and security, and prisons, which have nothing fundamentally to do with market forces. 
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anti-trust measures and ramped up deregulation efforts in order to allow for corporate 
mergers and reorganizations that could face the technological and market transformations of 
increased globalization (Galambos). Ideologically speaking, the push for privatization and 
deregulation is credited as having gained political force through a combination of research on 
economics at the University of Chicago and on public policy at the University of Virginia of 
the mid-twentieth century. To this must be added, however, a number of more institutional 
and material factors, most notably: 1) corporate sponsorship of conservative think tanks; 2) 
the increasing amount of legislation being written by lobbyists and corporate lawyers; and 3) 
coordinate efforts by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to break “down political and 
national regulatory barriers in regard to flow of investment and ownership” so as to enable 
transnational corporations from “advanced economies” to control a “managed system of 
international [intra-firm] production” (Phillips 32), as opposed to the twentieth-century 
model of corporate capitalism, which was more about coordinating market exchanges within 
the global economy. 
 These administrative, ideological and institutional transformations were supported by 
a series of Supreme Court cases that all culminated in the evisceration of the Taft-Hartley 
Act as related to the assertion of corporate sovereignty through protections of corporate 
speech. In 1976, the Court ruled in Buckley v. Valeo that money spent on elections (whether 
as contributions to candidates or indirect expenditures) is a form of protected speech 
(Rothkopf). This decision was extended to specifically protect corporations in 1978 in the 
ruling on First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, which declared unconstitutional a 
Massachusetts law that prohibited use of a company’s general treasury funds to advocate in 
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regards to state referendums (ibid). The expansion of the political rights of a corporation was 
dealt a set-back in both 1990 and 2003. In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the 
Court supported the intent of Taft-Hartley by upholding a Michigan law that prohibited use 
of a company’s general treasury to influence the election of candidates to political office 
(ibid). This stance was reinforced nearly a decade and a half later when the Court ruled in 
McConnell v. FEC ruled as legal the McCain-Feingold Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 
which in part “blocked corporations or unions from using general treasury funds to pay for 
‘sham issue’ ads (ads that purport to limit themselves to issues but actually urge voting for or 
against a particular candidate) within sixty days of a primary or a general election” (Rothkopf 
189).Any hope the Austin and McConnell decisions may have inspired in the rollback of 
corporate political power was dismantled in 2010, however, with the Citizens United 
decision, which “granted corporations relatively unlimited free-speech rights to spend 
corporate funds in electoral politics” (Gomory and Sylla 102)—thus asserting corporate 
sovereignty through the apotheosis of the persona ficta that had been evolving since the early 
19th century.  
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CHAPTER 3: CORPORATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SOVEREIGNTY 
 
 
Introduction 
 The previous chapter offered an alternative narrative to the contemporary political-
cultural-economic crises in the United States by reframing the discussion from neoliberalism 
to corporism. This chapter builds on that narrative by offering an explanation of how the 
developments leading up to corporism in the United States produced an organic form of 
corporate sovereignty through which a crisis of sovereignty overdetermines the current 
conjuncture, and offers a consideration of a set of signposts that indicate the crisis of 
corporate sovereignty in the current conjuncture. The purpose of this chapter is to 
demonstrate that the crises and contradictions we now face are the result of conjunctural 
articulations of relations of force (i.e. political economy, technology/technocracy and desire) 
in a crisis of sovereignty that operates through the organic development of corporate 
sovereignty. 
 This brings us to the concept of corporate sovereignty, which foregrounds the 
evolving nature of the corporation, as well as the evolution of the relationship between the 
corporation and the nation-state. By demonstrating how corporate capital, state governance 
and cultural practices are mutually constitutive (rather than distinct) phenomena, I seek to 
expand our understanding of the complex historical relations of force that characterize power 
in the current conjuncture. This allows for an understanding of contemporary power relations 
as resulting from the epochal transformation of sovereignty through an organic form of 
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corporate sovereignty. In order to contextualize both this transformation of sovereignty and 
the conjunctural re-articulation of power, the following section presents a consideration of 
the way corporate sovereignty is discussed in scholarly debate. 
Corporate Sovereignty 
Corporate sovereignty is often invoked but rarely conceptualized in any rigorous 
fashion. I will attempt to do so by beginning with a consideration of the ways in which 
researchers have invoked corporate sovereignty. Then, I turn to Joshua Barkan’s 
sophisticated reconceptualization of corporate sovereignty in Corporate Sovereignty: Law 
and Government under Capitalism. This will situate my argument within existing debates 
about the role of the corporation in contemporary society, while also providing an entry point 
for considering corporate sovereignty as a set of contextually-articulated relations of force on 
which the contemporary crisis is being constructed. 
For many authors, the legal framework by which the business corporation most 
effectively constructs and asserts its own practices of authority and governance through, with 
and against that of the nation-state, defines a new form of sovereignty—corporate 
sovereignty, which is distinct from that of the nation-state. The concept of corporate 
sovereignty has been invoked quite frequently (whether implicitly or explicitly) across 
popular culture and scholarly research. While popular books, films and television shows tend 
to present a fairly uncomplicated, dystopian perspective on the power of the corporation in 
modern society—for example the 1987 film Robocop and its 2014 remake, Joel Bakan’s 
2005 book The Corporation, the documentary of the same name based on that book, the 
recent television series Incorporated, and the 2017 movie The Circle (Bakan; The Circle; The 
Corporation; Pastor and Pastor; Robocop 1987; Robocop 2014)—recent scholarly research 
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offers an equally critical but more sophisticated and nuanced perspective (Joshua Barkan; T. 
M. Edwards; Suarez-Villa, Corporate Power, Oligopolies, and the Crisis of the State; 
Suarez-Villa, Globalization and Technocapitalism; Suarez-Villa, Technocapitalism; 
Timberg; Wolin). 
 Concerns over the power of business corporations in relation to the nation-state are by 
no means new. Thomas Jefferson expressed grave misgivings about the centralization of 
power in the federal government, which could potentially give rise to a “government of an 
Aristocracy, founded on banking institutions and monied in corporations under the guise and 
cloak of their favored branches of manufactures[,] commerce and navigation, riding and 
ruling over the plundered ploughman and beggared yeomanry. This will be to [the 
Federalists] a next best blessing to the Monarchy of their first aim, and perhaps the surest 
stepping stone to it” (Jefferson para. 2). This fear has been echoed in a variety of ways from 
the early 19th century through today. The explicit connection of corporate power to the 
concept of sovereignty, however, is (with a few exceptions) relatively recent, and largely 
present only in scholarly literature. Although Sigmund Timberg noted in 1946 that the 
business corporation was at that time a “newcomer to sovereign power” (Timberg 534), the 
concept of corporate sovereignty is (to the best of my knowledge) a 21st-century 
development, as evidenced by the work cited below.  
 Those who have written about corporate sovereignty have rightly posed the question 
of corporate power in relation to the nation-state.22 In 2001, Thomas Edwards discussed the 
emergence of the “corporate nation” (T. M. Edwards 294), which represents the synthesis of 
                                                 
22 With the exception of Barkan, none of the authors cited herein use the term corporate sovereignty. They do, 
however, grapple with the relationship between the corporation and nation-state in regards to the question of 
sovereignty, which makes their work relevant to the argument at hand. 
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“the powers of the nation-state and the TNC [i.e. transnational corporation], creating a new 
geopolitical entity [with its own emergent sovereignty] within the context of information 
geopolitics” (T. M. Edwards 308). From this perspective, the nation-state and the 
transnational corporation are competing sovereignties. The sovereignty of the nation-state 
centers on the institutional authority to manage and control a population within a distinct 
territory. It is legitimated by the explicit recognition of the nation-state by the international 
order of other sovereign nation-states. Corporate sovereignty (on the other hand) is “centered 
on economic control based upon virtual interconnectivity” (T. M. Edwards 293). It arises 
from a corporation’s level of political self-determination through technological innovation 
and economic expansion, which are due primarily to the corporation’s ability to gather, 
process, deploy and (ultimately) control access to information; it requires no legitimation by 
the international order. For Edwards, corporate sovereignty—as “the upheaval and 
redirection of the Westphalian model of nationality” (i.e. the political ordering of Europe as a 
region of sovereign states in co-existence following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648) (T. M. 
Edwards 293)—is a new type of sovereignty, one that emerged from the relatively recent 
paradigm of e-commerce. In this conceptualization, corporate sovereignty (as a form of 
authority based on economic and technological dominance) represents a competing form of 
sovereignty to that of the institutional apparatus of the modern nation-state. 
Sheldon Wolin, on the other hand, frames such sovereignty as the corporate takeover 
of popular sovereignty (i.e. sovereignty as residing in a democratic citizenry), with such a 
takeover potentially resulting in a form of “inverted totalitarianism” wherein “antidemocracy, 
executive predominance, and elite rule are [the] basic elements” (239). For Wolin, this type 
of sovereignty—which “represents the political coming of age of corporate power and the 
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political demobilization of the citizenry” (x), with the corporation as a new sovereign—came 
about as a result of the 20th-century globalization of capitalism as a system of decentralized, 
multiple powers that disrupted the traditional role of the nation-state in the international 
political order. The capitalist system that produces this condition is driven not only by the 
incessant expansion of capital as such, but also by scientific and technological innovation 
which (taken together) operate as the “dynamic powers” of corporate imperialism (Wolin 
132). Politically speaking, inverted totalitarianism operates as a form of managed democracy 
whereby a political system “driven by abstract totalizing powers” encourages “political 
disengagement” among the citizenry by way of propaganda that originates in private media 
organizations (Wolin 44). Such disengagement culminates in  
a political moment when corporate power finally sheds its identification as a purely  
economic phenomenon, confined primarily to a domestic domain of ‘private  
enterprise,’ and evolves into a globalizing copartnership with the state: a double  
transmutation, of corporation and state. The former becomes more political, the latter  
more market oriented. This new political amalgam works at rationalizing domestic  
policies so that it serves the needs of both corporate and state interests while  
defending and projecting those same interests into an increasingly volatile and  
competitive global environment. (Wolin 238-9) 
 
Inverted totalitarianism is the melding of the corporation with the nation-state whereby they 
exchange functions and powers so as to take over sovereignty from the populace. Wolin 
posited that this corporate takeover of popular sovereignty exists in America in the current 
moment as a set of tendencies that have not yet been fully realized. However, the presidential 
election of 2016 may render such a guarded perspective obsolete for those invested in 
Wolin’s argument. The anti-democratic, authoritarian populism that is only partially 
responsible for the outcome of the election, the assertion of unquestionable executive 
privilege expressed in Trump’s public proclamations, and the elite rule of crony capitalism 
embodied in his cabinet selections all point to the conclusion that we may well be witnessing 
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the actualization of what Wolin was only willing to assess as a potential threat to democratic 
governance. But that remains tangential to the task at hand; we are here to assess to the 
relative merits and shortcomings of corporate sovereignty as a concept. 
 Another researcher who invokes the problem of corporate sovereignty, albeit without 
actually using the term is Luis Suarez-Villa, who refers to this problem alternately as 
“technocapitalist corporatism” (Suarez-Villa, Technocapitalism 4) and “neo-oligarchy” 
(Suarez-Villa, Corporate Power, Oligopolies, and the Crisis of the State 295). 
Technocapitalist corporatism refers to the emergent melding of technocapitalism—“a new 
form of capitalism that is heavily grounded on corporate power and its exploitation of 
technological creativity” (Suarez-Villa, Technocapitalism 3)—and corporatism—“the wide-
ranging influence of corporate power on society, including its governance, and on nature” 
(Suarez-Villa, Technocapitalism 1-2). Neo-oligarchy refers to the combination of hegemonic 
oligopoly (i.e. dominant economic power residing in the hands of a small number of large 
corporations) and a mode of “corporatocratic governance” (i.e. the colonization of 
governance by the corporation, and its expression through the agendas of a small number of 
political and corporate elites) (Suarez-Villa, Corporate Power, Oligopolies, and the Crisis of 
the State 295). For Suarez-Villa, this form of sovereignty is more about the colonization of 
social relations on a global scale than it is about a problem of the nation-state per se; it is less 
a problem of state sovereignty than it is a problem of the ordering of social, political and 
economic relations amongst the global citizenry. Regardless of the term employed, Suarez 
Villa’s argument draws our attention to “the technological rationality” of corporate 
sovereignty, which “combines technique—the rational character of technology—with the 
relations of power—the global projection of corporate power in this case—and with the 
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ideological dimension of technocapitalist corporate power” (Suarez-Villa, Globalization and 
Technocapitalism 4). Sovereignty, in this sense, is a parasitic mode of hierarchical control 
that fundamentally exploits both nature and society for its own power. This argument is in 
many ways a variation on Wolin’s, with corporate sovereignty understood as a form of 
plutocracy. 
The works of Edwards, Wolin, and Villa-Suarez rightly frame the question of 
corporate sovereignty as being both a political-economic and a technological (or 
technocratic) one, inasmuch as corporate sovereignty is as much a construction of political-
economic and technological forces as it is a construction of the legal system. Moreover, for 
all these authors, corporate sovereignty is a relatively recent development. Wolin places the 
emergence of such sovereignty in the middle of the 20th century, when the Eurocentric 
geopolitical order of previous centuries was disrupted by two world wars and replaced by a 
new order centered on the growing economic and geopolitical power of the United States. 
Edwards places the emergence of corporate sovereignty much later, within the paradigm of 
“e-commerce” that resulted from the technological changes of the late 1990s and early 200s 
(T. M. Edwards 293). It is unclear exactly when Suarez-Villa locates the emergence of 
corporate sovereignty, but it can be reasonably assumed from his argument that this is a 
development of what is commonly referred to as neoliberalism—an era that is supposed to 
have begun in the late 20th century. What is presumed to be novel in each of these works is 
(as demonstrated in the previous chapter) actually much older, extending back to the colonial 
foundations of the United States.  
Joshua Barkan’s Corporate Sovereignty: Law & Government under Capitalism offers 
a different and, I believe, more useful framework for thinking through corporate sovereignty. 
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Barkan begins by addressing two fundamental errors in scholarship on the subject: 1) a 
binary logic that posits a clear, distinct demarcation between the corporation as an institution 
and the nation-state; and 2) the assumption that corporate intrusion into regulation, policy 
and politics is undue and erroneous. All of the authors cited above presuppose an essential 
distinction between the corporation and the nation-state. What is most significant to the 
argument here, however, is that this binarism relies on a particular model of nation-state 
sovereignty as a starting point for considering sovereignty itself. This model (taking as its 
starting point the Peace of Westphalia in 1648) defines sovereignty in terms of the right of a 
given nation-state to govern its internationally-recognized territory and population without 
interference from other nation-states (Glanville).  
But for Barkan, “corporate power and sovereign power are ontologically linked. […] 
The Anglo-American corporation and modern political sovereignty are founded in and bound 
together through a principle of legally sanctioned immunity from law” (4). The very legal 
foundations of the corporation as an economic, social and political institution are precisely 
what give corporations the right to undermine political sovereignty in that they are granted 
the rights of citizenship without the concurrent responsibilities expected of human citizens. 
This amounts to an ontological “doubling” relationship between the nation-state and the 
corporation “in which the fate of state sovereignty and corporate power are [and always have 
been] conjoined and also in conflict” (ibid). This doubling operates not only on an 
ontological level, but in the various techniques by which each institution asserts authority, 
establishes order and manages populations, territories and infrastructure—in short, the ways 
in which each institution commands power. The corporation and the modern nation-state are 
mutually-constitutive and mutually-dependent for their legitimation in that “modern state 
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sovereignty is founded in and anchored to a figure of the corporate political body. Likewise, 
modern corporate power emerges from and mobilizes apparatuses of sovereignty, discipline, 
and government” (Joshua Barkan 6).  
 In order to theorize this relationship, Barkan turns to the work of Giorgio Agamben 
who, working from Carl Schmitt, defines sovereignty as the authority to create the ban—the 
exception to law—and the authority to abandon sovereign responsibility to a population in 
order to preserve the security of the political community. In other words, the sovereign is the 
one who can establish and transgress the “boundaries of law” (Joshua Barkan 7). Within this 
perspective, then, corporate sovereignty is a product of and operates at the boundaries of the 
nation-state—at once legitimated by and imbricated with, yet distinct from and often at odds 
with, the legal framework of nation-state sovereignty. It derives from the law while also 
playing a role in establishing the law and operating as exception to the law. 
 This conceptualization of corporate sovereignty is significant in a number of ways. 
Temporally, Barkan’s research demonstrates that the problem of corporate sovereignty is by 
no means new, but instead constitutes a mode of sovereignty constructed through colonial 
practices informed by medieval imaginaries of collective property. Spatially, Barkan’s rids us 
of the notion that that the nation-state and the corporation are in any way distinct, separate 
institutions, always at odds with one another. The genealogy offered in Corporate 
Sovereignty focuses on questions of law—its evolution and functions—as a way of 
demonstrating the ontological doubling of nation-state and corporate sovereignty. Later in 
this chapter, I take up Barkan’s invitation to expand his genealogy beyond the framework of 
the law, to consider the political-economic, technological/technocratic, socio-psychological 
and cultural factors that play into this account of corporate sovereignty, so that we can better 
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understand how corporate sovereignty functions in the evolution of sovereignty. But for now, 
the significance of the move from neoliberalism to corporate sovereignty through corporism 
is found in the way it allows us to consider corporate sovereignty as an organic form of a 
crisis of sovereignty that overdetermines the current conjuncture. Evidence of this crisis may 
be most pronounced in the now-infamous Citizens United case that sanctioned unlimited 
corporate campaign expenditures and ensconced the capitalist corporation as the privileged 
citizen and subject of democratic governance, but this must be understood within the context 
of the historical construction and assertion of corporate sovereignty as an organic form—one 
whose claim to power was established in colonial charters and state legislatures, made robust 
by the Industrial Revolution, legally sanctified through the persona ficta of corporate 
legitimation by the nation-state, made essential to government and governance through the 
hot and cold wars of the twentieth century, and let loose to claim its centuries-delayed seat on 
the throne in the globalized economy of the current conjuncture. 
Sovereignty  
It is the notion of sovereignty itself that allowed the modern-nation state to emerge in 
part as a response to earlier kinship, monarchical and (most significantly) divine modes of 
authority and governance. If we consider the relationship between the nation-state and the 
corporation, this leads me to claim that the question of power in the contemporary 
conjuncture is ultimately a question of sovereignty. In order to demonstrate this, I need to 
offer some thoughts on the sovereignty of the nation-state in order to arrive at a 
reconsideration of sovereignty writ large.   
 The understanding of sovereignty related to the modern nation-state owes much to 
Carl Schmitt, whose work on the subject can be divided into two phases. In Schmitt’s earlier 
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work, “the connection of actual power with the legally highest power is the fundamental 
problem of the concept of sovereignty” (Schmitt, Political Theology 18). It is in this sense a 
question of legal form and decision-making: Who possesses authority as both belonging to 
yet transcending the legal system? This question forms the basis for considering the 
sovereignty of the nation-state. “The sovereign produces and guarantees the situation [of the 
law] in its totality. He [sic] has the monopoly over the last decision. Therein resides the 
essence of the state’s sovereignty, which must be juristically defined correctly, not as the 
monopoly to coerce or to rule, but as the monopoly to decide” (Schmitt, Political Theology 
13). In Schmitt’s later work, the question of sovereignty is considered in more philosophical 
terms, in so far as “power needs the sovereign body to become visible, and perceivable, at the 
phenomenological level while having its own raison d’etre from an ontological perspective” 
(Ragazzoni 61). This understanding of the connection between sovereignty and power brings 
a metaphysical implication to Schmitt’s work, which before had been concerned primarily 
with the constitutional and legal implications of the sovereign.  
 While the exercise of power—its phenomenology—is time-bound and biased by the  
limits of human nature, the essence of power—its ontology—transcends the physical  
appearance, contingent decisions, and specific actions of the holder of power. At the  
phenomenological level, power needs the ruler and his [sic] body; at the ontological  
level, power transcends both. This […] is the tragic telos of modernity—the point  
where its fragile foundations are unveiled and the façade of human sovereignty is  
inexorably disfigured. (Ragazzoni 67) 
 
There is always, then, a metaphysics to politics because sovereignty is fundamentally 
a question of who has ultimate authority (Schmitt, Political Theology II). This combination 
of legal and metaphysical concerns becomes paramount when considering, first, the notion of 
nation-state sovereignty (as the primary mode of modern sovereignty). The nation-state—as 
the modern form of the sovereign—is that which (through recognition of its authority in an 
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international order of nation-states) makes decisions on the balance between obedience and 
security (Schmitt, The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes). Nation-state 
sovereignty is usually understood as being the “final and absolute political authority in the 
political community” (F.H. Hinsley, quoted in Onuf 429), or in a given territory. It is a social 
construction of modernity involving a consideration of territory, population, authority and 
recognition (Biersteker & Weber), with the state-as-sovereign understood “in terms of 
authority relations which are worked out in practice” in a global system of sovereign states 
(Weber 11). If (as argued by Jens Bartelson) sovereignty is that which dominates the power 
structure in a particular socio-historical context—that which provides the conditions of 
possibility for power relations in that context—then state sovereignty functions as the legal 
and political authority over a particular territory and population.  
But we can also consider sovereignty in relation to another dominant institution of the 
modern age—the corporation. While the main points of Joshua Barkan’s contribution have 
already been addressed, what remains is to briefly consider two important, interrelated 
aspects of sovereignty that Barkan identifies. The first is that sovereignty itself is always 
already fundamentally corporate. The second (from Thomas Hobbes) is that political 
sovereignty is a secular substitute for the divine sovereign. These two aspects come together 
in the following perspective: 
Before the corporation had a relation with state power, and long before it had any  
relation to commerce or capitalism, it was a religious image that defined the relation  
between particular entities in subordination to a universal totality. […] The corporate  
form not only gave states a theological foundation but also provided a means for  
conceptualizing sovereignty as a superior power over both individuals and rulers that  
was unified through time and across space. (Joshua Barkan 23) 
 
 This perspective is particularly important to my analysis in Chapter 5 of the 
relationship between the nation-state and the corporation as it manifests through the 
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mechanisms and operations—the rearticulated relations of force—of fascist power in the 
current conjuncture. It opens a perspective on the problem of power that the Westphalian 
model of sovereignty (i.e. the framework that undergirds most contemporary discussions of 
political and corporate sovereignty) cannot accommodate. By forcing us to reassess 
sovereignty in older, religious terms of “the highest, legally independent, underived power” 
(Schmitt, Political Theology 17), it also forces us to confront the limitations of the concept of 
corporate sovereignty, even the sophisticated and nuanced form provided by Barkan. The 
problem here is Barkan’s reliance on Agamben’s definition (by way of Schmitt) of 
sovereignty. 
 While I am hesitant to make the assertion that Agamben misreads Schmitt, I will go 
so far as to suggest that Agamben’s uptake of Schmitt (at least as deployed by Barkan) is too 
simplistic and does not get to the heart of Schmitt’s argument. Carl Schmitt does indeed 
define the sovereign as “he [sic] who decides the exception” (Schmitt, Political Theology 5). 
However, this definition is based on the only-implicitly acknowledged assumption that 
deciding on the exception is simply a surface-level manifestation of sovereignty; it is not the 
exception but the authority to make a final decision that actually defines the sovereign. 
Because it is (as Schmitt himself asserts) “unlimited authority” that characterizes an 
exception (Schmitt, Political Theology 12); it is “the monopoly over the last decision” that 
constitutes sovereignty, whether that decision be ban or other (Schmitt, Political Theology 
13). This supports an understanding of sovereignty in terms more metaphysical than legal. 
Schmitt, Agamben and Barkan are all concerned with the question of sovereignty in regards 
to the law. In this sense, then, a definition of sovereignty as the authority to decide the 
exception to the law is perfectly appropriate. If, however, we are to expand our concern 
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beyond the legal form, I suggest a return to an older definition of sovereignty, the definition 
against which Schmitt was arguing in the first place: “sovereignty is the highest, legally 
independent, underived power” (Schmitt, Political Theology 17).  
Sovereignty is understood in this sense as the network—the very totality—of power 
within which dominant institutions (e.g. nation-states, corporations, inter- and supra-national 
organizations) vie for and negotiate over ultimate authority in a variety of overlapping spatio-
temporal contexts within a global system of economic production, distribution and 
consumption, political and social institutions, and cultural practices, as well as legal 
frameworks. Sovereignty is the authority over the conditions of possibility of the world. 
Corporate sovereignty points us to an epochal transformation of sovereignty whereby the 
corporate form is attempting to construct itself as a contradictory, transcendent-yet-
immanent, universal, eternal ultimate authority over all. In order to provide more specific 
detail as to how the contemporary conjuncture (characterized here as the era of corporism) is 
characterized by struggles resulting from the organic development of corporate sovereignty 
resulting in an organic crisis of sovereignty itself, the following section presents three 
signposts (or indicators) of the vectors of force that, articulated through corporate 
sovereignty, overdetermine this conjuncture. 
Signposts of Corporate Sovereignty in the Era of Corporism 
 As evidenced in the previous pages, the economic power of the corporation 
comprises—in conjunction with the recognition of the corporation as a legal individual—a 
form of political power that has been enhanced in recent years by a number of legislative and 
judicial actions (e.g. the Citizens United v. Federal Election Committee Supreme Court 
decision in 2010) and the work of non-profit corporations and lobbying groups (e.g. the 
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American Legislative Exchange Council and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce). The political 
and economic power engendered by these changes also produce a form of cultural power 
whereby the corporation plays a dominant role in organizing society through its roles in 
organizing labor, and in producing the technological innovations through which personal and 
social life are increasingly organized. When analyzed in relation to both the legal recognition 
of the corporation as an individual with constitutional rights and the contingent independence 
of corporations from the control of the nation-state, the political, economic and cultural 
power of the corporation comprise a new form of sovereignty that has yet to be sufficiently 
addressed.  
This section presents three indicators of corporate sovereignty as a way to consider 
the contemporary articulations of corporate sovereignty, specifically its conjunctural 
assertion as a set of articulated force relations that characterize a mode of power. Although 
these conjuncturally-articulated forces are treated distinctly for the purposes of analysis (e.g. 
ALEC is discussed in relation to political economy), these signposts should be considered as 
a constellation of articulated mechanisms of corporate sovereignty, imbricated in a network 
of power with each of the forces operating in different yet concurrent ways in all of the 
institutions/phenomena under consideration. For example, although my discussion of 
DARPA is analyzed primarily in regards to questions of technology/technocracy, it has (as 
will be demonstrated) profound implications regarding political economy and desire. The 
phenomena under consideration in this section are organized as follows: 1) a consideration of 
the role of ALEC in a corporate network committed to challenging or at least rearticulating 
state sovereignty to and through corporate sovereignty; 2) a consideration of the relationship 
between DARPA and major Silicon Valley corporations, resulting in changing articulations 
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of state and corporate sovereignties, through the mediations of military agendas and 
technological developments; and 3) a consideration of corporate investment in the 
Singularity through augmented reality and artificial intelligence, as a rearticulation of 
temporality and desiring subjectivities, displacing the relation of citizen/state into that of 
consciousness/corporation. 
American Legislative Exchange Council23  
 In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court legitimated unlimited corporate political 
expenditures in the now-infamous Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission decision. 
Many have characterized this as a novel and disastrous intrusion of corporate capital into the 
practices of American democracy. As demonstrated above, however, Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission is merely the most recent episode in the evolving relationship 
between the nation-state and the corporation as a legal form. By focusing so much on this 
particular decision, we miss the historical evolution—one that stretches back to the colonial 
foundations of the country.  
Moreover, the focus on Citizens United carries with it two key misassumptions about 
the problem of corporate interference in American democracy. First, such focus places 
primary emphasis on the role of money in political campaigns. But, as I will demonstrate, the 
more pervasive and pernicious influence involves private organizations engaged in drafting 
public policy. Second, the focus on Citizens United highlights the notion of corporate 
personhood that arose from the 14th Amendment, which provides equal protection under the 
                                                 
23 Technically, the American Legislative Exchange Council is not a privately-owned, publicly-traded business 
corporation. It is a 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation. However, executives from these business corporations are 
heavily represented among ALEC’s membership. As such, ALEC can be considered as pertinent to my 
argument given the fact that its agenda is the result of these business interests, and the model legislation it 
promotes is written and approved by its corporate members. 
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law for all citizens. But, two other equally important sources of the problem are actually the 
10th Amendment, which expresses the federalist mode of governance as a way of ensuring 
states’ sovereignty against that of the federal government, and Article 5, which allows for the 
convening of a second Constitutional Convention under particular circumstances. 
In order to facilitate a richer understanding of the complex articulation of state and 
corporate sovereignty, I want to examine the role of the American Legislative Exchange 
Council (ALEC) in American politics. Legally speaking, ALEC is a 501(c)(3) non-profit, 
tax-exempt charitable organization (American Association for Justice; Anderson and 
Donchik). Practically, however, ALEC is an “ideological think tank” (Ness and Gandara 
259) that brings together corporate executives and state legislators in closed-door sessions to 
draft “model or template bills that are introduced or promoted by ALEC members within 
state legislatures” (Anderson and Donchik 326). Although decades old, ALEC has only 
recently figured into public discourse concerning the political behavior of corporations. As 
such, its operations as part of the machinery of corporate sovereignty have yet to be 
adequately analyzed. I hope to at least begin to address this shortcoming. 
In 1973, Paul Weyrich (co-founder of the Heritage Foundation and coiner of the term 
“Moral Majority”) founded ALEC as a way of advancing conservative principles of limited 
government, free market economic policy and the advancement of state sovereignty over that 
of the nation-state (American Association for Justice; Anderson and Donchik; Butz, Fix and 
Mitchell). The organization’s original focus was on defeating “high-profile liberal social 
policies, such as the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment, abortion rights, gun control, 
DC voting rights in Congress, and gay rights” (Hertel-Fernandez 8). In the 1980s, the 
organization began to have influence with the Reagan administration by combining their 
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social platform with an increased focus on targeted business interests. With the uptake of 
ALEC policy recommendations by the Reagan administration, the organization was able to 
begin its long-term strategy of shifting public policy to the political right (Anderson and 
Donchik). By the 1990s, ALEC’s began to publicly downplay its social platform in favor of 
its pro-business agenda in order to attract corporate sponsorship (Hertel-Fernandez). In spite 
of this, the organization nearly folded in the late 1990s. In 1997, ALEC was rescued by 
Charles Koch with a $430,000 loan (Mayer). Koch Industries has served on the corporate 
board of ALEC ever since (Graves). The significance of Charles and David Koch to ALEC’s 
success will be discussed in more detail shortly. Before that, however, ALEC’s most recent 
history and legislative projects merit discussion. 
With financial and ideological guidance from the Koch Brothers, ALEC reached peak 
membership around 2004, when it “could claim nearly a third of all state legislators as 
members” (Hertel-Fernandez 2). Although it does not release its corporate membership 
roster, past and current members include representatives from a wide array of industries, 
including Corrections Corporation of America, GEO Group, Coca Cola, Microsoft, Kraft 
Foods, Hewlett Packard, Miller Coors, PepsiCo, McDonald’s, Ford, Shell, BP, Google, 
Facebook, eBay, Yelp, Exxon Mobil, and TransCanada Pipelines (American Association for 
Justice; Burkhardt; Hamburger; Pilkington; Taylor; Verma). This last company should give 
us pause because TransCanada Pipelines’ membership in ALEC means that a foreign 
corporation has a direct hand in writing American law. Although corporate membership often 
drops in the wake of public revelations concerning ALEC’s behavior (e.g. their support of 
Stand Your Ground Laws in the wake of the Trayvon Martin murder), those companies that 
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do withdraw often rejoin after a year or two because of the immense sway ALEC has in 
pushing pro-corporate public policies.  
 On average, ALEC authors between 600 and 800 bills a year, with between 100 and 
200 of those actually being passed by state legislatures (Hertel-Fernandez; Jacobs). These 
bills are debated by working groups in closed-door sessions at ALEC’s yearly convention 
with absolutely no public input or oversight. Corporate members have an equal vote to 
legislative members and also have veto power over any measure. The actual work of crafting 
and lobbying for ALEC-backed legislation is done by Shook, Hardy and Bacon—a corporate 
defense firm with deep ties to the pharmaceutical and tobacco industries (American 
Association for Justice). Once a model bill is approved by ALEC for release, versions of it 
are given to legislative members who take it back to their home states where they implement 
a shotgun approach of “trying to get the exact same laws [passed in multiple states] at the 
exact same time. The same language, the same talking points, the same arguments” in order 
to overwhelm state legislatures with little time for debate (Ron Johnson, R—WI qtd. in 
Verma). So what types of legislation are being written, advanced and brought to enactment 
by this coalition of corporate executives, corporate lawyers and right-wing state legislators in 
the subversion of the democratic process?  
ALEC’s legislative agenda reads like a wish list of the far-right—gun rights, rollback 
of environmental regulations, voting restrictions, destruction of public sector unions, limiting 
the ability of citizens to sue corporations for bad practices and illegal activities, rollback of 
civil rights and gay rights, opposing renewable energy, privatization of prisons and 
immigration detention centers, restrictive immigration policies, minimum wage caps, limiting 
the ability of local and county governments to govern, defunding of public schools, 
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mandatory minimum sentencing, repeal of the estate tax, blocking public health care and 
insurance, cutting the federal corporate tax rate, eviscerating labor standards and deregulation 
of finance, industry and the economy, just to name a few (American Legislative Exchange 
Council; American Association for Justice; Anderson; Anderson and Donchik; Joanne 
Barkan; Beall; Bentele and O’Brien; Center for Media and Democracy; Dagan and Teles; 
Doty and Wheatly; Dreier; Duda; Fogarty, Curtis, et al.; Garrett; Garrett and Jansa; Graves; 
Green; Gross and Davies; Haeder and Weimer; Hess and Mai; Hogler “Constitutionalizing 
Paycheck Protection”; Hogler “Repeal Section 14(b) of Taft-Hartley”; Hurd and Lee; 
Kuykendall; Longazel, Berman and Flery-Steiner; Martin; Meagher; Milkman; Nichols; 
Parkison; Pilkington; Potter; Rogers and Dresser; Underwood; Warrick; Willing). As odd as 
it may seem, however, ALEC’s legislative agenda is not the biggest cause for concern. 
Since its bailout by Charles Koch in 1990s, the American Legislative Exchange 
Council has become the epicenter of a network of organizations—including Americans for 
Prosperity, Heartland Institute, Cato Institute, Aspen Institute, State Policy Network, Club for 
Growth, Americans for Tax Reform; Freedom Partners, Competitive Enterprise Institute, 
national Governors’ Association, national Conference of State Legislatures, Council of State 
Governments, State Legislative Leaders Foundation, Citizens for Self-Governance, and 
Compact for America (Anderson and Donchik; Balz; Bottari; Cox, Barry and Glantz; 
Hayden, Garner and Hoffman; Mayer; Skocpol and Hertel-Fernandez; Taylor)—working 
towards the Koch brothers’ ultimate objective: the rewriting of the U.S. Constitution to create 
a corporate state. This push began in earnest in 1995 with a “federalism” summit aimed at 
giving states a larger voice in federal legislation, allowing states to produce Constitutional 
amendments, and limiting the federal government’s “ability to issue mandates on states” 
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(Balz A17). Currently, this effort (led by ALEC’s Balanced Budget Amendment Task Force, 
Compact for America and Citizens for Self-Governance) is focused on getting states to adopt 
resolutions requiring the federal government to operate with a balanced budget or face a 
second Constitutional Convention (Armiak; Bottari; Exposed by CMD Editors; Taylor; 
Wines). By ALEC’s figures, twenty-eight of the thirty-four required states have adopted such 
a resolution.24 If the required number is reached, a Convention of States can be called 
(according to Article 5 of the Constitution), at which ALEC-sponsored state legislators plan 
to propose “a sweeping rewrite of the Constitution that would allow states to opt out of 
Supreme Court rulings and federal laws they don’t like” (Armiak para. 13), stripping “the 
executive branch of the power to issue rules without congressional approval if they have an 
annual effect of $100 million or more” (Armiak para. 14), and overturning “the 17th 
Amendment, thereby stripping voters of their right to elect U.S. Senators and handing that 
power over to state legislators” (Armiak para. 36). Given the influence of Koch Industries 
and other corporate executives on ALEC and similar organizations, the calling of a 
Constitutional Convention of this nature would guarantee the rewriting of the U.S. 
Constitution according to the demands of corporate capital. In light of all of this, ALEC must 
be considered as a political-economic relation of force in the construction and assertion of 
corporate sovereignty in that the organization deploys the economic power of its corporate 
members to exploit and reorganize the legal and constitutional framework of the nation-state 
to create a corporate state, either returning the states to the status of independent corporations 
or reconstructing them as subsidiaries or private corporations. The following section shifts 
focus, examining both the ways in which a particular agency of the federal government has 
                                                 
24 This number is seriously contested. Independent investigators claim that “valid applying resolutions” of this 
nature have actually been passed by no more than eleven and as few as nine states (Bottari para. 21). 
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and continues to reform particular capitalist corporations, and the ways in which these 
changes have allowed corporations to reform particular functions of the federal government. 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
 “Geeks on acid, dreaming of the future. But financed by the military industrial 
complex. Complicated.”   —Jonathan Taplan 
 
The story of technological innovation and economic progress in America most often 
mythologizes the role of private initiative and enterprise, with the entrepreneur and ‘market 
forces’ cast as the heroic prime movers of such progress. Within this narrative, the nation-
state is most often cast as either villain or impediment, a lumbering institution that drains 
resources from and hinders innovation in the private sector. But even the most cursory 
examination of the recent history of technological innovation in America is enough to expose 
such a narrative as outright fiction. Since the onset of the Cold War, in fact, the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)—the research-and-development (R&D) and 
venture capital wing of the Department of Defense—has been a primary funder, facilitator 
and organizer of technological innovation in this country. DARPA provides venture capital 
for corporate and academic technological innovations often before private venture capitalists 
are willing to risk the investment (Holden), and offers capital to tech start-ups to develop 
“major contributions to the war fighter [i.e. soldier] and commercialized products useful for 
both the military and civilian sector” (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
frontispiece). The history of DARPA exposes the fundamental imbrication of corporate and 
military agendas in technological progress in the United States (Weinberger). 
 The agency was founded in 1958 as the Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(ARPA), in response to the Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik.25 The imbrication of corporate 
                                                 
25 “Defense” was added to its name in 1972 (Belfiore). 
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and military agendas can be traced to the agency’s earliest days. It was greenlit by Neil 
McElroy—Secretary of Defense under President Eisenhower—and first directed by Roy 
Johnson, both of whom came to government from the corporate sector; McElroy headed 
Proctor & Gamble prior to government service, while Johnson had been a vice president at 
General Electric (GE). As noted earlier in Chapter 2, the appointment of corporate executives 
to government positions was typical of this era. And while the agency was originally tasked 
with engineering projects related to space exploration, its mission soon shifted to questions of 
military technology for counterinsurgency with the formation of the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA) in the same year. For example, one of ARPA’s first major 
projects was to establish a Combat Development and Test Center in Saigon in 1961, the aim 
of which was “to develop technology suited for fighting insurgents in Vietnam’s jungles” 
(Weinberger 4-5). The center’s projects combined technological development, social science 
research and military strategy, and became the model for the Defense Department’s global 
counterinsurgency push—first in Southeast Asia and later spreading to the Middle East. The 
centrality of ARPA to the relationship between corporate technology and military 
technocracy was solidified during the Cuban Missile Crisis, when IBM’s 473L computers 
were first used by the Pentagon “to process real-time information” on military allocations 
and operational data (Weinberger 106). The implications of these examples are two-fold: 1) 
current technological progress in the United States must be analyzed within the context of 
post-World War II military objectives;26 and 2) such progress can only be understood within 
the context of the relationship between the nation-state and corporate capitalism. 
                                                 
26 Of course, this context is only part of a longer history of technological innovation being the result of 
objectives, intentions, purposes, agendas, needs, crises, and innovations that are not necessarily (or primarily) 
technological. For instance, Raymond William’s work on television demonstrates the need to reject both 
“technological determinism” (i.e. the assumption that research and development are “self-generating” in that 
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 These early examples are important for considering the construction and assertion of 
corporate sovereignty in the United States because they establish the fundamental 
interdependence between the nation-state and the business corporation in considering 
technological development and technocratic governance as a force vector in an emerging 
form of corporate sovereignty. Any analysis of the role of DARPA in the corporate 
development of technology must be considered in the context of the post-World War II 
national security apparatus. In the aftermath of the war, the Department of Defense—“driven 
by the politics of national security and by [its] belief in the competitive advantages of high 
technology”—began pouring unprecedented amounts of money into scientific R&D, with 
levels as high as $5.5 billion yearly by 1960 (Leslie 1). The vast majority of this money was 
funneled to defense contracting corporations, foremost among them AT&T, General 
Dynamics, GE, and Lockheed. All told, the Pentagon (primarily through ARPA) “accounted 
for about a third of all industrial R&D spending”—and three-quarters of all aerospace, 
computing and electronics R&D spending—in post-war America (Leslie 2).  
The amount of public funds diverted to the corporate sector through defense contracts 
for technological innovation continued to grow until a brief decline in the 1970s. As noted by 
Stuart Leslie, this decline was not due to a decrease in military influence on scientific and 
technological innovation, however, but to increased spending by NASA, the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH), and the National Science Foundation (NSF). This brief decline 
ended with the Reagan-era defense build-up, which ultimately elevated “military spending 
                                                 
“new technologies are invented as it were in an independent sphere, and then create new societies or new 
human conditions”) and the view of “symptomatic technology” (i.e. the assumption that particular technologies 
are indirect “by-products of a social process that is otherwise determined”) (6). My perspective follows 
Williams in understanding technology “as being looked for and developed with certain purposes and practices 
already in mind” and as being central to these “known social needs, purposes and practices” (7). 
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(in constant dollars) past the record levels of the mid-1960s” (Leslie 1). From the end of the 
Cold War through the late 1990s, government spending accounted for roughly one-third of 
all industrial R&D funding for computing alone (National Research Council). From 2003 to 
2007, the Department of Defense saw a 25% budget increase specifically related to 
DARPA’s mission “to solve national-level technology problems, foster high-risk/high-payoff 
military technologies to enable operational dominance, and avoid technological surprise” 
(“Defense Space Activities”).27 As noted by none other than Eric Schmidt—former executive 
chairman of Google and Alphabet, Inc.—Department of Defense spending (conducted 
primarily through DARPA is directly responsible for “almost all of the scientific and 
technological research that we take for granted now” (quoted in Zakaria).  
Since the onset of the Cold War, the Department of Defense has been the “largest 
funder of computing and communications research” (National Research Council 55), with 
DARPA “providing more support for computer science research than all other federal 
agencies combined” (National Research Council 56) [emphasis added]. The agency now 
operates with approximately $3 billion in yearly funding with much of that funding 
ultimately benefitting (either directly or indirectly) corporations such as Apple, AT&T, 
Google, IBM, Microsoft, SpaceX and Tesla, Inc.28 DARPA’s largesse has supported a wide 
                                                 
27 Defense spending on technological innovation is by no means limited to the corporate sector. The impact of 
Pentagon (most notably DARPA) funding on university research agendas has been amply demonstrated 
(Belfiore; Cohen; Kaplan; Leslie; Markoff, “Making Industrial Policy at the Pentagon”; Noble; Rifkin). 
Although not alone, Stanford and MIT have been the main benefactors of Pentagon funding. These universities 
have produced not only the technologies (and the science behind them) that predominate the current 
conjuncture, but also the business leaders that determine the course of technological innovation in Silicon 
Valley. Due to the scope of my argument, however, this case study is limited to a consideration of the impact of 
DARPA on the corporate sector. 
 
28 These corporations are no longer as reliant on government funding and contracts as they once were, as 
evidenced by two recent episodes: 1) Google’s recent decision not to renew its contract with the Pentagon on 
the Maven project, “which uses artificial intelligence to interpret video images and could be used to improve the 
targeting of drone strikes” (Shane, Metz, and Wakabayashi para. 4), after protests and resignations by company 
employees; and 2) Apple’s refusal of a court order requested by the FBI to decrypt the iPhone of Syed Rizwan 
99 
 
array of projects, including (but not limited to) integrated computing systems (most notably 
ARPANET, the precursor to the internet), brain-machine interfacing, cognitive computing, 
virtual reality, GPS, voice and facial recognition, HD flat panel display, fiber optic networks, 
software engineering, robotics, cell phones, autonomous vehicles and (as will be analyzed in 
more detail in the next case study) artificial intelligence (Ackerman; Belfiore; Cohen; 
Council on Foreign Relations; Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency; Defense Space 
Activities; Kaplan; Leslie; Markoff, “Acquisition Adds to Menagerie of Robots”; National 
Research Council; Rifkin; Southerland; U.S. Department of Commerce). Of course, the most 
publicly acknowledged project to have been realized out of DARPA funding and research is 
the internet. As significant as this is, however, it is rivaled by the agency’s role in developing 
one of the most impactful recent innovations; “every single technology on your smart phone 
was created by [DARPA] from theory to gOS [i.e. the operating system] to the touch screen” 
(Council on Foreign Relations). 
 But this is not just about the specific projects themselves. The exportation of 
DARPA’s technocratic operations into the corporate sector is also of central significance. As 
the de facto organizer of and investor for the majority of civilian technologies, DARPA 
selects and promotes innovations that will ultimately have military use, inevitably 
                                                 
Farook—the perpetrator of the mass shooting in San Bernardino in 2015—even after the FBI first offered to pay 
the company to do so (Etzioni). These examples strengthen my argument in that they indicate the assertion of 
corporate sovereignty against that of the nation-state. However, Google will continue to work on other military 
projects for the Pentagon that do not directly involve weapons systems (Quinn). Moreover, the FBI was 
eventually able to decrypt the operating system, but only by paying $1.34 million to an undisclosed corporation 
(“FBI Reveal”). During their legal battle, Apple did give the FBI access to Farook’s iCloud account and also 
gave the agency access to emails of Artem Vaulin, owner of the largest torrent site in the world, so they could 
charge him with money laundering and copyright infringement (Mansfield-Devine; Rosen). In fact, Apple 
regularly helps law enforcement with “bypassing the passcodes of seized phones in response to a valid court 
order and search warrants” (Potapchuck 1405). In fact, Google and Apple (along with Facebook and Uber) 
“collectively employ a couple of dozen former analysts for America’s spy agencies” (Yadron). These facts also 
strengthen my argument in that they indicate the inextricable relationship between Silicon Valley and the 
Pentagon, however contentious that relationship may sometimes be.  
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militarizing the development and purpose of consumer products through their necessary 
connection to the bureaucracy and agenda of the DoD. These technocratic functions have 
already spread from the DoD to Silicon Valley. Regina Dugan—former head of DARPA—
went to work in Silicon Valley after being fired for violation of the agency’s ethics rules for 
steering government contracts to RedX Defense, the family company at which Dugan had 
previously been CEO (Lamothe, Whitlock and Hicks). Her first position was head of 
Google’s Advanced Technology & Projects, redesigning the company’s facilities to function 
like DARPA by hiring engineers, scientists and artificial intelligence experts on short-term 
contracts (Miller). In 2016, Dugan left Google for Facebook as head of Building 8 of the 
Area 404 project—a highly-secretive hardware R&D lab working on virtual reality, cameras 
and drones (Guynn, “Facebook’s ‘Area  404’ Open for Business”). Her mandate at Facebook 
is the same as at Google—to redesign their labs to function like DARPA, this time by signing 
research collaborations with universities (Guynn, Facebook’s Secretive Building 8”). In 
addition to this technocratic redesign, Dugan’s move from DARPA to Silicon Valley is 
troubling given DARPA’s previous involvement with the PRISM program in 2007, which 
“mined and intercepted electronic communications such as video, live chat, user data, and 
email from many of the leading corporate technology providers,” including Google and 
Facebook (Alimahomed 90). All of the companies involved either complied or followed 
court orders (Kaplan). Although the majority of these intercepted communications will prove 
innocuous, the sheer volume and indiscriminant scope of the data generated through 
corporate technologies and captured by the national security apparatus indicates complicity 
between state and corporate sovereignties against that of the citizenry. 
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 The distribution of DARPA’s resources and technocratic apparatus to the corporate 
sector has a number of implications. As the director “of selected advanced basic and applied 
research and development projects for the Department of Defense” (Office of the Federal 
Register 358.2), DARPA only funds projects that will have potential military applications. 
The corporate push to driverless cars was instigated by DARPA’s Grand Challenge; any 
advances made in automated vehicles will (while producing consumer innovations) 
ultimately be put to use in automated tanks and warships. SIRI—Apple’s voice-activated 
personal assistant app—was first developed at MIT under DARPA’s mandate for a virtual 
personal battlefield assistant for soldiers in war zones. Although there has always existed a 
close relationship between Silicon Valley and the DoD, the reorganization brought to Silicon 
Valley by Regina Dugan further militarizes corporate R&D in terms of technocratic 
functioning. This is evident in the restructuring of corporate labs to outsource R&D to small, 
flexible semi-autonomous labs and universities on short-term projects, the focus on high-
risk/high-payoff projects, and promoting innovations with military as well as civilian benefits 
(Holden; Tennenhouse). Recursively, “DARPA functions much like a corporate research 
division in private industry that is responsible to the highest levels of corporate authority” 
(Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 11). In this, we see not only the 
corporatization of the nation-state, but also the sanctioning of corporate authority to function 
alongside or even to supersede that of the government—a distribution and proliferation of 
corporate sovereignties at the behest of national sovereignty. 
In light of all of this, DARPA must be considered as a technological/technocratic 
relation of force in the construction and assertion of corporate sovereignty in that the agency 
provides funding and guidance to the corporate development of technological innovation and 
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has distributed its technocratic functions and organization to the corporate realm. The results 
of these activities provide these corporations with the economic power and technological 
means that they require in order to function beyond the control of the nation-state, further 
militarizing the corporate form while also benefitting the military functions of the nation-
state itself. The following section looks closer at a specific iteration of the technological 
innovation that is further propelling the assertion of corporate sovereignty as enabled by the 
relationship between Silicon Valley and DARPA. 
The Singularity  
One of the projects that currently dominates R&D for the major players in Silicon 
Valley is that of general Artificial Intelligence (AI), which refers to the goal of creating a 
“self-improving machine that will autonomously find design algorithms for all [human] 
tasks” (Aleksander 10).29 In layperson’s terms, this means mirroring in computer systems the 
capabilities of the human brain to create new abilities from old information. For companies 
like DeepMind (now a subsidiary of Alphabet, Inc.—Google’s parent corporation), futurists 
such as Ray Kurzweil, and corporate executives including Sergey Brin and Peter Thiel, 
general AI looms as a Holy Grail of sorts—a fetish object of spiritual devotion that promises 
to deliver the faithful from the all-too-human condition of toil-until-death.30 Current popular 
                                                 
29 General AI, which (as yet) does not exist, is distinct from current forms of narrow AI—i.e. task-specific 
forms of intelligent machines that do not display general cognitive abilities beyond the data recall necessary for 
their programmed tasks, language understanding, autonomous forms of self-improvement completely free from 
human programming and intervention, or anything resembling actual consciousness. Examples of narrow AI 
(commonly known as “supercomputers”) include IBM’s Deep Blue (which defeated reigning world chess 
champion Garry Kasparov in 1997), IBM’s Watson (which defeated two human opponents to become a 
Jeopardy! champion in 2011), and Google’s AlphaGo (which defeated Go grandmaster Lee Sedol in 2016) (J. 
Best; Metz; Murphey). 
 
30 Google has made public claims that DeepMind has achieved some form of artificial general intelligence 
(Sample); this claim, however, has not yet been supported through publicly-available evidence or 
demonstrations. As such, it must be regarded skeptically. 
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and corporate discourse tends to focus on the liberatory potential of this technological object 
of devotion, with consideration of the potentially diabolical (or, at least, ethically, politically 
and practically problematic) implications of its development relatively marginalized to 
speculative fiction and certain corners of the academy.31 I will not contribute to this debate, 
based as it is on a highly-speculative teleological binary in which both sides (with 
exceptions, of course) generally tend to presume the inevitability of general AI, and ascribe 
to it an evolutionary (sometimes divine) status as progressing somehow independently of 
political-economic, cultural and ideological human agendas, agents and actions. 
 Instead, I want to draw attention to the actual mechanisms and operations of corporate 
sovereignty at work in the near-obsessive push to create general AI. In this instance, such 
mechanisms and operations function as a principle of desire, in both a socio-psychological 
and a metaphysical sense. I discuss this dual (though hardly binary) understanding of desire 
in Chapter 5. For now, however, the Singularity serves as an effective point of entry to 
considering the relations between general AI and corporate sovereignty.  
 The term singularity originated in physics as a designation for the event-horizon of a 
black hole (Rose). John von Neumann adapted the term to a technological context in 1958 
(the same year in which ARPA was founded, coincidentally) in order to conceptualize “the 
ever accelerating progress of technology and changes in the mode of human life, which gives 
the appearance of approaching some essential singularity in the history of the race beyond 
which human affairs, as we know them, cannot continue” (Frey 38). The term was 
popularized in the early 1980s by science-fiction author Vernor Vinge, who predicted that 
                                                 
 
31 One notable exception is Elon Musk (founder of SpaceX and co-founder of PayPal and Tesla, Inc.), whose 
public predictions concerning the possible extinction of humanity at the hands of AI are widely available. 
104 
 
“the Singularity will occur when technological progress powered by self-improving artificial 
intelligence […] becomes so rapid that it speeds beyond our ability to foresee or control its 
outcomes” (qtd. in Bailey 46). Since that time, the notion of the Singularity has been taken 
up by futurists—most notably Ray Kurzweil (The Age of Intelligent Machines; The Age of 
Spiritual Machines; How to Create a Mind; “The Next Frontier”; The Singularity Is Near)—
to refer to the dawning of a technological epoch in which humans transcend the limits of 
biology by (among other means) merging with digital computer networks. In the current 
cultural context of the corporate-led development of general AI, “the Singularity” resonates 
with a sense of evolutionary inevitability concerning “the exponential progression of 
information technology” with which we have been confronted since the onset of the AI 
paradigm in 1956 at the Dartmouth Summer Project (Liebert 568), which brought together 
“ten scientists sharing an interest in neural nets, automata theory, and the study of 
intelligence” (Bostrom 5). 
 Put simply, the Singularity refers to the total merger of human biology and 
consciousness with technology in order for humans to remain relevant beyond the point when 
general AI surpasses human intelligence (L. R. Baker). As predicted by Kurzweil, “in the 
aftermath of the Singularity, intelligence, derived from its biological origins in human brains 
and its technological origins in human ingenuity, will begin to saturate the matter and energy 
in its midst. It will achieve this by reorganizing matter and energy to provide an optimal level 
of computation […] to spread out from its origin on Earth” (“The Next Frontier” 21). In 
order not to become (at best) redundant or (at worst) extinct, humans must become immortal 
through immersion in the Singularity’s reorganization of energy and matter. This is supposed 
to be achieved by a combination of means: 1) the uploading of human consciousness into 
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robots or networked computing systems; 2) the genetic engineering of future generations of 
humans; and 3) the implantation of nanotechnologies into the human body (Dauphin and 
Abell; Kapoor; Miles; O’Connell). These methods of achieving the Singularity so desired by 
futurists are all intended to overcome the corporeal—to eliminate disease, decay, aging and 
(eventually) death itself—while preserving intelligence. From the futurist perspective, the 
emergence of the Singularity will serve to make gods of us mere mortals… some of us, 
anyway. 
 The human desire for immortality is nothing new. Perhaps humankind has always 
sought some technological cheat when confronted with the very visceral inevitability of 
death. So it is fitting to apply an ancient metaphor to the futurist preoccupation with cheating 
death through the Singularity. In regards to our cultural obsession with technological 
progress, we have not escaped the cave. Indeed, we are so enthralled by the dance of 
mediated shadows on the wall that we collectively have yet to turn around, to confront the 
puppeteers and ask them “To what purpose? For whose benefit? Who even asked you to put 
on this show?” Because, of course, who will be allowed to become divine (and by which 
criteria selected) is a matter on which the likes of Ray Kurzweil, Sergey Brin and Peter Thiel 
remain silent. I will return to these questions in brief order. But before that, I would like to 
add some modern twists to this metaphor. The phantasmagoria on the cave walls are being 
produced by a billionaire boys’ club of ersatz Übermenschen who mistake the cave for all 
existence, and their own pet project for the end of history.32 
 To be fair, technological advances of the past few decades have made the 
development of general AI (and, consequently, the ushering in of the Singularity) a viable 
                                                 
32 Apologies to Plato, Hegel and Nietzsche. 
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even if still distant and speculative possibility: a possibility, however, not a probability. 
Necessary (though still thoroughly inadequate) strides have been made in algorithmic 
computing, semantic systems, biomedical technology, automation, information processing, 
genetic engineering, narrow artificial intelligence, brain emulation and networked computing 
systems. Ray Kurzweil (who, at the time of this writing is the Director of Engineering at 
Google) predicts that “we will have reverse engineered the entire [human] brain and 
nanobots will be operating our consciousness” by the 2020s or ‘30s (L. R. Baker 37). In the 
visions of futurists, these nanobots will allow us “to connect to the cloud, allowing us to send 
emails and photos directly to the brain and to back up our thoughts and memories” (Miles 
24). This would involve the rerouting of sensory data in the brain and replacing it with virtual 
content (Rose). Facebook is also reportedly working on some form of “tech-mediated 
telepathy” (Allan 11). While the existence of these specific projects cannot be entirely 
verified due to corporate secrecy, their existence has been publicly acknowledged by those 
involved. Moreover, Kurzweil stated in an interview with Charlie Rose that by the 2040s, 
“the non-biological [i.e. machine] intelligence we’re creating […] will be a billion times 
more powerful than all of the biological intelligence we have in the human species.” The 
technology necessary for general AI and the technology necessary for immortality are 
necessarily linked, and that is the point. Bill Maris (head of Google Ventures, the investment 
arm of Alphabet) founded the California Life Company (Calico) in 2013 with the expressed 
corporate mission to “solve” death (Naughton).Peter Thiel has invested heavily in cryonics 
recently through his company Halcyon Molecular (O’Connell). Dr. Hossein Rahnama of 
MIT’s Media Lab and Ryerson University (Toronto) is working on immortality from another 
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angle, attempting to create an “augmented eternity” wherein people’s digital identities are 
immortalized, enabling us to communicate with the dead through algorithms (Tynan). 
 Not surprisingly, many of these projects link directly back to DARPA. Boston 
Dynamics (now owned by Google) makes advanced robotics for the agency. The human-
machine interfaces that Facebook would need to enact its tech-mediated telepathy originate 
with DARPA’s Human-Assisted Neural Devices Program (Belfiore). The computer 
hardware, software, systems engineering and robotics necessary for AI are all the result of 
DARPA’s funding to Stanford, MIT, Carnegie-Mellon, and Georgia Tech (just to name a 
few)—the universities that produce much of Silicon Valley’s workforce (Noble). Artificial 
intelligence and interactive computing have been primary goals of DARPA since it acquired 
its first computer in 1961 (Belfiore).  
 But the necessary components of actualizing the Singularity have yet to be developed 
to the point where they can even perform without human operation and/or intervention, much 
less self-replicate through the automation of design and manufacture, or self-organize into a 
holistic system (Aleksandar). Current AI systems are not designed with “an internal model of 
their [own] scope of limitations” (i.e. they cannot conceive of the limits of their own abilities 
and therefore cannot conceive of possibilities beyond their programmed mandates) and are 
thus not capable of organizing new abilities to the point of being able to automate, much less 
self-replicate (Bundy 41). If general AI is supposed to surpass the functions of the human 
brain, it is still based on those functions, as well as human notions of “intelligence.” It is not 
surprising, then, that the due date for the Singularity keeps getting pushed back whenever the 
rose-tinted predictions of futurists come face-to-face with the limits of contemporary 
technologies.  
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Predictions about “machines matching humans in general intelligence” have been put 
forth since the 1940s (Bostrom 3). The first predicted date of arrival was to be in the 1960s, 
with futurists reformulating the calculation for such an event within about two decades from 
the moments when they realize that earlier predictions proved false. At this point, the rosiest 
of predictions puts its arrival “around 2045” (Bundy 40). It all seems eerily reminiscent of 
Harold Camping, the evangelist harbinger of doom who, when May 21, 2011, passed by and 
the world had not ended as Camping predicted, simply reworked his ‘calculations’ to show 
that it would actually happen in October of the same year. Unless we are all suffering from 
the same collective hallucination, we know how that turned out. Although in different ways, 
both Camping and the futurists suffer from what Igor Aleksander refers to as “the ‘alchemy’ 
error” in futurist logic, one “based on the philosophy of an eventual discovery in a domain 
where no discovery exists” (10). In sum, the connection between futurist and apocalyptic 
logics indicate a shared metaphysical orientation towards human existence, however different 
the technological or religious implications of such logics may be. 
 For all of these reasons, I think that the Singularity is the guiding metaphysical 
principle of desire that manifests in the corporate development of general AI in the current 
conjuncture. It is, moreover, the guiding socio-psychological principle of desire in the 
corporate development of the networked digital technologies that increasingly (though not 
yet completely) overdetermine the conditions of possibility for the organization of social 
relations. Indeed, the same corporations (led by the same executives and engineers) that are 
working to solve the problem of general AI are also largely responsible for enmeshing us 
further in the matrix of smartphones, online platforms, surveillance apparatuses, data 
collection, etc., through which we are increasingly required to interact as a precondition of 
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participating in social, economic, political and cultural realities. In the Singularity, we see a 
desiring relation of force in the construction and assertion of corporate sovereignty: this 
metaphysical principle guides the attempt to construct a technological realm of immortality 
for corporate executives and the technocratic corporate form beyond the bounds of corporeal 
existence. This desire has direct implications for the form of corporate sovereignty. Of the 
four types of AI systems identified by Nick Bostrom (i.e. oracles, genies, sovereigns and 
tools), “a sovereign is a system that has an open-ended mandate to operate in the world in 
pursuit of broad and possibly very long-range objectives” (148). The very notion of the 
sovereign and its role in determining the conditions of possibility for human existence are 
rhetorically and conceptually constructed into the forms of artificial intelligence even before 
their material development. 
Implications of ALEC, DARPA and the Singularity on Our Understanding of 
Corporate Sovereignty 
 
 Taken together, the examples of ALEC, DARPA and the Singularity can be 
considered as conjunctural expressions of the transformation of corporate sovereignty. These 
organic articulations, while overdetermining the contemporary conjuncture, are the result of 
the construction and assertion of the sovereignty of the business corporation in relation to the 
U.S. nation-state. As demonstrated above, the work of ALEC constitutes a political-
economic force relation of corporate sovereignty in that it operates to assert the power and 
might of corporate interests over nation-state sovereignty. This is achieved through the 
dominance of corporations in ALEC’s development of legislation in closed-door sessions and 
the introduction of such policies in state legislatures. This might also be further realized in 
the future if ALEC can force a second Constitutional Convention not only because the 
convention would be determined by delegates selected by state governments, largely through 
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corporate influence (ignoring the will of a majority of the nation’s citizens), but also because 
the state aim of such a convention is to enshrine corporate sovereignty over that of the 
nation-state, to create a corporate state.  
DARPA constitutes a technological/technocratic relation of force in this crisis of 
sovereignty in several ways: 1) while it has determined the course of corporate technological 
innovation by providing material support to those innovations considered valuable to the 
military/national security apparatus, its mode of R&D is being increasingly deployed to 
reorganize the R&D practices of major technology corporations, creating a new corporate 
technocratic infrastructure; 2) the venture capital it provides comes from public funds, thus 
redirecting economic wealth into private corporate enterprise; and 3) the technologies 
produced as a result of DARPA’s practices will ultimately serve military, intelligence and 
national security interests, the bulk of which have been transferred to the private military 
industry. These developments signal two crucial points about the construction and assertion 
of corporate sovereignty. First, the relation of DARPA to corporations shows how 
inextricably linked they have been since World War II, with DARPA enabling the creation of 
modern corporate technocracy. Second, as corporations have modelled themselves on 
DARPA, and have begun to assert their own power over that of the nation-state, we are 
witnessing the emergence of corporism. 
The Singularity (as a desiring relation of force of this crisis) presents the strangest 
case of all. The fantasy of the corporate form to make human intelligence obsolete through 
artificial intelligence while simultaneously making human intelligence eternal through 
networked digital technologies, represents the emergence of a new—or the rearticulation of 
an old—desire, both socio-psychological and corporate. The proliferation of social media 
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posts and engagement through networked communication devices can be thought of in this 
instance as expressive of a human desire for immortality—to preserve in the more permanent 
format of technological infrastructure the ephemera of ourselves and social interactions. But 
more importantly in the consideration of corporate sovereignty, this socio-psychological 
desire becomes articulated to the corporate desire for immortality. In the (il)logic of the 
Singularity, the human desire for immortality can only be expressed (in a secular sense, at 
least) through the immortality of the corporation as enabled by the legal form of corporate 
personhood and guided by the will of corporate executives having merged with a networked 
infrastructure of artificial intelligence. 
These relations of force might well coalesce in the “government of an Aristocracy” 
that Thomas Jefferson saw in its nascence—one enabled by corporate economic, political and 
technological power. I want, in concluding this discussion, to engage in a brief thought 
experiment—thinking-through these case studies in relation to the various iterations of the 
concept of corporate sovereignty I described above. At the risk of showing my hand before 
its time, it must be noted that none will prove adequate because each holds together only on 
one level of abstraction (i.e. the organic). But ultimately, they will prove to be productive 
failures in that they provide an opening for analyzing the relation between the organic and 
the conjunctural, thus providing the basis for my analysis offered in Chapter 5. The 
significance of this relation is discussed at the end of this chapter. For the moment, let us 
focus on corporate sovereignty as it has already been discussed.  
In the work of ALEC and DARPA, we can see at work Thomas Edwards’s concerns 
about the emergence of a corporate nation that embodies a hybrid sovereignty whereby the 
boundaries between the nation-state and transnational corporations become blurred to the 
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point of constituting a novel geopolitical entity. We see this not only in ALEC’s exploitation 
of the federalist system of governance by pushing corporate-sponsored bills through state 
legislatures, but also through their longer-term push to force a second Constitutional 
Convention. Moreover, this is evidenced in the work of DARPA, in regards to both the 
reorganization of corporate R&D labs to function more like the agency and the military 
objectives that determine much of corporate technological innovation. And if, as argued by 
Edwards, corporate sovereignty is predicated “on economic control based on virtual 
interconnectivity” (T. M. Edwards 293), then the economic power generated for major tech 
corporations by the networked digital technologies that gather, process, deploy and control 
the majority of information in the contemporary moment is the driving force that propels the 
development of artificial intelligence towards the apotheosis of virtual interconnectivity (i.e. 
the Singularity). Taken together, the legal and constitutional maneuverings of ALEC, 
DARPA’s reorganization and militarization of corporate technological development, and the 
eternal virtual interconnectivity espoused by proponents of the Singularity can presage an 
emergent form of sovereignty in Edwards’s terms—one based on corporate economic and 
technological dominance, and requiring no legitimation by the international order. 
 The arguments of Sheldon Wolin seem equally appropriate to considering the 
examples offered here. The drafting of legislation by corporate executives in closed-door 
sessions at ALEC conferences with absolutely no oversight by or accountability to public 
interests eerily resonates with Wolin’s understanding of inverted totalitarianism as the over-
taking of popular sovereignty through the concurrent political mobilization of corporate 
power and political demobilization of the citizenry. The funding of ALEC by corporate 
membership dues and the largesse of the Koch Brothers in ultimate pursuit of a constitutional 
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rewrite outside the purview of the U.S. Congress further indicates the antidemocratic nature 
of elite executive rule in the contemporary moment. As noted earlier, Wolin argues that this 
form of sovereignty was enabled by the globalization of capitalism as a system of 
decentralized, multiple powers that disrupted the traditional role of the nation-state in the 
international political order. In this regard, we may consider DARPA as a prime mover in the 
creation of these decentralized, multiple powers (i.e. transnational technology corporations). 
By providing venture capital and R&D for corporate technological innovation for over half a 
century now, the agency is at least partially responsible for the massive economic dominance 
of these corporations. The technological innovations that have built the new global 
corporations (coupled as they both are to the incessant drive of capitalist expansion as such) 
form the dynamic machinery of corporate imperialism that (for Wolin) emerges finally as the 
political co-partner with the marketized nation-state, whereby each institution exchanges 
functions and powers in the takeover of popular sovereignty on a global scale. Carried to its 
(il)logical conclusion, the Singularity can be thought of in this regard as the abstract 
totalizing power of political disengagement through eternal interactive distraction—an 
advanced form of propaganda that demobilizes popular political will by subsuming it to the 
corporate and futurist drive to networked immortality. 
 In the terms set out by Luis Suarez-Villa, these signposts indicate the oligarchic and 
technocapitalist components of corporate sovereignty, whereby the economic power enabled 
by technological innovation converges with practices of corporate governance to produce a 
form of hegemonic plutocracy in which power resides in the hands of a limited number of 
corporate actors, not only in terms of governance and politics but also regarding the 
fundamental organization of social relations. In the case of ALEC, we see evidence of the 
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ideological dimension of corporate power discussed by Suarez-Villa. Since its founding, 
ALEC’s legislative practices have been focused on advancing a right-wing social agenda, in 
combatting progressive gains on issues such as gay rights, collective bargaining rights and 
voter empowerment, but more importantly, a corporate agenda divesting the nation-state of 
its ability to regulate business. The technological rationality (or, technique) of corporate 
sovereignty is evidenced in the example of DARPA in that the organization of social 
relations as financed and directed by the agency is a material expression of the technocratic 
rationality of corporate innovation as articulated to military interests. Technological 
innovations (e.g. the internet) that form a significant (and increasing) portion of the 
infrastructure of social organization in the United States were initially developed according 
to the rationality of military and corporate organization and, as such, allow for the 
colonization of social relations by this rationality. The Singularity can be understood in 
relation to the third part of Suarez-Villa’s equation—the relations of power (i.e. the global 
projection of corporate power)—in so far as the achievement of the Singularity would be the 
most effective means for universalizing corporate power through both the eternalization of 
corporate elites and the totalization of their control over the organization of social relations 
through artificial intelligence and a networked technological infrastructure. 
 Finally in relation to the existing literature on corporate sovereignty, we can consider 
these case studies in relation to the work of Joshua Barkan. Beginning with the notion that 
the sovereignty of the corporation and that of the nation-state are ontologically conjoined, yet 
in conflict within the framework of legal authority, the examples of ALEC, DARPA and the 
Singularity lend credence to Barkan’s argument that while corporate power arises from 
apparatuses of government, nation-state sovereignty is also founded in the corporation as a 
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political body. Moreover, this doubling operates as a condition of sovereignty (as understood 
in Agamben’s reading of Schmitt) in that corporate sovereignty derives from the legal 
framework established by the sovereignty of the nation-state while also operating as 
exception to the law. Regarding ALEC, this is most evident in that the organization’s 
existence is predicated on its legal recognition as a corporation and the partial makeup of its 
membership by members of state legislatures. In conflict with this is ALEC’s concerted 
efforts to reestablish the boundaries of the law through initially extra-legislative means and to 
undermine the legal framework of the nation-state through a Constitutional Convention. In 
regards to DARPA, the ontological coupling between the corporation and the nation-state 
functions a bit differently. Corporate sovereignty is enabled in this sense from the legal 
transfer of public wealth into private hands by way of DoD investment in corporate 
technological innovation. The notion of the exception to the law comes into play here in that 
the economic power generated by these innovations allows corporations to then invest in 
projects that might ultimately allow them to exist as sovereign entities outside the control of 
any nation-state. Google recently unveiled barges capable of existing self-sufficiently in 
international waters for a couple of years at a time. Peter Thiel is a strong proponent of 
“seasteading, which is the concept of creating artificial permanent islands […] outside the 
territory claimed by any government” (Taplan 24). Larry Page has been funding research on 
the viability of creating “privately-owned city-states” (ibid.). These barges, seasteads and 
city-states would effectively be corporate nations that could not be regulated, taxed or 
legislated by any nation-state. Having evolved with the nation-state and gained legitimation 
in the legal framework of the nation-state, corporations are now poised to establish 
themselves as states without a nation. This consideration of DARPA applies equally to the 
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Singularity in that artificial intelligence is at least partially funded by DARPA in the same 
way as other corporate technological innovations. The distinction here is that the extra-legal 
space that might be created through the advent of the Singularity will not exist in 
international waters but in networked digital environments that confound any notion of 
territorial boundaries. Taken together, it can be argued that these case studies lend credence 
to Barkan’s argument that “the Anglo-American corporation and modern political 
sovereignty are founded in and bound together through a principle of legally sanctioned 
immunity from law” (Joshua Barkan 4) 
 All of these considerations (i.e. of the work of Edwards, Wolin, Suarez-Villa and 
Barkan) provide a useful though incomplete framework for thinking ALEC, DARPA and the 
Singularity through the concept of corporate sovereignty. If these narratives seem a bit too 
tidy—a touch simplistic—that is because they are. In finding one-to-one correlations between 
these signposts and the various conceptualizations of corporate sovereignty, I have exposed 
the necessity of bringing another concept to bear upon this argument, because there is no 
simple, one-to-one correspondence between reality and our attempts to theorize it. The 
mechanisms and operations of power are, in fact, more complex. Corporate sovereignty is 
indeed the crucial issue, but not only in the way that the existing literature on corporate 
sovereignty allows us to think about it. As I have been arguing, corporate sovereignty must 
be thought of first, as an organic form that was constructed and asserted through the 
evolution of the legal form of the corporation and the U.S. nation-state, and second, as an 
organic form through which the transformation of sovereignty overdetermines the crises and 
contradictions of the current conjuncture. The direct application of corporate sovereignty to 
these signposts require a conjunctural consideration of corporate sovereignty. While Joshua 
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Barkan’s work provides an opening for thinking of corporate sovereignty in organic terms, it 
does not quite get us to a consideration of the conjunctural articulation of relations of force in 
a way as that can help us come to terms with the crisis of American political life that was so 
brutally exposed by the 2016 election cycle. As evidenced in the following chapters, this only 
becomes possible if we articulate corporate sovereignty to the problem of fascism, although 
not in the ways that term is normally understood and used. So the reframing of yet another 
narrative becomes necessary. 
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PART II: FASCISM 
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CHAPTER 4: AREN’T YOU A LITTLE SHORT FOR A STORMTROOPER? OR, 
THE LIMITS OF FASCISM 
 
Introduction 
 It might seemed anachronistic (or, at least, ill-advised) to discuss fascism in reference 
to contemporary problems of governance in the United States. So often has that term been 
thrown around in casual, haphazard and ignorant ways that it might seem best to dispense 
with its use altogether. However, fascism is indeed a central problematic of the current 
conjuncture, especially when considered in tandem with the problematic of corporate 
sovereignty. As such, this chapter functions as a detour through theory in order to 
recontextualize the functions of ALEC, DARPA and the Singularity as conjunctural 
articulations of corporate sovereignty. Fascism (as I argue here) is a mode of power by which 
the crisis of sovereignty is resolved conjuncturally, but only if understood in a way that runs 
counter to how it is usually discussed. Fascism has been extensively theorized and deployed 
in scholarship, partly as a way of exorcising from our collective intellect the horrors of World 
War II. Fascism has been so theorized, in fact, that it is “probably the vaguest of political 
terms” (Payne 4)—at once highly specified and overly generalized, too reductive to be 
anything other than historically descriptive yet too abstract to serve a concrete analytical 
purpose. Some scholars have suggested that there is not even such a “thing as fascism,” only 
the people and movements that we identify as fascist (Allardyce 368). In agreeing “to use the 
term without agreeing on how to define it,” we have evacuated the term of any substance 
(Allardyce 367). And while I disagree with the suggestion of Gilbert Allardyce that fascism 
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should “become a foreign word again, untranslatable outside of a limited period of history” 
(388), I am sympathetic to the frustration out which such a suggestion arises. This frustration 
results from three contradictory tendencies in our current understanding of fascism: its 
indiscriminate usage in public discourse; the tension between generalization and over-
specification in theoretical work on the subject; and the recent incorporation of the work of 
Deleuze & Guattari into critical scholarship concerning fascism. This chapter seeks to 
rehabilitate a particular use of the term “fascism” by explaining each of these tendencies (i.e. 
public discourse, political theory, and critical scholarship) in turn and offers an explanation 
of their inadequacy. The purpose of this is to demonstrate the necessity of thinking fascism 
conjuncturally so as to provide the groundwork for my analysis of ALEC, DARPA and the 
Singularity through what have been generally marginalized theories of fascism in Chapter 5. 
Fascism and Its (Popular) Discontents 
 The first of these tendencies—its indiscriminate use in public discourse—has 
rendered the term “fascist” into “an all-purpose term of abuse” for one’s political adversaries 
(Passmore 11). Such usage has “distorted [the term] out of all recognition” into a catch-all, 
“emotionally charged word of condemnation for any political regime or action perceived to 
be oppressive, authoritarian or elitist” (Griffin, The Nature of Fascism 4). Although a variety 
of explanations could be offered as to how this came about, at least part of the answer lies in 
the use of the term by members of the radical left and youth-oriented political movements of 
the 1960s (Passmore). Of course, it must be acknowledged that the political right is 
sometimes as guilty of this as the left.33 Another part of the answer lies in Marxist analyses of 
fascism, which (with a few exceptions) suffer from a “tendency to reduce fascism to an 
                                                 
33 For evidence of this, look to Jonah Goldberg’s Liberal Fascism: The Secret History of the American Left, 
from Mussolini to the Politics of Meaning, or recent interviews with Dinesh D’Souza. 
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aggressive form of capitalism” (Griffin, The Nature of Fascism 4). Yet another (and 
heretofore unacknowledged) part of the problem lies in how fascism has been theorized 
within the disciplines of political science and history, which tend to focus overwhelmingly on 
Nazi Germany as the exemplar of a fascist regime. This focus is understandable given the 
horrors of that regime, but such identification—and the emotional resonance wrapped up 
with such identification—allows for irresponsible commentators in popular (though certainly 
not academic) discourse to shut down reasonable political discussions by comparing their 
opponent to Hitler. 
 In popular discourse, the slur “fascist” is usually levelled against political 
conservatives—from the administrations of Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan and George W. 
Bush, to the rise of the Christian right in American politics and the resurgence of right-wing 
nationalism in Europe (Davidson and Harris; Griffin, “Studying Fascism in a Postfascist 
Age”). There are, however, a few notable exceptions. One is Jonah Goldberg’s Liberal 
Fascism, which attempts to explain fascism as a phenomenon of the political left. While I 
share Goldberg’s frustration with the indiscriminate use of “fascist” as a slur for political 
conservatives, his work does nothing to recuperate an accurate understanding of fascism; it 
simply reinforces the vacuity of colloquial usage by multiplying its potential targets. Despite 
Goldberg’s claims, no, we are not all fascists now. The recent use of “fascism” against the 
left in popular discourse arguably arises from the scholarly work of Friedrich Hayek, who 
argued that fascism was “a necessary outcome of [socialist] tendencies” instead of a reaction 
against them (Hayek 4).  
This view is rooted in Hayek’s overly simplistic conflations of fascism with all forms 
of totalitarianism (and of socialism with authoritarianism), as well as a fallacious argument 
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that socialist forms of economic planning are inevitably incompatible with democracy. For 
Hayek, fascism was the result of three interrelated forces: the unmasking of the socialist 
illusion by the realities of the Soviet Union; frustration with elite privilege and materialism, 
which resulted in the abandonment of liberalism; and mass dissatisfaction with the 
“ineffectiveness of parliamentary majorities” (Hayek 136). There is merit to Hayek’s points 
about frustrations with elite privilege and materialism, and mass dissatisfaction with 
legislative ineffectiveness. However, the realities of the Soviet Union had yet to be unmasked 
to such a degree to warrant Hayek’s connection of the regime to the rise of classical Fascism.  
 Hayek’s argument rests on the conflation of freedom with what we might call market 
capitalism: “The separation of economic and political aims is an essential guaranty [sic] of 
individual freedom” (145). Hayek argued that money was the ideal medium of desire (with 
individual freedom as the actualization of desire through economic activity). This belief 
underlies Hayek’s idealization and naturalization of an economic system founded on 
unfettered competition. Socialism (or, indeed, any economic planning) becomes equated with 
the suppression of competition. For Hayek, any such interference in the supposedly natural 
workings of economic markets by the government is viewed as fundamentally totalitarian—
in the sense of striving for economic unity under political authority—and authoritarian—in 
the sense of exerting political authority over realms of life that (according to Hayek) should 
be free from political control—hence fascist. For evidence of this, many people who adopt 
Hayek’s position simply point to the fact that the Nazi regime referred to itself as National 
Socialist, never mentioning the fact that this was an intentional rhetorical strategy on the part 
of the Nazis designed to draw working-class support away from socialist parties, and perhaps 
ignorant of the fact that economic planning under classical Fascism was not socialist; it was 
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corporatist (i.e. the economic system was organized through national corporations under the 
authority of the state), and on a practical level involved much less government planning and 
interference than socialist regimes.34 
 Hayek’s conflation of economic planning and/or regulation on the part of the 
government with fascism underlies the use of “socialist” as a dominant term of abuse levied 
against liberals in the United States in the current age. Owing to the continued relevance of 
Hayek to some variations of conservative, libertarian and neoliberal discourse, the 
implication of being a fascist is arguably always already embedded in the use of “socialist” 
as a slur for liberals. With the exception of “eco-fascist” and “femi-nazi,” “socialist” is the 
right-wing iteration of the unsubstantiated use of the term “fascist” by the left. In each of the 
instances noted above, colloquial use of the term “fascist” has little or no connection to 
fascism as theorized by historical and political science scholarship, and for the most part has 
no consistent understanding of the term. 
 This poses a serious problem for scholarship—one that is at once epistemological and 
political. Epistemologically, indiscriminate popular usage effectively empties fascism of any 
verifiable content. By reducing the term to an empty signifier, popular usage serves as a 
distraction from the effort to map and understand the resurgence of fascism (whether 
potential or actual) in other socio-historical contexts. How can we understand fascism as an 
actual phenomenon or recognize the features of fascism at work in a particular social 
formation if all of us (regardless of political orientation) are reduced to the state of fascist-
and-also-not-fascist-but-less-fascist-than-thou-who-art-more-fascist-than-I-who-am-not-
                                                 
34 The analysis of fascist political economy offered in Chapter 5 demonstrates that the relationship between the 
nation-state and the corporation under fascism bears little resemblance to socialist economic planning, 
regardless of how Nazis liked to refer to themselves. 
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fascist?35 Within this cultural climate, scholarship concerning fascism can appear to be 
anachronistic at best and conspiracy theory at worst. And this speaks to the political problem 
with the contemporary use of “fascist” as an indiscriminate slur. How are we to engage in 
meaningful anti-fascist political action if “we are all, always fascist of multiple kinds” (Evans 
and Reid 5)? The questions of power require that we take serious stock of the re-articulations 
of fascist power within our own socio-historical context rather than simply “accepting 
impurity [i.e. fascism as an ontological condition of human political behavior and 
psychological character] as a condition of possibility for political thought and action” (ibid). 
The Limits of Political Theory 
 Scholarly argument about fascism presents a more complex set of problems. I want to 
be clear from the outset that I am not criticizing the existing body of theoretical and historical 
scholarship on fascism. For the questions and problems with which such scholarship is 
concerned, it is adequate and appropriate to the task. Political theory and history have done 
an admirable job grappling with the extraordinary problems that one encounters when 
attempting to delineate the ideological and politico-institutional characteristics of a 
phenomenon as amorphous and contradictory as fascism. I, however, am concerned with 
another set of questions and problems—the articulated assemblage of political economic, 
technological/technocratic and socio-psychological relations of force through which such 
ideological characteristics and political practices are expressed.  
 Historical and theoretical work on fascism has been concerned predominantly (though 
not exclusively) with defining the characteristics of fascism as it manifested in Italy and 
Germany under the leadership of Benito Mussolini and Adolph Hitler, respectively (Eatwell, 
                                                 
35 This shortcoming is (as demonstrated in the pages below) also present in the recent scholarly application of 
the work of Deleuze & Guattari to the question of fascism. 
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“Towards a New Model of Generic Fascism”; Eatwell, “On Defining the ‘Fascist 
Minimum’”; Griffin, The Nature of Fascism; Laqueur; Passmore; Payne).36 Hence, there is a 
predominant concern with ideology, party politics and the bureaucracy. Theories of fascism 
generally start with classical Fascism and continue on to fascist organizations after the war, 
less imperially aggressive manifestations of state fascism (e.g. Spain under the dictatorship of 
Francisco Franco), and the adoption of fascist ideology and symbolism within marginal 
ethno-political groups (e.g. the British National Party, the Golden Dawn in Greece, and neo-
Nazi/Aryan groups in the United States). This type of scholarship—largely concerned with 
historical instances of fascist political parties gaining (or at least attempting to gain) control 
over the political and bureaucratic apparatus of various nation-states—gives rise to what I 
refer to as the political-ideological account and the totalitarian account of fascism.37 
                                                 
36 The conflation of Nazism and Italian Fascism into the term “fascism” within political and historical 
scholarship is itself problematic. Although understandably arising from the alliance between these two regimes 
during World War II, it elides important differences between them. Academic focus on the ideological content 
of fascism tends (though not exclusively) to emphasize the political features of Nazism at the expense of an 
equally-careful consideration of the development of fascist economic ideology in Italy during the inter-war 
period (or even back to the 19th century, depending on one’s preferred chronology). For example, anti-Semitism 
is frequently highlighted as being characteristic of fascist ideology although it was not integral to Italian 
Fascism until Mussolini reluctantly entered into an imperial alliance with Hitler. Mussolini’s regime received 
considerable support from Jewish war veterans prior to this alliance, with Jewish Italians serving in high-
ranking offices in the fascist state (Italian Fascism in Color). I am in no way justifying fascism or any of its 
tenets. I am simply striving for clarity, however Quixotic that quest may be. Given these considerations, this 
chapter re-produces the conflation of Nazism and Italian Fascism within current scholarship. Chapter 5, 
however, focuses primarily on Italian Fascism, referring to Nazism only when reference to Italian Fascism is 
insufficient to the task at hand. This choice (as with all other choices I make) is both epistemological and 
political. 
 
37 A significant amount of contemporary scholarship also deals with “the relationship of fascism to organized 
religion, gender, modernity, culture, art, economics, communism, male chauvinism, aesthetics, […] political 
religion, technology, and modernism” (Griffin, “Studying Fascism in a Postfascist Age” 2). I limit my summary 
of contemporary understandings of fascism to the political-ideological and totalitarian accounts, however, 
because these other lines of research stem primarily from those accounts. This is not to suggest that these lines 
of research are unimportant; they are, however, part of the “new consensus” in fascist studies (Griffin, 
“Studying Fascism in a Postfascist Age” 1), which is based on the political-ideological account—particularly 
Roger Griffin’s “core matrix of [fascist] axioms” (Griffin, “Studying Fascism in a Postfascist Age” 6). 
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 Although these accounts do not represent the entirety of disciplinary scholarship, they 
do define major positions within our current understanding of fascism. While there is much 
value in these accounts, they do not provide much insight into the core problem of power of 
both classical Fascism and what we face in the United States in the current conjuncture. The 
political-ideological account tends to describe fascism, first, by its aggressive nationalist 
antagonism towards socialism, democracy and liberalism (Mussolini, “The Doctrine of 
Fascism”; Passmore)—a characteristic Hayek seemed to feel not worth considering.38 
Socialism is the first enemy of fascism because it stands in the way of fascism’s primary 
economic objective as made explicit in the fascist literature itself: the political reconciliation 
of labor and capital, with labor subservient to imperialist national capital (Mussolini, “The 
Doctrine of Fascism”). It is only through the establishment of national corporations that such 
reconciliation can be achieved in accordance with fascist ideals. Democracy is viewed “as 
from time to time giving the people the illusion of sovereignty, while the real, effective 
sovereignty lies in the hands of other, concealed and irresponsible forces” (Mussolini, “The 
Doctrine of Fascism” 239). Although these forces and the dangers they pose are neither 
coherently defined nor explicitly identified, they are deployed discursively to generate 
support for the authoritarian domination of both labor and the nation-state by the fascist 
political party.  
Liberalism (political and economic) is attacked as “the logical and, indeed, historical 
forerunner of anarchy” (Mussolini, “The Doctrine of Fascism” 240). The connection of 
                                                 
38 There is also a debate as to whether fascism also considered capitalism as an enemy (Guerin; Hayek). This is 
examined in Chapter 5. For now, I set this debate aside because of two facts: 1) the originators of classical 
Fascism did not identify capitalism as a mode of economic production as such to be their enemy; and 2) the 
actual economic policies and practices of German and Italian Fascism were themselves variations of capitalist 
production (Einzig; Guerin). 
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liberalism to anarchy evokes populist fears of alterity, multiplicity and the degradation of the 
country. Nationalism and xenophobia—residing as they do at the heart of fascism’s 
“intellectual origins” (Passmore 2)—weave through these antagonisms to fabricate an anti-
left, populist-authoritarian, ultranationalist political movement.39 Classical Fascism opposed 
left-wing political ideologies primarily because they foster loyalty to groups or institutions 
other than the nation-state. 
Fascism is a set of ideologies and practices that seeks to place the nation, defined in  
exclusively biological, cultural, and/or historical terms, above all other sources of  
loyalty, and to create a mobilized national community. Fascist nationalism is  
reactionary in that it entails implacable hostility to [for example] socialism and  
feminism, for they are seen as prioritizing class or gender rather than the nation. That  
is why fascism is a movement of the extreme right. Fascism is also a movement of the  
radical right because the defeat of [enemies such as] socialism and feminism and the  
creation of the mobilized nation are held to depend on the advent to power of a new  
elite acting in the name of the people, headed by a charismatic leader, and embodied  
in a mass, militarized party. […] Fascists seek to ensure the harmonization of  
[disparate] interests with those of the nation by mobilizing them within special  
sections of the party and/or within a corporate system. (Passmore 31). 
 
 Built as it is on the more often latent, occasionally explicit prejudices of a national 
populace, this ultranationalism manifests in the fascist desire for a single-party state that 
displays a set of commonly-accepted characteristics (Griffin, The Nature of Fascism). In 
addition to being fundamentally anti-left and ultranationalist, fascism aspires to imperialism 
through military expansionism (Passmore). To these characteristics should be added “racism, 
charismatic leadership, […] fears that the nation or civilization as a whole [is] being 
undermined by forces of decadence, deep anxiety about the modern age and longings for a 
new era to begin” (Griffin, The Nature of Fascism viii). Although varying according to the 
                                                 
39 Contrary to popular misperception, to say that fascism is anti-left does not imply that it is a form of 
conservatism. When theorizing fascism, we need to do so outside the political binaries to which we in the 
United States are generally accustomed. Fascism (as explained in the following pages) is inherently 
contradictory and cannot be understood within those binaries. 
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specific context, fascism is essentially reactionary in an ideological sense. Reactionary 
ideologies tend to form in response to changes in the social world rather than on a core set of 
positive values. The reactionary nature of fascism marks it as substantially devoid of any 
“definite and coherent doctrine” (Guerin 95). Generally speaking, the reactionary-yet-radical 
ideological characteristics of fascism are identified as sets of contradictions, for example: the 
hierarchical mobilization of disparate (often antagonistic) social groups united around a myth 
of national unity; a traditionalism that is obsessed with technological progress; populist 
elitism; hyper-masculine aesthetics with rhetorical appeals to women; idealization of the 
people with a concurrent contempt for mass society; the desire to wrest authority from 
institutionalized conservative political coalitions coupled with a reliance on popular 
conservative coalitions; and the invocation of violence as a means to preserve order (Eatwell; 
Griffin, The Nature of Fascism; Passmore; Payne). 
 Indeed, it is this contradictory nature that underlies the difficulties that scholars 
encounter in attempting to identify, characterize and analyze fascism as a clearly defined 
phenomenon. As counterintuitive as it may seem, the attempt to specify the precise historical 
and ideological characteristics of fascism has added to the confusion—if not vagueness—
surrounding the term. Scholars often identify certain components as defining fascism, even 
though these components on their own are not exclusively fascist. Although important, the 
debates arising from the political-ideological account have had a simultaneously widening 
and narrowing effect on our understanding of fascism. For example, Roger Eatwell’s 
conceptual model of generic fascism promotes an ideological interpretation centered on 
themes of “natural history, geopolitics, political economy [and] leadership, activism, party, 
and propaganda” for the purpose of comparing the varieties of fascist political programs in 
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various historical moments and societies (174). In contrast, Roger Griffin developed the 
notion of a “fascist minimum” (Griffin, The Nature of Fascism viii), which defines fascism 
as “a genus of political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a 
palingenetic form of populist ultranationalism” (Griffin, The Nature of Fascism 26).40 
 In spite of these contradictions, debates and confusions, there is (according to 
Mussolini) one unifying factor to fascist ideology and political practice: the nation-state. 
“The foundation of Fascism is the conception of the state, its character, its duty, and its aim” 
(Mussolini, “The Doctrine of Fascism” 242). The classical Fascist state was intended to 
operate as “an embodied will to power and government. […] According to fascism, 
government is a thing to be expressed not so much in territorial or military terms as in terms 
of morality and the spirit. It must be thought of as an empire” (Mussolini, “The Doctrine of 
Fascism” 244). The state is the point of convergence for “all the political, economic, and 
spiritual forces of the nation” (Mussolini, “The Doctrine of Fascism” 243). Moreover, all 
individual or collective subjectivity/identity has value only in relation to the nation-state. 
Politically speaking, the classical Fascist state took the form of an “organized, centralized, 
and authoritative democracy,” but only if democracy means the absolute submission of 
individuals to the collective advancement of the racialized fascist nation (Mussolini, “The 
Doctrine of Fascism” 240). The fascist state was distinguished from other forms of 
dictatorship in that it was able to gain control of the government bureaucracy by electoral and 
legislative means rather than vanguard revolutionary action. “What made fascism different 
from earlier dictatorships was the presence of a mass party that monopolized power through 
                                                 
40 “Palingenetic” refers to rebirth or regeneration. Biologically, this implies “embryonic development that 
reproduces the ancestral features of the species” (OED). In a metaphysical sense, this implies baptism in service 
of the “transmigration of souls” (ibid). These two implications should be taken together for the argument at 
hand, with the fascist state as both Womb and Savior. 
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its security services and the army and that eliminated all other parties” (Laqueur 14). Fascism 
came to power in Italy and Germany through preexisting parliamentary institutions (enabled 
by mass support of the populace and violence on the part of organized thugs), then 
consolidated power by fostering bureaucratic inefficiency and chaos.41 
 The question of the nation-state serves as the focal point for the totalitarian account 
of fascism, which offers insight into how fascist parties (enabled by both cadres of violent 
thugs and mass support of the populace) were able to gain control of government 
bureaucracies. The mass appeal of fascism is viewed as having resulted from a series of 
crises—primarily the military failures of the German and Italian states in World War I, 
economic depression, the inter-war weakening of established conservatism (which resulted in 
a shift of conservatives to the far right), and the failure of the socialist left to gain control of 
the nation-state (which was predicated on the left’s failure to present a coherent political 
platform capable of mobilizing the working class) (Laqueur; Passmore). This account 
highlights fascism’s need for a unified party with mass support, headed by a single leader and 
“superior to or intertwined with the governmental bureaucracy” (Passmore 19). Once in 
control of the government, the fascist party operated through a combination of mass media 
propaganda, political terror exercised by the police and secret police, a weapons monopoly 
concentrated in the relationship between the military and heavy industry, and centralized 
control of the economy (Passmore). This account focuses on fascism as “an elaborate 
ideology, which covers all of man’s [sic] existence and which contains a powerful chiliastic 
[i.e. messianic] moment” in pursuit of the total restructuring of society through the nation-
                                                 
41 This is one of the few consistent features of fascism: to construct grand, mythical dictums then avoid 
questions of practical implementation, dealing with concrete historical realities in a manner that is both 
expedient and reactionary. 
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state in accordance with such an ideology (Passmore 19). In the context of classical Fascism, 
the restructuring of society required control of the nation-state. The difference between the 
political-ideological account and the totalitarian account is not a matter of kind; it is simply a 
matter of whether emphasis is placed on the ideological characteristics of the political 
movement or on the control of the nation-state by a fascist party. 
 Both of these accounts provide valuable insight into the character and functions of 
fascism as an ideology and political movement. At the risk of contradicting my earlier 
statements regarding the U.S. presidential election of 2016, it is not difficult to recognize the 
ideological characteristics and contradictions of fascism as a force in American politics in the 
current moment—the rejection of socialism and liberalism, with a concurrent distrust of 
representative democracy; racism, xenophobia and ultranationalism; the hierarchical 
mobilization of disparate (often antagonistic) social groups united around a myth of national 
unity; a traditionalism that is obsessed with technological progress; populist elitism; hyper-
masculine aesthetics with rhetorical appeals to women; idealization of the people with a 
concurrent contempt for mass society; the desire to wrest authority from institutionalized 
conservative political coalitions coupled with a reliance on popular conservative coalitions; 
and the invocation of violence as a means to preserve order. We witnessed the coming to 
power through electoral means of a leader professing exactly those values. It can reasonably 
be argued that “Make America Great Again” expresses the mythic core of these values while 
advocating a palingenetic form of populist ultranationalism. The current administration views 
the nation-state as necessary for the purposes of reorganizing society to the demands of 
corporate capital—even if the government itself is derided in public discourse as being 
inefficient and a hindrance to business. The agenda of this administration (and its reluctant 
132 
 
allies among the institutionalized conservative coalitions in Congress) seems to be based on 
grand, mythical dictums that avoid questions of practical implementation, and deals with 
concrete historical realities in a manner that is both expedient and reactionary. 
Of course, there are a few important differences between classical Fascism and the 
current state of American politics. The current administration is not a dictatorship, nor has it 
eliminated other political parties. Forms of mass media have not been monopolized for party 
propaganda, which is disseminated instead through social media. Political terror is not 
exercised through the police or a secret police, but by loosely-organized groups of white-
nationalists with no official bureaucratic positions. And while a monopoly on heavy arms 
certainly exists between the military and defense contractors, the National Rifle Association 
at least ensures that anyone with even a well-documented history of violence and psychiatric 
problems can still amass a personal arsenal of small arms for the purposes of “a well-
regulated Militia” (Constitution of the United States). Finally, there is no central control of 
the economy. Corporate capital no longer requires the nation-state for its productive 
organization, except when it wants either funding for technological and scientific 
innovations, or tax rebates, deregulation or what is often called “corporate welfare.” 
At least this is what I would say if I were thinking about the current state of American 
politics through the political-ideological and totalitarian accounts of fascism. But these 
accounts have only limited analytical value to the argument at hand. The totalitarian account 
tends to push aside questions of causality, content instead “with mechanistic generalizations 
about the crisis of traditional ideas, a consequent sense of disorientation, and search for 
substitute religion” (Passmore 21). Moreover, this account regards fascism as a unified mass 
party. Actual analyses have shown, however, that classical Fascist regimes lacked a clear 
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authority structure and were rife with internal dissension and power maneuvers that inhibited 
the assumed authoritative supremacy of the party leader (Gibson; Neumann; Renneburg and 
Walker). By focusing on the revolutionary aspects of fascism, the totalitarian account 
generally ignores fascism’s equally significant reactionary and traditionalist features. This is 
due in part to the fact that, although the totalitarian account does address Italian fascism, the 
Nazi regime in Germany is typically posited as the archetype of fascism (Passmore). This 
tends to reinforce a political orientation to the problem while viewing as tangential the 
economic, cultural and technological aspects of fascism—in as much as the totalitarian 
account is concerned with the more politically totalitarian regime of the era of classical 
Fascism. Finally, the totalitarian account ignores Hannah Arendt’s analysis of totalitarianism, 
which argues that fascism is not actually totalitarian because the classical Fascist state (i.e. 
Mussolini’s regime) “did not attempt to establish a full-fledged totalitarian regime” because 
while it attempted to organize classes through a one-party dictatorship, it did not further 
attempt to organize the masses (Arendt 309). 
The political-ideological account is also limited when attempting to theorize fascism 
as a form of power. The theoretical reduction of fascism to a set of specific ideological 
components that characterize particular political regimes, or the generalization of such 
components into a conceptual model for comparing/contrasting fascism with other political 
movements, cannot account for the cultural, economic and social contexts out of which those 
ideologies and parties arose.42 Analyses grounded in this account exhibit “certain basic 
deficiencies: either they remain merely at the empirico-descriptive level or, when we burrow 
                                                 
42 To be fair, this is not the aim of the political-ideological account. I am not blaming a theory for not doing 
what it does not claim to do; I am simply suggesting that it is of limited value when our questions about fascism 
move beyond the realms of ideology and political practice.  
 
134 
 
down to the historico-explicative mechanisms which order the tangled mass of facts, we find 
that fascism is reduced to relatively simple contradictions” (Laclau 81). Such analyses lack 
an understanding of the very “complex articulation of contradictions from which it emerged” 
(Laclau 82). They are content with pointing to the necessity of mass support for the success 
of fascist parties without accounting for the mechanisms by which such support was 
generated. This is especially problematic when we consider fascism’s cooptation of particular 
socialist sentiments in order to destroy socialist and other revolutionary workers’ movements. 
 There is an ambiguity and complexity—a fluidity—to fascism that cannot be reduced 
to either ideological characteristics or the actions of a political party. As such, the totalitarian 
and political-ideological accounts need to be supplemented by other accounts that consider 
the economic, technological and socio-psychological lines of force that characterize fascist 
power.  
Fascism’s ambiguity explains why it is both attracted to and repelled by  
conservatism, and makes sense of the oft-noted oscillations between radicalism and  
reaction in fascism’s history. Despite some attempts to see the history of fascism in  
terms of a series of definable ‘stages,’ there was no clear pattern to fascism’s frequent  
changes of direction. Its mutations resulted from conflicts within fascist movements  
operating in unpredictable circumstances. (Passmore 32) 
 
When we consider all of this in relation to the contradictory content of fascist ideology (as 
well as in relation to the complex articulation of ideas, contexts and practices out of which 
fascism arose), it is quite understandable that scholarship still has not adequately come to 
terms with its object of analysis. 
 As demonstrated, dominant theories of fascism are framed by a classificatory system 
of ideological characteristics or totalitarian practices. The purpose of this system is three-
fold: to distinguish fascism from other dictatorial and/or authoritarian ideologies with 
overlapping characteristics; to allow for comparison and contrast between different fascist 
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regimes; and to situate fascism as a unique yet variable phenomenon of particular historical 
and social contexts. The political-ideological and totalitarian accounts tend to focus narrowly 
on the political aspects of fascism, leaving little room for other considerations. While not 
necessarily a shortcoming in disciplinary terms, it limits our ability to understand fascism as 
something more (or other) than simply a political movement. What Paul Einzig noted in 1934 
is equally applicable today: fascism is “still regarded principally as a political movement; the 
economic implications of the term are generally ignored” (Einzig 2). 
 Perhaps this is the most glaring limitation of these accounts: they are structured in 
such a way so as to advance (however unintentionally) the view that fascism was an 
historical anomaly, something that could not resurface in the current age apart from 
marginalized far-right groups with little relevance to mainstream politics.  
Through all kinds of means […] we are led to believe that Nazism was just a bad  
moment we had to go through, a sort of historical error, but also a beautiful page in  
history of the good heroes. And besides was it not touching to see the intertwined  
flags of capitalism and socialism? We are further led to believe that there were real  
antagonistic contradictions between the fascist Axis and the Allies. (Guattari 239-40) 
 
The belief that fascism could not reappear is a consistent theme in both the political-
ideological and totalitarian accounts. While classical Fascism as a state apparatus dominated 
by a single fascist party is almost certainly (or hopefully, at least) an historic relic, fascism as 
a form of power evolved beyond its original context to the larger (and more long-term) 
context of corporate capital. Indeed, Roger Griffin (whose work is rightfully foundational to 
the political-ideological account) denies the possibility of a resurgence of fascism, claiming 
that the structural features of the current age prevent fascism from being anything more than 
a “paper tiger” (Griffin, The Nature of Fascism 220).43 However, the claims forwarded by the 
                                                 
43 Griffin seems to have backed away from this claim in recent years but (as far as I know) has yet to repudiate 
it. 
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political-ideological account itself suggest that this claim might be untenable. Several factors 
acknowledged as contributing to the mass support of classical Fascism bear more than a 
passing resemblance to the issues we face in the current conjuncture, including high 
unemployment among youth, fears that immigration will disintegrate national unity and 
destroy the national economy, dissatisfaction with globalization, the continued prevalence of 
racism, popular belief in the fundamental corruption of establishment politics, the 
abandonment of radical principles by the political left, and the general rightward shift of the 
political mainstream. “The differences between the left and the right have been attenuated, 
and all parties speak largely for those who have gained from the transformation of the 
economy, leaving the losers without representation” (Passmore 94). In this way, many of the 
conditions that contributed to the rise of classical Fascism continue to exist (albeit in re-
articulated form) in the current era. Fascism was not simply about nationalism or a reaction 
against socialism; its appeal derived from “a diffuse reaction, rooted in daily struggles for 
jobs, financial reward, educational success, and political honour against socialists, ethnic 
minorities, feminists, and liberals in a context of imperialism and nation-building” (Passmore 
41).   
As much as fascism has been theorized as a reactionary ideology, it contains modern 
tendencies that continue to characterize corporate capital. Classical Fascism was (in part) 
marked by a fetishization of technology—particularly military technology and mass media—
which was viewed as central to the mystical rebirth of the fascist nation. Government 
contracts for technological innovation tended to favor big business. The interrelation between 
technological fetishism, mysticism, military expansionism, and large corporations cannot be 
overlooked, especially when considered in relation to “the internationalizing tendencies of 
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capitalism, technological change, and advanced communications” in the current age 
(Passmore 95). 
 Furthermore, there is (as noted by Walter Laqueur and Kevin Passmore) a radical 
contextuality to fascism that confounds any attempts at conceptual generalization. Any 
meaningful analysis of fascism should highlight the links between contextual phenomena and 
the contradictory nature of fascism, rather than simply explicating specific characteristics that 
mark a phenomenon as being fascist or not fascist.  
Using the concept of fascism provides only partial insight into specific cases, for any  
individual movement will possess features explicable only in terms of its particular  
circumstances. Since no ‘pure’ example of fascism could ever exist, we need to  
deploy other concepts alongside that of fascism. (Passmore 154) 
 
What is important in the study of fascism (and in the use of analysis to inform anti-fascist 
politics) is to maintain a self-reflexive critical framework that accepts the plurality of 
analytical accounts rather than to posit one’s own “pet theory [as] the only way to understand 
fascism” (Passmore 14).  
There is also another set of concerns when considering the political-ideological and 
totalitarian accounts of fascism. These concerns are not, however, shortcomings of the 
theories themselves because neither account was concerned with what I will suggest is the 
key component of fascist political economy: the relationship between the nation-state and the 
business corporation. Neither do they provide an understanding of the way the economy is 
organized through this relationship, which is significant owing to the fact that both the 
organization of national economic production and the reconciliation of labor to capital were 
only possible under classical Fascism through this relationship. This limits our ability to re-
theorize fascism from being a political ideology or mode of party politics to a form of power 
characterized by particular relations of force (i.e. of political economy, technology and 
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desire). This is not a criticism of these accounts because it would be unfair to criticize work 
for not doing what it does not claim to do. I mention these concerns here because they simply 
demonstrate the limitations (rather than any shortcomings or failures) of the dominant 
scholarly understanding of fascism.  
The Fetishization of Theory and Multiplicity 
 There is a third tendency that characterizes our current understanding of fascism, one 
that attempts to theorize fascism in ways different than the political-ideological and 
totalitarian accounts. This tendency is (admittedly) relatively novel and does not dominate 
current understandings of fascism in the ways that popular usage and the political-
economic/totalitarian accounts do. However, it does reflect a significant trend in critical 
scholarship: fetishizing Marxist, poststructural and/or postmodern theory at the expense of 
both theoretical innovation and empirical work. In regards to fascism, this tendency 
expresses itself in two ways: 1) the conflation of neoliberalism to fascism through a Marxist 
conflation of fascism and capitalism; and 2) the uptake of the work of Gilles Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari.  
As discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, there is a long history of Marxist analyses 
concerning fascism. Although there are variations between these analyses, they all converge 
on an understanding of fascism as being either the logical end result of capitalism or a form 
of imperial capitalism. As noted by the Communist International of 1935, “fascism in power 
is the open, terroristic dictatorship of the most reactionary, the most chauvinistic, the most 
imperialistic elements of finance capitalism” (Passmore 14-5). This view is echoed 
throughout Marxist analyses, in which fascism is alternately described as: the third stage of 
capitalist development—“the decline of capitalism” (Trotsky 19); one of two possible end 
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results of Enlightenment reason as articulated to capitalism (Horkheimer, “The Authoritarian 
State”; “The End of Reason”); “‘logically’ the last stage of capitalist development” 
(Kirchheimer 13); “a form of what Lenin called capitalism in decay” (Guerin 285);and “the 
modern form of the class dictatorship of capital”—a structural “transformation of the form of 
the domination of capital” (Marcuse, Collected Papers, Volume One 218-19). 
By circumstance, while I was editing this chapter, a book was published with the 
intriguing title, The Fascist Nature of Neoliberalism. The book’s authors, Andrea Miccoci 
and Flavia Di Mario, argue that the supposedly liberal features of neoliberalism (i.e. 
competition, inequality, corporate management, the dismantling of the welfare state, and the 
retreat of the state from the economy) are actually fascist. By pointing to the overlaps 
between the ideals and practices of classical Fascism with those of contemporary capitalism 
(i.e. the need for an organic national community, repression of unions to corporatist 
demands, constant drive to war, discursive construction of us-versus-them political 
formations, and expedient political and economic responses to problems of efficiency), 
Miccoci and Di Mario argue that fascism is a “flawed, limited and limiting” component of 
“capitalist metaphysics,” with neoliberalism as “the best interpreter” of this component for 
mitigating the tension between politics and economics in the current phase of capitalism (3). 
The relation between neoliberalism and fascism ostensibly arises from what the author’s 
consider to be the philosophical origin of fascism: Hegel’s doctrine of the state, wherein it is 
argued that the state embodies the collective national will and (as such) operates as the 
rational guarantor of human freedom (Miccoci and Di Mario). Under the auspices of 
contemporary capital, this shared metaphysics is expressed through corporate managerialism. 
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 While I agree with the authors’ instincts in recognizing some connections between 
neoliberalism and fascism, their argument suffers because their understanding of 
contemporary capital is inadequate. As argued in Chapter 2, neoliberalism is too broad and 
vague a term to capture the particularities of the crises we now face; they are blind to the role 
of the business corporation as paramount, and to the role of corporate sovereignty and the 
crisis of sovereignty. In fact, the conflation of fascism with capitalism reproduces the popular 
misunderstanding of fascism explained earlier in this chapter. With both neoliberalism and 
fascism being such vague and amorphous terms (conceptually and popularly, respectively), it 
becomes possible to justify an indiscriminate usage of the term fascist within the terms set 
forth in The Fascist Nature of Neoliberalism. Ironically, the authors’ reliance on a dialectical 
understanding of the relationships between capitalism and fascism prevents them from taking 
a more conjunctural approach to the question of fascism. 
 An important development has been the recent uptake of the work of Deleuze and 
Guattari on fascism. While there is a range of work here—and I myself will use Deleuze and 
Guattari in the following chapter—I want to identify and reject one common interpretation 
exemplified in Deleuze and Fascism, edited by Brad Evans and Julian Reid, because I 
believe it has the potential to lead us down unproductive (even counterproductive) paths. The 
overall purpose of the project is to disrupt the perception that fascism was defeated by 
liberalism so as to interrogate “contemporary power relations as predicated on the real and 
necessary existence of fascism” as it continues to operate in supposedly liberal regimes 
(Evans and Reid 1). I am sympathetic to this project for a number of reasons: it stresses the 
need for analyses that understand fascism as a contemporary phenomenon of power relations; 
it is critical of the post-war liberal assumption that fascism was defeated; it understands 
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fascism as a set of practices rather than ideological characteristics (May); and it moves 
beyond both “the generalization of fascism as though it were a logic of politics” itself and 
“the mobilization of fascism as an axiological marker” (i.e. a marker of values held by 
individuals and/or groups (Whitehall 64). However, the analytical deployment of Deleuze 
and Guattari’s understanding of fascism in the volume suffers from a number of deficiencies. 
First, the editors of Deleuze and Fascism take as their starting point the 
presupposition that all life is and all relations are inherently fascist. If fascism “is as diffuse 
as the phenomenon of power itself,” then fascism becomes conflated to the desire for power 
as such (Evans and Reid 1). This is much closer philosophically to Nietzsche’s will to 
destroy than it is to the will to power. From this perspective, not only are all political 
practices themselves inherently fascist, but we as human beings are fundamentally, 
existentially and ontologically without exception “all, always fascists of multiple kinds” 
(Evans and Reid 5). Such a statement reproduces the type of essentialist, universalist logic 
that Deleuze and Guattari resist. 
 Second (and as evidenced by the title), Deleuze and Fascism refers primarily (if not 
exclusively) to the influence of Deleuze on Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of fascism. 
This is a serious error because their understanding of fascism does not come from Deleuze’s 
philosophy; it comes from Guattari’s training in psychoanalysis. Much of Guattari’s solo-
authored work deals directly with the problematic of fascism in a way that Deleuze’s does 
not. The understanding of fascism in their work comes directly (if only minimally cited) from 
Wilhelm Reich—a psychoanalyst trained by Sigmund Freud. Although a couple of the 
authors in Deleuze and Fascism refer to Reich (Evans; Evans and Reid), they cite only the 
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brief mention of Reich found in the work of Deleuze and Guattari. There is no in-depth 
consideration of Reich’s theory of fascism although it is foundational to their argument. 
The universalization of fascism offered in this volume’s interpretation is deeply 
troubling. What are we to do with this perspective if we wish to engage in effectual anti-
fascist politics? How are we to understand the mechanisms and operations of fascist power in 
the current moment if we a priori abstract the question of fascism from specific machinic 
assemblages in specific contexts of desiring-production?44 Indeed, if we were all always 
already fascist, what would be the point of anything at all except a suicidal line of flight? 
While I also deploy the work of Deleuze and Guattari to theorize fascism, I do so with a 
sustained consideration of the work of both Guattari (with and without Deleuze) and (more 
importantly) Wilhelm Reich—and without the presupposition that fascism is an ontological 
condition of humanity.  
 The need for a self-reflexive, open critical framework becomes particularly 
significant when considered in conjunction with the claims of Antonio Gramsci (one of 
classical Fascism’s initial victims). “There does not exist any essence of Fascism as such”; 
the essence of fascism in a particular context is “provided by a particular system of relations 
of force” (Gramsci, The Antonio Gramsci Reader 139) (emphasis added). This insight 
highlight the need for a conjunctural approach to analyzing fascism, one that theorizes 
fascism as a form of power characterized by a particular system of force relations (i.e. 
political economy, technology and desire) rather than in the terms narrowly set out by the 
political-ideological and totalitarian accounts. For as Felix Guattari noted, “we must 
                                                 
44 Machinic assemblage refers here to the materiality, interrelations and affective engagements of relations of 
force in the production of social realities and power formations. Desiring-production refers to the machinic 
operations of desire as productive of such realities and formations.  
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abandon, once and for all, the quick and easy formula: ‘Fascism will not make it again.’ 
Fascism has already ‘made it,’ and continues to ‘make it.’ […] It is in constant evolution, to 
the extent that it shares a micro-political economy of desire itself inseparable from the 
evolution of the productive forces. […] Fascism, like desire, is scattered everywhere, in 
separate bits and pieces, within the whole social realm; it crystallizes in one place or another, 
depending on the relationships of force” (Guattari 244-5).45  
This is precisely the point of Umberto Eco’s consideration of “Ur-Fascism” or 
“Eternal Fascism” (para. 30). While we can identify certain features of fascist ideology and 
political practice (e.g. ultranationalism, populist elitism, “culture of tradition,” fear of 
alterity), fascism does not disappear with the addition or elimination of any of these 
particular features. “The Fascist game can be played in many forms, and the name of the 
game does not change” (Eco para. 27), hence its attraction for a variety of regimes, such as 
Nazism or Franco’s dictatorship in Spain. Ultimately for Eco, fascism has neither an 
exemplar nor an intrinsic constituent character. It is “a rigid discombobulation, a structured 
confusion. Fascism [is] philosophically out of joint, but emotionally it [is] firmly fastened to 
some archetypal foundations” (Eco para. 26). It can thus survive a particular political regime 
because it is more intimately connected with cultural habits and desires than with ideology or 
politics. For these reasons, fascism must be re-theorized from being an object of analysis to 
being a problematic, and thus more suited to conjunctural analysis. The following chapter 
presents a conjunctural analysis that demonstrates fascism to be a mode of power—a 
                                                 
45 While such a claim could be interpreted as an instance of indiscriminate usage in popular discourse, it is 
anything but that; it is (as demonstrated in Chapter 5) a key component of the socio-psychological account of 
fascism. 
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contingent set of articulations of force relations operating through a crisis of corporate 
sovereignty. 
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CHAPTER 5: A CONJUNCTURAL UNDERSTANDING OF FASCISM 
 
“Marx, following Hegel, said that history can sometimes repeat itself: but what the first time 
was tragedy, is the second time farce. The formulation is striking, but it is true in one sense 
only: there are such things as black comedies.” 
- Nicos Poulantzas 
 
“what the whole hep world would be doing on Saturday night if the Nazis had won the war. 
This is the Sixth Reich. […] This madness goes on and on, but nobody seems to notice. […] 
Reality itself is too twisted. […] No. Calm down. Learn to enjoy losing.” 
- Raoul Duke 
 
Introduction 
 
When I first began this work, I intended to discuss only the potential for fascism to 
reappear as an outright political and cultural reality at some point in the future. The crisis of 
American democracy that was laid bare by the election of Donald Trump has thrown any sort 
of cautious prognostication out the window. Though not in the way that critics of Trump 
would like to suggest, fascism has arrived in America and it has done so on the back of 
corporate capitalism. But these fascistic tendencies have been with us for over half a century, 
and they are not solely the result of capitalism. Perhaps, in fact, the most significant factor in 
all of this is simply our own desire. Following the lead of the socio-psychological account of 
fascism (detailed in a following section of this chapter), I. W. Charny posited that the fascist 
mindset is a political construction in search of “certainty, suppression of contrary 
information, and the exercise of violence toward those who differ or disagree with us, and 
even toward those parts of our own selves that do not conform to the rules we have made for 
ourselves” (Charny 1)—a mindset that “thrives on our powerful anxieties of incompleteness, 
fears of not becoming what we can be, and dread of our mortality and limitations. We make 
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certain that our way of life is the one and only right way in an effort to spare ontological 
dread of anxiety, limitation, and knowledge of one’s finality” (Charny 6).  
While Charny does not provide explicit evidence for this claim, it is consistent with 
the empirical research of Allen Edwards, who conducted a series of survey studies of 
American attitudes toward fascist principles in the 1940s. The studies surveyed respondents 
about their agreement or disagreement with certain political statements that (although wholly 
consistent with fascist ideology) were not identified as being fascistic. Overall, this research 
indicates “that many people are opposed to fascist ideology only as a stereotype; their 
allegiance to democracy is only verbal homage. The label ‘fascism’ evokes an emotional 
rejection of the label, but not a critical rejection of the principles of fascism for which the 
label stands” (A. Edwards 314) [emphasis added]. Edwards found that agreement with fascist 
principles correlates with age, political affiliation and income. Agreement with fascist 
principles tends to increase with age among “consistent supporters of the Democratic or 
Republican parties” in the United States (A. Edwards 306), but tends to decrease with age 
among self-identified political independents. Agreement with fascist principles rises with 
either increased income—correlated to a desire to protect personal wealth and security—or 
dissatisfaction with the status quo. Demographically, agreement with fascist principles was 
highest among housewives, especially rural women. The study correlated this with a desire 
for homeostasis, stability and ego-defense in the face of changing social norms. Conversely, 
the lowest degree of acceptance of fascist principles was found among social workers and 
elementary school teachers. Edwards further identified the primary factors that underlie 
fascism in its particularly American form—“White supremacy, Christianity, and 100-per-
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cent Americanism” (A. Edwards 312).46 Although over seventy years have passed since the 
publication of this study, its results give us much to consider about the crises we now face, 
and the need to take fascism seriously as a contemporary problem. 
 With this in mind, I propose that fascism is best theorized (for my purposes, at least) 
conjuncturally in its particularly American form as a contingent set of articulations between 
political-economy, technological/technocratic and desiring relations of force. This 
perspective requires unsettling our dominant understandings of fascism as explained in 
Chapter 4. What is of concern in analyzing fascism are not simply definable characteristics, 
but the interplay of ideas, contexts and practices. Fascism can be understood not only as an 
ideology, a political movement or an ontological condition, but as a complex configuration 
across multiple axes or dimensions, of which I will focus on three because I think these 
particular axes open up the contemporary conjuncture in a useful way. 
Fascist Forces 
 I want to turn to some bodies of work on fascism that have been largely ignored. The 
theories with which my work engages fall broadly into three main categories: a political-
economic account, a technological/technocratic account, and a socio-psychological 
account.47 Engaging with each of these accounts allows me to highlight the complexity, 
contingency and fluidity of fascism as a mode of power—to analyze it as being “the result of 
a very complex over-determination of contradictions” and relations of force (Laclau 88).  
                                                 
46 While this could be considered a question of ideology, it is not about fascist ideology as such. It indicates 
instead the ability of fascism to manifest in different socio-historical contexts through its ability to resonate with 
other ideological investments. 
 
47 There are other accounts (i.e. a philosophical account, an aesthetic account and a mediational account) which 
provide valuable insight into questions regarding the relation of fascism to Enlightenment rationality and 
Modernism, the role of symbolism and ritual in fascist practices, and the functions of propaganda and media in 
fascist regimes. These accounts, however, do not relate directly to my analysis and (as such) must regrettably be 
excluded from consideration here. 
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A concept must be framed in such a way that it can be subjected to criticism and  
possible contradiction. […] Our definitions must permit critical analysis and  
investigation. […] Beyond being potentially falsifiable, definitions must also  
illuminate and make sense of the things we know about the world. […] Difficulties  
arise when scholars claim that their pet theory provides the only way to understand  
fascism. Since any given political movement is too complex to be encompassed  
within a single concept, they soon encounter evidence that won’t ‘fit.’ (Passmore 12- 
13) 
 
Fascism cannot be reduced to its classical form (i.e. that of Nazism or Italian 
Fascism). As noted by Felix Guattari, what those regimes “set in motion yesterday continues 
to proliferate in other forms, within the complex of contemporary social space. [Fascism 
exists] as a whole totalitarian chemistry” that can operate through political, economic and 
cultural practices in representative democracies as well as dictatorial regimes (235). 
Moreover, Nicos Poulantzas (one of the major Marxist theorists of fascism) concluded that 
“it is possible for fascism to recur, but of course it would not necessarily arise or come to 
power in the same forms as in the past” (358). This is precisely because different contexts 
can be overdetermined by the same relations of force, but the ways in which these forces 
become articulated to each other (and the mechanisms and operations by which these forces 
manifest) depend on the specific historical and social conditions of the context itself. 
Rather than limiting our understanding of fascism purely in terms of the political 
practices and ideological characteristics of classical Fascism, a conjunctural perspective 
recognizes that the character of fascism is “provided by a particular system of relations of 
force” as they arise in the attempt to settle an organic crisis in a particular moment of its 
historical development, and not by a checklist of descriptive categories (Gramsci, The 
Antonio Gramsci Reader 139). This is important because without thinking through fascism 
conjuncturally, our ability to recognize it in forms that do not precisely mirror classical 
Fascism is compromised. This in turn compromises our ability to prevent (or stop in its 
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nascency) the resurgence of fascism in the contemporary moment. Conjunctural analysis can 
account for the fact that multiple forms of fascism operate in different ways in different 
contexts without reducing all of them to a single essence or model. Moreover, conjunctural 
analysis allows us to conceptualize corporate sovereignty in ways that do not automatically 
reify it as something necessarily distinct from (and in opposition to) the sovereignty of the 
modern nation-state. 
A Political-economic Account of Fascism 
There is little unifying consensus in the theoretical literature on the foundation of the 
fascist economy. In order to provide some analytical clarity, my argument draws heavily 
from primary source documents of the Italian fascist regime concerning economic policies 
and programs (Celli; Mussolini, “Ascension Speech”; Mussolini, “For the Battle of Grain”; 
Mussolini, “Before the Assembly of the Council of Corporations”; Mussolini, “On the Bill 
Establishing the Law on the Corporate State”; Mussolini, “Birth Certificate of Fascism at 
Piazza San Sepolcro”; Mussolini, “On the Corporate State”; Mussolini, “The Defense of the 
Lira and Problems with Exports”; Mussolini, “The Economic Policies of the Regime”; 
Mussolini, “Law Establishing the National Council of Corporations”; Mussolini, “Pesaro 
Speech”; Mussolini, “Plan for the New Italian Economy”; Mussolini, “Program of the 
National Fascist Party”; Rocco; Rossi), as well as theorists such as Paul Einzig, Max 
Horkheimer, Antonio Gramsci, Daniel Guerin, Otto Kirchheimer, Franz Neumann, and Nicos 
Poulantzas.  
Acolytes of market capitalism argue that fascism is a form of socialism—an absolute 
form of state planning resulting from the abandonment of competitive economic liberalism, 
social-democratic frustration with elite privilege and materialist egotism, and public 
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dissatisfaction with ineffective and inefficient legislative assemblies (Hayek). Given the 
dearth of empirical evidence for such views, I choose to think through various Marxist, 
anarchist and even fascist explanations, which, despite fundamental disagreements, all see 
fascism as a form of imperial capital, regardless of its occasional anti-capitalist rhetoric. My 
consideration of these theories in connection with primary source documents indicates that 
although the fascist regime organized business corporations according to industry under the 
aegis of the nation-state, it rarely intervened in the operations of those corporations except to 
combat inflation or stabilize the lira. 
 Generally speaking, the political-economic account begins with the corporatist nature 
of classical Fascism, otherwise referred to as the “Corporate State”—a “constitutional system 
in which the employers and employed, grouped into mixed national corporations, play a 
predominant part in the government” (Einzig 25). Rather than being a form of absolute state 
planning as suggested by Hayek, fascism actually operated as a compromise between state 
planning and competitive capitalism (Einzig). This account broadens our understanding of 
the fascist political program beyond questions of the fascist party or state regime to include 
the relationship between the nation-state and the legal form of the business corporation. 
 “Fascism is essentially an economic system—a compromise between pure 
individualistic Capitalism and complete State control” (Einzig 6). From the fascist 
perspective, the state “is the force that alone can provide a solution to the dramatic 
contradictions of capitalism” (Mussolini, “The Doctrine of Fascism” 242-3). This does not, 
however, indicate a socialist foundation to fascism, which (unlike socialism) denies the 
possibility of economic well-being or the possibility of material happiness for all. Fascism is 
resolutely opposed to socialism in that any society based on the ideal of “the well-being and 
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the personal liberty of all the individuals of which it is composed” is unnatural (Renan, 
quoted in Mussolini, “The Doctrine of Fascism” 239). The fascist state is (from a fascist 
perspective) unique in that attempts to anticipate and solve “the universal political problems” 
of the modern age through the merging of politics, economics and morality (Mussolini, “The 
Doctrine of Fascism” 243).  
The Fascist state has drawn into itself the economic activities of the nation, and,  
through the corporative social and educational institutions created by it, its influence  
reaches every aspect of the national life and includes, framed in their respective  
organizations, all the political, economic, and spiritual forces of the nation. (ibid) 
 
However, the role of the state was not (in functional, practical terms) so absolute—or even so 
primary—as was the role (and relative independence) of the corporate organization of 
economic activity. 
 In order to accustom the masses (particularly the working class) to “real and effective 
leadership” (Mussolini, “The Doctrine of Fascism” 236), fascism needed to draw working-
class support away from communist, socialist and liberal political movements. The fascist 
solution to this problem was the establishment of national corporations, whose purpose was 
to assist the “political dictatorship with a planned economic system on capitalistic lines” 
(Einzig 18). These corporations were intended to direct industry and commerce through 
political leadership, although such leadership intervened only to mitigate currency and 
inflationary crises; it did not functionally impose itself on the practical functioning of the 
economy in any significant way. Although providing leadership, the Corporate State 
maintained the institutions of private property and independent private banks. Regarding 
industrial production, trusts and cartels were encouraged “under the supervision of [the 
national] Corporations so as to fit their activities into the general working of the [economic] 
system” (Einzig 34). In other words, monopoly capital was not only tolerated, but viewed as 
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essential to the functions of the national economy. Regarding monetary policy, the Corporate 
State maintained responsibility for combatting inflation, but allowed private and public-
private financial bodies to have a significant degree of independence from the state in order 
to support private initiative (i.e. in order to placate the financial elites who backed the fascist 
regime). State intervention in banking was reserved for economic crises, and actualized in the 
bailing out of banks without seizing control of them.48 Although Mussolini at first refused to 
delink the Italian lira from gold (Einzig), it later became necessary to break from the gold 
standard as an expedient response to economic instability (Guerin). These examples point to 
the fundamental characteristic of fascist political economy, which is very similar to that of 
liberal capitalism: intervention by the state only as an expedient response to economic 
instability or crisis—not the centralized state planning of the economy as suggested by either 
Hayek or Mussolini himself. 
 Bureaucratically, the Italian regime organized the economy under a set of National 
Corporations, which were officially part of the nation-state apparatus—“recognized by law as 
organs of the state” (Rocco 63). These corporations were organized according to the industry 
in which they primarily operated (e.g. agriculture, armaments) and were given relatively 
independent control over production and labor under the aegis of broadly stated goals of 
national interest. Professional and trade unions were allowed within these corporations, but 
they had to have legal recognition from the state. Their primary objective was to represent 
the public interest in relation to the state. In other words, the purpose of labor unions was to 
represent the interests of the nation-state through the reconciliation of labor and corporate 
oversight. Beyond broad economic goals developed by the fascist party, state interference 
                                                 
48 As noted by Daniel Guerin and Herbert Marcuse, there is no qualitatively significant difference between 
fascism and other forms of capitalism in this regard. Think of Too Big to Fail. 
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was kept to a minimum under the belief that “private enterprise in the sphere of production 
[is] the most efficient and useful instrument in the national interest” (ibid.). The Nazi regime 
maintained a similar bureaucratic approach by fostering the autonomous political 
organization of business under the National Economic Chamber (Neumann). Beneath this 
chamber, economic interests were organized through National Groups related to industry, 
trade, banking, insurance, etc. Each of the National Groups supervised the Economic Groups, 
Branch Groups and Provincial Guild Organizations related to its specific industry. This 
bureaucratic organization was altered in 1939 to organize the national economy for war. All 
economic oversight became organized under the control of the Chief of the War Economy. 
 In terms of the need to expediently address instability and/or crisis, the political 
potential of the working class—particularly as enabled by socialist trade and labor unions—
was one of the major political-economic obstacles for classical Fascism. As a way of 
mitigating this potential, fascism enveloped these unions into the national corporations. “It is 
only by combining [the independent and conflicting] desire[s] of economic interests to co-
operate with the guidance of the central authority that planning can be made to succeed” 
(Einzig 36). Rather than giving the working class a stake in political and economic authority, 
fascism reconciled their interests to those of the owners of finance and industry. Fascism 
maintained class distinctions through conciliatory practices that perpetuated the belief that 
the interests of labor and capital are identical. Additionally, the Corporate State outlawed 
strikes in order to prevent class war; replaced welfare with public works as a means to divert 
public monies into corporate enterprise (while simultaneously dismantling the welfare state); 
and regulated wages and prices so as to maximize distribution, consumption, efficiency, 
discipline and expediency.  
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Classical Fascism was a compromise between market capitalism and a planned 
economy. Just as importantly, these elements of fascist political economy were utilized not 
only for ostensible economic growth and stability, but more importantly for the perpetuation 
of a war economy. For Mussolini, economic activity was secondary to war; fascism believed 
“in neither the possibility nor the utility of perpetual peace” and organized economic activity 
for the purposes of imperial expansion (Mussolini, “The Doctrine of Fascism” 237). This 
point is crucial: the fascist compromise between market capitalism and a planned economy 
was necessitated by the desire for war.  
Unlike some Marxists cited in the previous chapter, while Nicos Poulantzas viewed 
fascism as connected to imperial capital, he did not reduce imperialism to a purely economic 
condition. Instead, he understood imperialism as a rearticulation of monopoly capitalism to 
emergent social and political phenomena. The state was a necessary conduit for monopoly 
capital, but the fractiousness and ineffectivity of the existing parliament hindered the 
expansion of such capital. Corresponding to this was an intensification of class divisions and 
the need to reconcile this to both prevent working-class revolutionary action and expand the 
power of monopoly capital. The attractiveness of fascism to monopoly capital became more 
acute in the wake of working-class failures to translate revolutionary politics into actual 
political power. Here we see the convergence of ideological, economic and political crises, 
which necessitated the use of the fascist party to ally the middle class to the interests of 
monopoly capital so as to quash the revolutionary potential of the working class (Poulantzas). 
Once in power, fascist control of the state hinged on its ability to neutralize the 
revolutionary potential of the working class. Working to reconcile class antagonisms under 
corporate capital, the fascist party served as the political machinery for the gaining of state 
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power by the economic elite, particularly the owners of finance capital (Trotsky). In this 
regard, fascism was a mixed form of state economic organization and private capital that 
granted a public character to private economic interests, with the aim of increasing security 
and growth for the owners of industry and finance (Horkheimer, “The Authoritarian State”; 
Kirchheimer). This occurred primarily through the national corporations, which received 
from the state “active encouragement of the process of monopolization and cartelization and 
the transformation of a private power position […] into a monopoly that remain[ed] private, 
yet [was] invested with public power” (Kirchheimer 59). The policies of the fascist state (e.g. 
the protection of private property, the fostering of private finance, the organization of the 
economy into national corporations) resulted in the hegemonic power of the corporation, 
which resulted in turn in the conflation of all domestic politics to an economic-corporate 
stage, with fascist ideology serving “as an element of a ‘war of position’ in the international 
economic field (free competition and free exchange here corresponding to the war of 
movement)” (Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks 120). 
This is not to suggest that fascism was simply an outcome of monopoly capital. 
Correlation does not equal causation. “To describe fascism as a capitalist regime is not 
saying much, for big business has shown an enormous ability to align itself to regimes to 
which it is opposed in principle” (Passmore 146). Equally, fascism showed an enormous 
ability to align itself with coalitions, businesses and financial institutions to which it was 
opposed in its political rhetoric. My hope is to present an analysis of the relations between 
fascism and capitalism that demonstrates the inherent complexity of those relations without 
theorizing fascism as simply an outcome of monopoly capital. 
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 Fascist economic policy served to universalize the particular interests of corporations 
through a number of practices: the encouragement of plutocracy; preservation of private 
finance and private property; suppression of labor to the interests of ownership; supporting 
private and semi-public industry and banking with public money; the flotation of long-term 
debt with taxes on the middle and working classes; modernizing the economy through 
investment in technological and military innovation; and combatting the falling rate of profit 
(as well as other crises of capital) through expedient monetary and trade policies—all in 
service to the ultimate aim of imperialism, which could only be achieved through the 
corporatization of the national economy (Gramsci, The Antonio Gramsci Reader; Guerin). 
“Thus from expedient to expedient—following no preconceived theory but in a purely 
empirical fashion, perhaps without having foreseen exactly where the road was leading 
which excessive armaments was forcing it to take—fascism [arrived] at a […] war economy 
in peace time” (Guerin 238-9). This relation between political economy and militarism is 
established primarily through the question of technology, which is discussed in the following 
section (Horkheimer; Kirchheimer; Marcuse, Collected Papers, Volume One). 
A Technological/Technocratic Account of Fascism 
 My consideration of the relationship between technology and fascism begins with the 
work of Herbert Marcuse (One-dimensional Man; Collected Papers, Volume One). Although 
Marcuse was concerned primarily with technological rationality and not technology per se, 
he was one of the only people writing about the technological character of fascism during the 
period of classical Fascism. Later writers shifted focus from technological rationality to 
issues of aeronautics, biological research, mass media, military technology, propaganda, 
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technocracy, technological culture, and the most recognizable technological aspect of 
fascism—war (Brose; Renneburg and Walker). 
 Technological production, organization and rationality are not inherently fascist. 
They are, however, determining forces of the modern era and (as such) affect the 
organization of social, political and economic relations. For Marcuse, there is a determinate 
relation between the technological mode of a society or historical era and the modes of 
human thought and behavior. In modern technological societies, human subjectivity is 
subordinated to an efficient and highly-rationalized system of mechanization, which 
“establishes standards of judgment and fosters attitudes which make men [sic] ready to 
accept and even introcept the dictates of the apparatus” (Marcuse, Collected Papers, Volume 
One 44).49 As a transformation of Enlightenment rationality through the evolution of 
industrial production, technological rationality is (for Marcuse) the guiding logic of modern 
capitalist production. The overriding social function of technological rationality is to reframe 
the individual as a purely economic subject whose social value is determined by one’s 
position within the prevailing economic system. Technology, then, is part of a larger 
apparatus of economic calculation, wherein the evaluation and implementation of 
technological innovations are motivated primarily by economic concerns. Technological 
rationality and the system of technological production function as part of the social process 
whereby liberty, equality and rights are conflated to the purely economic. 
 This relation between the technological and the economic highlights the role of 
technological rationality in producing modes of thought and behavior that are most amenable 
                                                 
 
49 “Introcept” refers to the process whereby someone attempts to view themselves through the perspective of 
another. In this sense, humans come to view themselves through the perspective of the apparatus of mechanized 
production. 
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to organizing human relations in accordance with capital production. Technological changes 
“result in fundamental changes in the structure of society” (Neumann 222). Society itself 
becomes a form of technocratic apparatus in that the organization of large-scale economic 
production requires the organization of social relations through technological means. This 
technocratic apparatus is necessarily hierarchical; favors private over public interests; and 
requires the (re)production of scarcity, inequality and even oppression to maintain the 
security of those in positions of power within the apparatus. As such, “technocracy implies a 
deepening of the gap between specialized knowledge and common knowledge, between the 
controlling and coordinating experts and the controlled or coordinated people” (Marcuse, 
Collected Papers, Volume One 59). And since the efficient functioning of the apparatus can 
only be achieved through aggressive expansion, technological rationality has a necessarily 
imperialistic character. This is the basis for considering technological rationality in relation 
to fascism: 
We may call [fascist rationality] technological rationality because it is derived from  
the technological process and therefrom applied to the ordering of all human  
relationships. This rationality functions according to the standards of efficiency and  
precision. At the same time, however, it is severed from everything that links it with  
the humane needs and wants of individuals; it is entirely adapted to the requirements  
of an all-embracing apparatus of domination. (Marcuse, Collected papers, Volume  
One 77-8) 
 
 This theorization of technological rationality serves as the basis for considering 
fascism as a form of technocracy, especially when considered in tandem with Franz 
Neumann’s theorization of the Nazi state as a “cartel of power blocs” rather than as a unified 
bureaucracy (Renneburg and Walker 1). Research has demonstrated that “the tensions 
between [the military, corporate capital, the civil service, the Nazi party, the secret police and 
bureaucratic agencies] produced much of the dynamic energy that ran the regime” 
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(Renneburg and Walker 2). Although the party leader (in this instance, Adolph Hitler) served 
as the hub for the intersection of these power blocs, he was not necessarily in control. Rather, 
technocrats in each the blocs—sometimes competing, sometimes collaborating—played a 
predominant role in the functioning of the regime and the expansion of its power, with 
technocracy functioning as an ideological commitment that cut across bloc lines. 
 Technocracy here is understood in three distinct ways. First, it is understood as the 
“management of society by technological experts,” with scientists and engineers as the active 
agents of the regime (Renneburg and Walker 4). Second, technocracy is understood as the 
“institutionalization of technological change for state purposes,” with the positioning of 
scientists and engineers as functionaries for the desires of the state (Walter McDougall, qtd. 
in Renneburg and Walker 5-6). And third, technocracy involves “the use of technocratic 
principles to achieve both rational and irrational goals. […] Technocratic methods [in the 
Nazi regime] were decoupled from technocratic goals. State purposes were similarly replaced 
by the purposes of power blocs or ideological groupings” (Renneburg and Walker 6). Such a 
perspective on technocracy allows for an analysis of the irrational and “un-technocratic goals 
and policies” as they are implemented by technocrats (ibid), and highlights the lack of clear 
and coherent state purposes in regards to technological development. While the regime itself 
lacked a unified plan of technological development in this way, the power blocs within the 
regime represented a sort of ad hoc technocratic apparatus guided by the form of capitalist 
technological rationality described above. The Nazi regime was at one point or another 
characterized by each of these understandings of technocracy, depending upon the specific 
contexts of struggles between competing power blocs. What unites all three of these 
contradictory functions of technocracy in fascism is the synchronization of engineering and 
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science for technological development in the service of military and economic goals, as well 
as the organization of social relationships (Renneburg and Walker). 
A Socio-psychological Account of Fascism 
 This account arises from two main areas of inquiry—critical theory (via the Frankfurt 
School) and psychoanalysis (via the work of Wilhelm Reich)—and opens the possibility of 
analyzing fascism in relation to the question of desire. Generally speaking, the socio-
psychological account is concerned with understanding fascism not as a political 
phenomenon, but as a manifestation of the relationship between psychology and the 
organization of social relationships (Adorno; Adorno, et al.; Bataille; Deleuze and Guattari, 
Anti-Oedipus; Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus; Fromm; Guattari; Reich, 
“Dialectical Materialism and Psychoanalysis”; Reich, The Function of the Orgasm; Reich, 
“The Imposition of Sexual Morality”; Reich, Listen, Little Man!; Reich, The Mass 
Psychology of Fascism; Reich, People in Trouble; Reich, “What is Class Consciousness?”). 
Ultimately, the applicability of the socio-psychological account to my argument stems from 
two main presuppositions: the human character structure is socially-constructed instead of 
being biologically innate; and “models of political economy” are undergirded by “collective 
desire” (Guattari 25). The presupposed alignment of desire and political economy provides 
an opening for establishing both the radical contextuality of fascism and how such contextual 
relations between political economy, technology and desire can become re-articulated in 
different spatio-temporal contexts. 
 Within critical theory, the major work to deal with the relationship between fascism 
and desire is The Authoritarian Personality by Theodor Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, 
Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford. The overarching hypothesis of the Authoritarian 
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Personality is this: “the political, economic, and social convictions of an individual often 
form a broad and coherent pattern, as if bound together by a ‘mentality’ or ‘spirit,’ and that 
this pattern is an expression of deep-lying trends in his [sic] personality” (Adorno, et al. 1). 
As one who is “particularly susceptible to anti-democratic propaganda” (ibid), the 
“potentially fascistic individual” represents a particular convergence of ideological forces 
and underlying psychological needs (Adorno, et al. 2). 
 Ideology is understood here as a structure with organization on and among multiple 
psychological levels. It is “an organization of opinions, attitudes, and values—a way of 
thinking about man [sic] and society. [The result of] both historical processes and 
contemporary social events [operating as] a function within the overall adjustment of the 
individual” (ibid). Within this perspective, ideology is a fixed-yet-flexible total structure that 
(although it may operate in an inconsistent or even contradictory manner) “is organized in 
the sense that the constituent parts are related in psychologically meaningful ways” (Adorno, 
et al. 5). Because ideological structure is partially (though not ultimately) determined by both 
individual personality and social organization, fascism is considered from this perspective as 
a type of personality—with personality viewed “as an agency through which sociological 
influences upon ideology are mediated” (Adorno, et al. 6). Here we see a recursive 
interrelation between society, individual personality and ideology—a relationship in which 
the “delineation of the conditions for individual expression requires an understanding of the 
total organization of society” (Adorno, et al. 7). 
 The authoritarian character structure is the result of large-scale changes in 
civilization. “The increasing disproportion of the various psychological ‘agencies’ within the 
total personality is undoubtedly being reinforced by such tendencies in our culture as division 
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of labor, the increased importance of monopolies and institutions, and the dominance of the 
idea of exchange and of success and competition” (Adorno, et al. 261). “The potentially 
fascist character” is an interactive production of both the individual and the economic, social, 
political, cultural and ideological “climate” (Adorno, et al. 354), with such production 
mediated (at least initially) by the family unit. Fascism, then, is the production of 
contradictory basic needs within the human character structure that require certain social 
structures and contextual conditions for actualization as an overt political movement. This 
contradiction manifests as well in the fact that although fascism is imposed upon people and 
actively works against their basic interests, it is only able to manifest or operate through the 
willing consent of the people. 
 Although the precise link between the human character structure and social structures 
was not developed in The Authoritarian Personality, Wilhelm Reich’s The Mass Psychology 
of Fascism provides a point of entry for the problem. As with Adorno, Reich argues that 
fascism is not primarily a political program, but a function of the “biopsychic structure” (The 
Mass Psychology of Fascism xi), which is composed of three levels that roughly correspond 
to Freudian representations of the personality structure.50 The character structure is largely 
constructed by “deposits of social development” rather than operating as an innate, 
immutable psychological structure (ibid). In Reich’s work, the three levels of this structure 
are: 1) “the deep biologic core” within which “under favorable social conditions, man [sic] is 
an essentially honest, industrious, cooperative, loving, and, if motivated, rationally hating 
animal” (ibid);51 2) an “intermediate character layer”—analogous to the unconscious in 
                                                 
50 That is, the conscious, unconscious and subconscious. It is important to note that this correspondence is not 
exact, but rather useful for understanding Reich’s arguments as being (in part) a response against the 
“civilizational turn” in psychoanalysis. 
 
163 
 
Freudian analysis—that is exclusively anti-social (i.e. consisting of “cruel, sadistic, 
lascivious, rapacious, and envious impulses”) and the result “of the repression of primary 
biologic urges” (ibid); and 3) a “surface layer of social cooperation,” which has no direct 
connection with the biologic core in contemporary society (ibid). 
 It is within the intermediate character layer (and the drives operating there) that the 
fascistic components of the human character structure are constructed. Inasmuch as libidinal, 
natural and cooperative social impulses from the biologic core must pass through the 
secondary layer on their way to the surface layer, those biologic impulses are necessarily 
distorted by the fascistic drives of the intermediate layer. “This distortion transforms the 
original social nature of the natural impulses and makes it perverse, thus inhibiting every 
genuine expression of life” (Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism xii). And while this 
might seem to suggest that everyone is fascist, Reich (along with Adorno) understood that 
while the potential for fascism exists in everyone, different life experiences, educational and 
family backgrounds, and positions within the social structure can produce different 
actualizations of this potential, with many actualizations actually resisting the fascist 
character. Given the socially-sedimented nature of the character structure, Reich’s argument 
allows for the transposition of this structure into the workings of politics, economics, 
ideology and social relations. 
It is not difficult to see that the various political and ideological groupings of human  
society correspond to the various layers of the structure of the human character. We,  
however, decline to accept the error of idealistic philosophy, namely that this human  
structure is immutable to all eternity. After social conditions and changes have  
transmuted man’s [sic] original biologic demands and made them part of his [sic]  
character structure, the latter reproduces the social structure of society in the form of  
ideologies. Since the breakdown of the primitive work-democratic form of social  
                                                 
51 By this, Reich means that under favorable social conditions, hate is a rational reaction to negative external 
stimuli. Under fascistic social conditions hate results instead from irrational impulses such as racism, sexism, 
etc. 
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organization, the biologic core of man [sic] has been without social representation.  
(ibid) 
 
 Critical theory, poststructuralism and variations of psychoanalysis owe much to 
Reich’s understanding of fascism as “the expression of the irrational structure of mass man 
[sic]” (Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism xx). He remains, however, cited in only the 
most minimal sense; those who cite his work (whether for purposes of extension, revision, 
critique or negation) tend to focus only on the following passage from The Mass Psychology 
of Fascism: 
“Fascism” is only the political expression of the structure of the average man’s [sic]  
character, a structure that is confined neither to certain races or nations nor to certain  
parties, but is general and international. Viewed with respect to man’s [sic] character,  
“fascism” is the basic emotional attitude of the suppressed man’s [sic] of our  
authoritarian machine civilization and its mechanistic-mystical conception of life. It  
is the mechanistic-mystical character of modern man [sic] that produces fascist  
parties, and not vice versa. (Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism xiii) 
 
But Reich’s argument is much more complex than this passage suggests. His analysis of 
fascism as a product of contradictions within the human character structure was developed 
out of his experience as both a practicing psychoanalyst and a student of Marxist sociology. 
In fact, Reich’s understanding of fascism as “the character structure of the mass individual” 
(Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism xiv)—with its specific conceptualizations of and 
attitudes towards life, humanity, work and love—only makes sense within the nexus of 
Freudian analysis of libidinal drives and Marxist analyses of ideology and the production of 
social relations. 
 In addition to challenging Freud on the essential nature of the character structure and 
the “civilization turn” in psychoanalysis, Reich also challenges vulgar Marxist 
understandings of class distinctions and class-consciousness as not only artificial, but crucial 
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to the rise of fascism.52 “There are no ‘class distinctions’ when it comes to character” (Reich, 
The Mass Psychology of Fascism xxiv). Reich further argues that Marx’s understanding of 
private property references “the private ownership of the social means of production, i.e., 
those means of production that determine the general course of society” (The Mass 
Psychology of Fascism xxv), instead of referencing private property as a category writ large. 
This challenged the claims of Reich’s contemporaries who supported Soviet and other 
communist or socialist attempts to reappropriate the means of production. In Reich’s 
estimation, his Marxist contemporaries were ill-equipped to combat fascism because their 
analyses only took up Marx’s economic analysis, were confined to the relatively recent 
historical past of capitalist development and industrial innovation, and contained no 
consideration of either the human character structure or Marx’s sociological analysis (which 
Reich viewed to be the great contribution of Marx). 
Twentieth-century fascism, on the other hand, raised the basic question of man’s [sic]  
character, human mysticism and craving for authority, which covered a period of  
some four to six thousand years. […] The [modern character structure] reflects a  
patriarchal authoritarian civilization that goes back thousands of years. Indeed […]  
the abominable excesses of the capitalist era […] (predatory imperialism,  
defraudation of the working man [sic], racial subjugation, etc.) were possible only  
because the human character structure of the untold masses who had endured all this  
had become totally dependent on authority, incapable of freedom and extremely  
accessible to mysticism. That this structure is not native to man [sic] but was  
inculcated by social conditions and indoctrination does not alter its effects one bit; but  
it does point to a way out, namely restructurization. (Reich, The Mass Psychology of  
Fascism xxvi-xxvii) 
 
Several authors have taken up Reich’s arguments in order to explain how fascism continues 
to manifest in this way beyond its original context. Foremost among these authors are Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari. 
                                                 
52 Referring to economist Marxism as “vulgar” is Reich’s usage, not necessarily my own. 
166 
 
 As with Reich, the understanding of fascism in Deleuze and Guattari is not the 
fascism of political theory; it is “the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday 
behavior, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates 
and exploits us” (Foucault, “Preface” xiii). Although conceptualized in different ways in 
Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus, fascism is theorized in these works primarily 
through negation—through explaining what it is not—posited as a sort of fluid, spectral 
“absent other” to non-suppressed and non-transmuted desire.53 The anti-fascist principles 
espoused by Deleuze and Guattari center around a free form of political action that rejects all 
manifestations of paranoid, unitary or totalized power. These principles represent a 
combination of desires, actions and thought guided by “proliferation, juxtaposition, and 
disjunction, and not by subdivision and pyramidal hierarchization” (Foucault, “Preface” xiii); 
they are meant to affirm “what is positive and multiple, difference over uniformity, flows 
over unities, mobile arrangements over systems” and also to result in a nomadic “‘de-
individualiz[ation]’ by means of multiplication and displacement, diverse combinations” 
(Foucault, “Preface” xiv). This perspective forms the basis for a theorization of fascism as 
the operative functioning of negation, lack and castration on the psychological level that 
concurrently (and recursively) (re)produces desire as a mechanism of the social production of 
a totalized system of stratified power. This link between desire and social production is 
central to Anti-Oedipus. Although this perspective is concerned with “the fascist in us all,” it 
does not support the universalizing perspective (discussed in Chapter 4) that we are all 
fascist. This is because Deleuze and Guattari understand the socio-psychological character of 
fascism to be a form of desiring-production connected to the determinate conditions of socio-
                                                 
53 This chapter deals only with the arguments found in Anti-Oedipus. Discussion of A Thousand Plateaus is 
reserved for my conclusions in order to connect the question of fascism to that of sovereignty. 
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economic production. In this sense, fascism is part of a machinic assemblage that does not 
necessarily actualize the potential for fascism that is embedded in human psychology. It can, 
moreover, be resisted. 
 “Social production is purely and simply desiring-production itself under determinate 
conditions” (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 38). Following the lead of Reich, Anti-
Oedipus theorizes fascism through desire—the particular desire of human beings to cede 
leadership, legislation and responsibility to another, to be led and exploited within a 
hierarchical system. In this way, fascism is “a perversion of desire” that cannot be explained 
simply in relation to unitary structures of political or state power (ibid). It is intimately 
imbricated in (though neither reducible nor equivalent to) the ego and its paranoiac 
functions—the channeling of desiring-production according to an Oedipal investment of 
libido within the social field. “Oedipus is a means of integration into the group, in both the 
adaptive form of its own reproduction that makes it pass from one generation to the next, and 
in its unadapted neurotic stases that block desire at prearranged impasses” (Deleuze and 
Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 103). Fascism may be theorized as the nationalistic, racist, pseudo-
religious basis of the repressive form of a subjugated group whose “Oedipal applications […] 
depend on the determinations of the subjugated group as an aggregate of departure and on 
their own libidinal investment” (ibid).  
 Fascism is theorized here not as an ideology, but as desire functioning through 
particular “unconscious libidinal investment[s]” in a particular social field (Deleuze and 
Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 104). It is a set of unconscious investments that cut across the Oedipal 
socio-political-economic infrastructure “according to positions of desire and uses of 
synthesis, very different from the interests of the subject, individual or collective, who 
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desires” (ibid). Fascism represents a specific libidinal investment in the realms of politics and 
economics for the integration of a repressive “death instinct in the circuit [of capitalist 
production] connecting desire to the social field” (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 105).54 
It is a conduit within the libidinal infrastructure of capitalist political economy for “artificial, 
residual, archaic” territorialities that have adapted to modern social, economic and political 
forms (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 257). 
 In this account, fascism is a particular function of desiring-production within the 
capitalist system; it might best be characterized in this context as the repression by the libido 
of its own flows—a sort of self-inflicted “paranoiac castration” that underlies the restrictions, 
blockages and reductions of Oedipalization (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 278). 
Moreover, fascism produces reproduces and expands capitalism through the repression of 
libidinal desiring-production; it is the socio-psychological foundation of “politico-economic 
determinations” that themselves support the logic of capital (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-
Oedipus 380). In this sense, fascism represents the operative functions of negation, lack, and 
castration that connect desire to social production for the purposes of a totalized system of 
stratified power. 
The paranoiac character of fascism provides the clearest connection between desiring-
production and social production.  
The paranoiac investment consists in subordinating molecular desiring-production to  
the molar aggregate it forms on one surface of the body without organs, enslaving it  
by that very fact to a form of socius that exercises the function of a full body under  
determinate conditions. The paranoiac engineers masses, and is continually forming  
large aggregates, inventing heavy apparatuses for the regimentation and the  
repression of the desiring-machines. (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus  
364) 
                                                 
54 The “death instinct” is not (as Deleuze & Guattari point out) to be considered as equivalent to the death drive 
in psychoanalysis. The death instinct might best be characterized as a desire for that which flows against “one’s 
own interest” (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 257). 
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Fascism is conceptualized here as the paranoiac enslavement of desiring-production, the 
displacement of the limit of production into “the interior of the socius, as a limit between two 
molar aggregates, the aggregate of departure and the familial subaggregate of arrival” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 365), with such displacement stagnating 
production within the oedipal formation. As the molar expression of rationality, reason, 
goals, law and order, fascism serves as the axiomatic of capital, forcing submission in 
molarity to “the irrationality of the full body” (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 
367). It is the psychiatric category of “politico-economic determinations” (Deleuze and 
Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 380). 
Articulations of Fascist Forces in the Corporist Conjuncture 
 
I want to return to the signposts initially analyzed in Chapter 4 in order to provide 
evidence for my argument that the contemporary conjuncture in the United States is best 
understood as a rearticulation of fascist forces of political economy, technology/technocracy 
and desire as manifest through a crisis of corporate sovereignty. The following sections—
concerning the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), the Defense Advanced 
Research projects Agency (DARPA), and the Singularity—are not an indictment of the U.S. 
as being a fascist nation-state, or of individuals and/or groups as being fascists. In fact, my 
argument and the evidence that supports it are intended to argue against referring to 
governments and people as “fascist” outside of very specific socio-historical contexts. They 
seek to reframe our understanding of fascism from being a political ideology or movement to 
being a question of power related to a system of force relations that overdetermines the 
conditions of possibility for cultural, economic, political, social and everyday lived relations.  
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 The following section is organized as follows: 1) an analysis of the role of ALEC in a 
corporate network committed to undermining the federal government and representative 
democracy, with theories of fascist political economy as a framework for understanding 
ALEC in the context of the particularities of American modernity as expressed in the 
relationship between the nation-state and the legal form of the corporation; 2) an analysis of 
the relationship between DARPA and major Silicon Valley corporations, with theories of 
fascist technology/technocracy as a framework for understanding DARPA in the context of 
corporate technological development as an extension of state-centered military agendas; and 
3) an analysis of the corporate development of the Singularity through interconnectivity and 
artificial intelligence, with theories of fascist desire as a framework for understanding the 
Singularity in the context of a new cultural economy whose conditions of possibility are 
overdetermined by corporate processes for transcending the nation-state. Taken together, 
these case studies demonstrate the analytical benefit (perhaps even necessity) of retheorizing 
fascism conjuncturally in relation to an organic crisis of corporate sovereignty. 
ALEC (Revisited) 
 Let me return to ALEC as a figure of an inverted rearticulation of fascist political 
economy. While classical Fascism operated as a Corporate State wherein national 
corporations (as authorized by the constitution) played a significant role in governance at the 
level of the nation-state, ALEC represents the exertion of corporate will at the level of the 
states in a way that is not authorized by the U.S. Constitution but enabled by exploiting the 
10th Amendment. Such exploitation has resulted in the enactment of conservative and often 
reactionary policies at the state level in a way that circumvents the sovereignty of the nation-
state. These policies—covering everything from minimum wage, school choice and gun 
171 
 
rights to labor unions and local and county governance—in many ways reiterate the fascist 
drive to solve “the universal political problems” of the modern age through the merging of 
politics, economics and morality (Mussolini, “The Doctrine of Fascism” 243). We see this in 
the breadth of policy issues covered in ALEC-sponsored bills: immigration, minimum wage, 
local governance, the legal accountability of corporations, gun rights, education, abortion, 
voting rights, campaign finance, and labor and public service unions, just to name a few. But 
this also functions in an inverted manner in a number of ways. Instead of the nation-state 
drawing “into itself the economic activities of the nation” by establishing national 
corporations (ibid.), ALEC operates to insert the economic activities of corporate capital into 
the nation-state through the drafting and implementation of state-level political policies. And 
if ALEC continues to be successful in doing so, we will be faced with a situation in which 
corporate “influence reaches every aspect of the national life and includes […] all the 
political, economic, and spiritual forces of the nation” (ibid.). Moreover, the fascist aim of 
reconciling labor to capital is being achieved not only through the drawing away of working-
class support from liberal policies and state-level laws aimed at destroying the political 
power of public sector unions, but might also be achieved at the federal level if the Supreme 
Court decides in Janus v. AFSCME Council 31 and Madigan that unions cannot compel 
government employees to pay dues for collective bargaining rights (Mears), with ALEC 
involved in various ways in the actualization of these goals.  
Bureaucratically, ALEC is organized into working groups that draft model legislation, 
each focused on a different aspect of ALEC’s agenda (e.g. education, energy, public safety). 
These working groups are comprised of both corporate and legislative members, with a 
corporate member in the position of chair. As noted in Chapter 3, model legislation must be 
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approved by a majority of the members, with corporate members holding veto power. Once a 
model bill has passed through the working group, it is adopted by ALEC and distributed to 
its legislative members, who then introduce the bills into the legislatures to which they were 
elected by their constituencies. While the nation-state under classical Fascism served as the 
sovereign central organizer of corporate economic and political leadership, it now serves 
(along with state legislatures) as a conduit for corporate authority operating within, without, 
through and against the nation-state. 
Through the collective activities of ALEC, other organizations like it and the elected 
officials that support their agenda, we are witnessing an increasingly corporate state whereby 
political leadership cedes to corporate leadership its role in the economic functions of the 
nation (except to divert public funds into corporate enterprise through tax breaks or public 
works projects, or as an expedient response to instability or crisis), and in the reorganization 
of labor (e.g. by capping minimum wages, divesting local and county governments of control 
over labor standards, and decimating the political power of labor unions), but also in the 
legislative prerogatives of the nation-state itself. In this way, we can understand the current 
conjuncture in terms of Nicos Poulantzas’s analysis of fascism as a form of imperial 
capitalism whereby older forms of monopoly or oligarchic capitalism become rearticulated to 
emergent social and political phenomenon. But where imperialism in Poulantzas’s work 
refers to the outward expansion of corporate capital beyond the nation-state, the form of 
imperialism enabled by ALEC becomes inverted in a form of inward imperialism that seeks 
to reorganize both the nation-state and the populace to the economic demands of corporate 
capital through reactionary legal and legislative maneuvers, and through the very locus of 
legislative sovereignty. The ultimate aim of ALEC, its partner organizations and its main 
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corporate benefactors (i.e. Charles and David Koch) is to exploit Article 5 of the 
Constitution, to call a second constitutional convention at which the formation of a new 
Corporate State can occur (Armiak; Bottari; “Exposed by CMD Editors”; Taylor; Wines). 
Rather than popular sovereignty, this would place the founding act of creating a constitution 
largely in corporate hands. The fascist conflation of national interests with corporate interests 
will be achieved in this context by the political leadership of the private economic power of 
corporations—the granting of a public character to private economic interests—ultimately 
reconciling labor and capital while exacerbating class inequality. The particular interests of 
corporations become the general interests of the nation-state through ALEC’s exploitation of 
the federalist mode of governance and the specific policies they support, and their attempt to 
re-enact the founding of the nation. The form of government drafted at this convention will 
finally bring to fruition the fascist dream of the Corporate State. In these ways, ALEC 
operates as an inverted rearticulation of fascist forces of political economy by helping 
produce, through a war of positions, the hegemony of the legal form of the business 
corporation through state policies.  
DARPA (Revisited) 
A consideration of DARPA in regards to the technological account of fascism leads 
to my assertion that the organization functions as a distributed rearticulation of fascist 
technology/technocracy. The utility of analyzing DARPA through these theories arises from 
considering the agency as a central node in the military/corporate matrix of technological 
innovation. As noted by Herbert I. Schiller and Joseph D. Phillips, such matrices  
are not, after all, as American as apple pie. To be sure, Germany still has an  
unmatchable modern record for fashioning business-grounded military juggernauts.  
Gas ovens, meticulously engineered by the world’s most advanced scientific  
community, remain a testimonial to the efficient linkage of commercial objectives,  
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technological know-how, and military conquest in the Third Reich. […] Moreover,  
Italian military and corporate elites had their short-lived dream of a Mediterranean  
basin restored to Roman hegemony in the 1930s. […] The emergence of a powerful  
military-commercial component in the American system, therefore, is no exceptional  
event in the modern Western world. On the contrary, if generalizations can be made  
about cross-national organizational behavior in this period, the national business- 
military linkages have fairly uniform origins though obviously very specific national  
characteristics. […] It was entirely predictable, therefore, that American economic  
expansionism during and since World War II should produce an ever-warmer  
association between economic operator and military protector, that is, between the  
principle agent and certainly the chief beneficiary of that expansion, U.S. corporate  
business, and the main instrument for protecting that expansion, the armed forces. 
(1-2) 
 
This analysis follows the route of my explanation of the technological account of fascism, 
moving from technological rationality to technology and technocracy. 
 Beginning with the question of technological rationality, the work of DARPA (as 
R&D and venture capital wing of the DoD) is not simply about technological innovation; its 
activities have effects on the organization of social, political and economic relations. DARPA 
is responsible in one way or another for nearly every technological innovation that organizes 
social relations in this conjuncture. Our ability to interact is dependent on the technological 
infrastructure produced by DARPA and its corporate partners and that infrastructure is itself 
embedded with not only the rationality of late capitalist production and its reliance on 
technocracy, efficiency and surveillance, but also the rationality of military objectives central 
to DARPA’s mission. In this regard, the organization of social relations is determined to a 
significant degree by both the technological infrastructure and the technocratic apparatus 
formed by the partnerships between DARPA, transnational corporations and academic labs.  
 The technocratic apparatus under examination here can be understood in relation to 
fascist technocracy, but as a form of technocracy that is distributed beyond the nation-state. 
Whereas fascist technocracy served to provide cohesion and mitigate competition between 
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competing power blocs within the nation-state, DARPA serves as a hub for the intersection 
of competing private corporations by providing them with venture capital and (more 
significantly in relation to the question of technological rationality) a guiding purpose (if not 
a guiding logic) in directing the course of technological innovation for both capitalist and 
military objectives. The early history of DARPA indicates quite clearly the military purpose 
of scientific and technological innovation in the corporate sector, this relationship might at 
first glance seem obscure in the current era.  
Where the military implications of corporate technology were (in the context of the 
Cold War) given primary significance, the situation now is reversed. DARPA’s investment in 
technological innovation privileges the development of consumer technologies that (in 
addition to their eventual military application) serves an arguably greater function in the 
organization of social relations that reproduces hierarchical modes of social control before 
these technologies produce military benefits. For example, the scientists and engineers 
working on ARAPANET knew that the technology was being developed for military 
purposes. It was only later that the commercial potential of the internet would be realized. 
The developers of artificial intelligence, however, are concerned primarily with the 
technology’s corporate and commercial applications, with military use as a secondary 
consideration. It is no longer military desire that allows for consumption as its surplus, but 
consumption as enabled by corporate desire that allows itself to be articulated to military 
needs. 
As DARPA technocracy has moved into corporations, corporations have redefined 
their relations to the nation-state. The technocratic apparatus represented in the example of 
DARPA expresses all three understandings of technocracy described in previous pages (i.e. 
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social management by technological experts, the institutional repurposing of technological 
innovation for state purposes, and the achievement of rational and irrational goals through 
technocratic principles).55 In regards to the management of society by technological experts, 
the agency (through the decisions of its technocrats regarding funding and research) has a 
controlling role in which consumer technologies will be developed. Regarding the 
repurposing of technology for state purposes, each of the projects funded by DARPA (e.g. 
facial-recognition software, driverless cars, search algorithms, mechanisms of surveillance) 
are given priority according to their eventual benefit to the national security apparatus. And 
regarding the achievement of rational and irrational goals through technocratic principles, 
one need look no further than the development of artificial intelligence as a core project of 
Silicon Valley and DARPA—in many ways the total technological convergence of the 
rational and the irrational aims of human activity. DARPA unites these distinct functions of 
technocracy in its support of corporate technological development in the service of military 
and economic goals, as well as the organization of social relationships. Its technocratic 
functions inextricably link military and corporate aims through the appeal to consumer 
desire. 
 More important to the question of technocracy than any given project, DARPA’s 
technocratic functions introduce changes in production, labor and social relations through the 
aegis of transnational technology corporations. Regina Dugan’s mission at both Google and 
Facebook since her departure from DARPA has been to redesign the production and labor 
operations of these corporations to function practically in the model of DARPA. Given the 
impact of production and labor operations on the development of new technologies and their 
                                                 
55 The question of irrationality in regards to technological innovation is discussed in more detail in a 
consideration of the Singularity later in this chapter. 
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implementation in the practices of everyday life (and the military origin of corporate 
innovation), these changes speak to imbrication of military objectives and the organization of 
social relations as structured through the use of consumer technologies. DARPA has moved 
from being the technocratic origin of corporate innovation to the technocratic model by 
which corporate innovation can have a recursive effect on military needs. This distribution of 
the technocratic form has the potential to exponentially integrate humans further into 
multiplying forms of control, with such control directed by the technological rationality of a 
technocratic organization that is oriented toward both economic and military objectives.  
Under classical Fascism—especially the Nazi regime—technological development 
was oriented most significantly to the development of weapons systems, biological 
engineering and mass mediated-propaganda. Technological development in the United States 
during the Cold War was oriented predominantly towards the production of military systems, 
with technological innovation and research agendas that were originally intended for military 
purposes transformed for civilian and consumer purposes. In the current conjuncture, this 
relationship has been rearticulated so that innovations and agendas originally intended for 
corporate and consumer purposes can be integrated into the military apparatus. Corporations 
do military work for the sake of corporate aims, but the military funds and originates 
corporate work for its own. In these ways, DARPA operates as a distributed rearticulation of 
fascist forces of technology/technocracy by (at least initially) determining the course of and 
funding technological innovation and technocratic organization among competing corporate 
actors. Moving from technological rationality through technocracy to technological 
production aids in the analysis of the problematic of corporate sovereignty as a particular set 
of relations of force as articulated through competing power blocs, as well as opening a space 
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for a detailed examination of contemporary technologies. But the question of rationality also 
leads to another, different, question—that of desire. 
The Singularity (Revisited) 
 From the outset, the Singularity can be understood in relation to the socially-
constructed character structure discussed by Theodor Adorno, et al., and Wilhelm Reich. The 
technological and economic push to develop artificial intelligence is intimately connected to 
a collective desire for reprieve from the chaos, crises and tribulations of corporeal existence. 
From the perspective of the socio-psychological account of fascism, this can be understood 
as a paranoiac response to the fact of mortality. Regardless of the economic, political or 
social convictions involved in the push for the Singularity, there is here an expression of a 
deep-lying convergence of ideological forces and psychological needs—a total yet flexible 
structure that becomes organized and reorganized in response to historical processes and 
contemporary social events. As a fascistic structure, the Singularity is (despite what its 
proponents may tell us) a production of the repressive anti-social level of the human 
character—one that seeks ultimate relief from the pain of being human-with-other-humans in 
this finite and often terrifying reality. The desire for the Singularity represents the distortion 
(through the character structure) of libidinal and biologic urges and their transmutation into 
the production of a fundamentally irrational (yet technologically rational) social system 
capable of immanentizing the twinned forces of human mysticism and a craving for 
authority.  
 In this sense, the fascism of the Singularity is not a political program; it is the 
networked technological projection of “the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday 
behavior, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire everything that dominates and 
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exploits us” (Foucault, “Preface” xiii)—namely the corporate organization of economic, 
political and social relations as overdetermined by a technocratic elite. The Singularity, then, 
is the paranoiac functioning of negation and lack on both the psychological and social levels 
that works for the corporate production of a totalized system of stratified power, with such a 
system operationalized through networked artificial intelligence. It is the production of a 
perverse desire to cede leadership and responsibility to a transcendent unitary network of 
corporate imaginaries. And it is the question of the corporate imaginary that offers a 
connection between the psychological and the social in the socio-psychological account.  
 The Singularity is not simply a matter of the human character structure and its desire 
for immortality; it is also a matter of the corporation as a legally-recognized human whose 
existence extends beyond that of its members. If the legal form of the corporation is a social 
production of human desire for making permanent property and profit, why would the 
corporate form (as the displacement of the nation-state as a site of permanence) not also 
replicate the human desire for immortality beyond its legal legitimation? Understood in this 
light, the corporation functions as part of our “unconscious libidinal investment” in a 
particular political-economic-social field (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 104), one 
overdetermined by the demands of both corporate capital and fascist metaphysics. The 
Singularity (by way of extension) functions as part of the corporate form’s unconscious 
libidinal investment in a particular technological field that exists beyond the control of the 
nation-state. The fascism of the Singularity represents a specific corporate libidinal 
investment in the death instinct that has been integrated into the circuit of capitalist 
production, and which connects desire not to the social field, but to the metaphysical field. It 
is a conduit within the libidinal infrastructure of corporate capital for residual archaic 
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territorialities to be reactualized in the hyper-advanced imaginary of artificial intelligence, 
thus twinning the desire of the corporation with the human desire for immortality through the 
system of technological production determined by the twinning of corporate and nation-state 
technocrats. 
 The reactualization of these archaic territorialities does not require the repression by 
the corporate libido of its own flows; it requires the repression by the corporate libido of 
human flows. Artificial intelligence is the outward projection of the human character 
structure turned recursively against itself in a potentially eternal feedback loop of restrictions, 
blockages and reductions within the paranoid axiomatic of the corporate form. It is the 
political-economic and technological/technocratic foundation of metaphysical 
determinations. The Singularity (as the metaphysical principle of the corporate development 
of artificial intelligence) is the paranoiac investment of the corporate form in perverted 
desiring-production. It is the logic that produces those mechanisms and operations of power 
which redirect our desire into the machinic production of an amoral hypermediated 
godhead—the singular god of corporate capital made eternal through technological 
infrastructure. In these ways, the Singularity operates as a universalized rearticulation of 
fascist forces of desire by serving as the metaphysical principle behind the corporate 
development of artificial intelligence. 
Leviathan’s Utopia 
The main benefit of engaging with these largely ignored theories of fascism is that 
they enable a consideration of the complex interrelations, contradictions and 
overdeterminations that characterize fascism as a conjunctural manifestation of an organic 
crisis. Rather than theorizing fascism purely in terms of ideological characteristics and 
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political practices, these accounts recognize that the character of fascism is “provided by a 
particular system of relations of force” and not by a checklist of descriptive categories 
(Gramsci, The Antonio Gramsci Reader 139). These accounts allow for a conjunctural 
analysis of fascism, one that can account for the old, the new and the re-articulated relations 
of force of fascist power in the United States in the 21-st century. 
What fascism set in motion yesterday continues to proliferate in other forms, within  
the complex of contemporary social space. A whole totalitarian chemistry  
manipulates the structures of state, political and union structures, institutional and  
family structures and even individual structures, inasmuch as one can speak of a sort  
of fascism of the super-ego in situations of guilt and neurosis. (Guattari 235-6) 
 
This interdisciplinary (even anti-disciplinary) theorization of fascism as the conjunctural 
articulation of particular relations of political economic, technological and socio-
psychological forces has addressed this “totalitarian chemistry” by analyzing the construction 
of corporate sovereignty in the United States from the colonial era through the current 
moment, as well as its assertion as an organic crisis that overdetermined the current 
conjuncture as fascistic. This discussion of the mechanisms and operations of fascist power 
in the current moment (as a conjunctural manifestation of an organic crisis corporate 
sovereignty) allows me to offer some tentative conclusions about the epochal transformation 
of sovereignty as informed by these analyses. 
 The preceding pages were intended to reframe a number of key narratives (i.e. 
neoliberalism and fascism) that have been deployed to explain the failures of representative 
democracy. But there is something that has not yet been explicitly addressed, even though it 
has been hinted at. A specter is haunting these pages, but it has not quite revealed its 
substance. That specter is power—or, rather, the transformation of sovereign power through 
conjunctural articulations of fascist relations of force as overdetermined by a crisis of 
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corporate sovereignty. I have tried to trace an origin story about our failure to overcome the 
legacies of corporate sovereignty and fascism. Although the connections between fascism 
and corporate sovereignty have been made, I would now like to offer some contingent 
conclusions connecting these to a crisis of sovereignty. 
As already argued, sovereignty is understood in this sense as the network—the very 
totality—of power within which dominant institutions (e.g. nation-states, corporations, inter- 
and supra-national organizations) vie for and negotiate over ultimate authority, in a variety of 
overlapping spatio-temporal contexts, within a global system of economic production, 
distribution and consumption, political and social institutions, and cultural practices, as well 
as legal frameworks. Sovereignty is the authority over the conditions of possibility of the 
world. Corporate sovereignty is not a form of sovereignty; it is a crisis within the 
transformation of sovereignty whereby the corporate form is attempting to construct itself as 
a transcendent, universal, and eternal form and locus of ultimate authority over all. 
Sovereignty is power itself. 
Up to this point, my argument has focused on where we find ourselves. I turn now to 
where we might be headed if the inertia of this system of power continues unchecked. Given 
the argument offered in the preceding pages, there are several possibilities for the next 
conjuncture in the transformation of sovereignty. One—concerning the Singularity—
represents of mode of sovereignty as universalized through artificial intelligence; it has 
already been addressed in this chapter and is addressed at the end of this section. Before that, 
however, I want to provide details about another possibly emergent sovereign that is more 
probable given the current state of affairs—a globalized sovereignty that represents the total 
convergence of government, military and corporate authority. I am referring to the private 
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military and security industry (PMSI), and I find it useful to consider this industry as a socio-
technical system that introduces changes in production, labor and the organization of social 
relations into society through the aegis of transnational corporations. 
“The concept of the socio-technical system was established to stress the reciprocal 
interrelationship between humans and machines and to foster the program of shaping both 
the technical and social conditions of work, in such a way that efficiency and humanity 
would not contradict each other any longer” (Ropohl 59). Since its emergence in the late 
1950s, the concept has been expanded beyond its original concern with the workplace to 
concerns of technology and society in general. Socio-technical systems act as a convergence 
of structure and function for the integration of technological objects, processes, and 
apparatuses into the organization of social relations. They actualize this integrative purpose 
“partly [by substituting] given human functions, and partly [by adding] novel acting 
functions, not feasible by humans” (Ropohl 69).  
But mere integration is not their ultimate purpose; such integration enables the 
organization of social relations according to technological means within the context of 
capitalist production. As such, socio-technical systems are active, adaptive, goal-oriented, 
hierarchical, and institutional. They function by means of the reciprocal relations between 
humans and technology. “Technology is rational and uses a method that is built upon the 
accumulation of its processes in a material world. As a result, it performs an immediate and 
pragmatic function” (Rivers 551). But the relationship between humans and technology is not 
purely rational. The choices humans make (especially in regards to technology) are often 
unconscious and irrational (Mumford). As argued earlier in this chapter, the very 
manifestations of a technological rationality are not themselves always or entirely rational.  
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Technological rationality depends foremost on the ability to reduce phenomena to 
rational conceptual categories, classify them within a system of value, and regiment them 
according to automated processes of technical production (Mumford). This necessarily 
involves the abstraction of value and calculation, which suits technological rationality to 
capitalism (Ellul; Mumford). Reciprocally, capitalism is suited to technological rationality by 
way of the organization of social relations according to labor, capital, and production 
(Marcuse, One-dimensional Man; Mumford). This relationship between technological 
rationality and capitalist production dominates the character and functions of socio-technical 
systems in the 20th and 21st centuries. 
For Jacques Ellul, the link between technological rationality and sociotechnical 
systems is expressed in the concept of technique. Technique is “the consciousness of the 
mechanical world” (Ellul 6), but it is also the “means and the ensemble of means” that 
characterize the totality of technological society (Ellul 19). More than just rationality, 
technique refers to the methods, processes, infrastructure, and materiality of sociotechnical 
systems. Technique is not limited to technology. It is the structure and processes of all of 
modern life, pervading economic, judicial, military, political, and social practices and 
institutions. These systems (characterized as they are by technique) operate through 
standardization, rationalization, and organizational efficiency for the purpose of organizing 
all of social life according to a total inhuman system of technical means. “It might be said 
that technique is the translation into action of man’s [sic] concern to master things by means 
of reason, to account for what is subconscious, make quantitative what is qualitative, make 
clear and precise the outlines of nature, take hold of chaos and put order into it” (Ellul 43). 
Technique strives for the total unity of a world according to technological rationality and 
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marked by the concentration of both capital and power (Ellul). In this way, technological 
rationality can be understood as a systemic force by which technological constraints are 
placed upon the agency of individuals through the operations of technique in a variety of 
sociotechnical systems—be they economic, political, or technological. 
Of the socio-technical systems characterized by technique, Ellul stresses the primacy 
of economics and the military. To this I would add the role of the state, the system with (and 
through which) corporate capital and the military converge in the most significant manner. 
This brings us to the private military and security industry. The most obvious connection 
between national security and corporate imperatives is found in the number of government 
defense contracts with companies such as Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Halliburton, Northrop, 
General Dynamic, Raytheon and a host of others (Lutz; Paglen). These contracts cover a 
variety of national security functions, including the development of missile systems and other 
military technologies, the provision of private soldiers and intelligence analysts to replace 
government soldiers and employees, and the reconstruction of foreign and domestic 
infrastructures following military destruction or natural disaster (Graham; Paglen).  
This is but one aspect of militarization—the organization of civil society for 
institutional violence through the use of control technologies (Graham; Lutz). While certainly 
signaling the shift of social values to the legitimation of force through the production of 
“citizen-consumer-soldier[s]” (Graham 62), militarization is also linked “to the less visible 
deformation of human potentials into the hierarchies of race, class, gender, and sexuality, and 
the shaping of national histories in ways that glorify and legitimate military action” (Lutz 
723)—a militarization of everyday life that is discussed at the end of this chapter.  
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If we consider the public/private nexus of military, intelligence, and national security 
as a form of sociotechnical system, the technological constraints of militarization on the 
agency of individuals manifest in the areas of knowledge, law, gender, race, popular culture, 
social geography, the federal deficit, social services, welfare, debt, labor, resources, and civil 
liberties (Graham; Lutz; Whitaker). Concurrently, there exists a general invisibility of the 
effects of militarization on these issues, with such invisibility being “the outcome of secrecy 
laws, of an increasingly muzzled or actively complicit corporate media, and of the difficulty 
of assessing a highly complex and far-flung institution and the not-so-obviously related 
consequences of its actions” (Lutz 724). Such secrecy ultimately bolsters the unilateral and 
legitimated excesses of executive (or, sovereign) power through the creation of “a hidden 
geography of finance, research, development, engineering, manufacturing, and testing 
projects” (Paglen 68). Executive power understood in this sense wields surveillance and 
secrecy as tools to secure “the strung-out commodity chains, logistics networks, and 
corporate enclaves that constitute the neoliberal geo-economic architectures of our planet” 
(Graham 77). The global industry of private military corporations serves as a primary tool of 
the sovereign power of nation-states and may well transform into a form of sovereignty in its 
own right.56 
                                                 
56 The following pages contain a brief consideration of PMSI. For a fuller account of this industry and the issues 
associated with it, refer to Abrahamsen and Williams; Aggestam and Bjorkdahl; Alexandra, Baker, and 
Caparini; Bryden and Caparini; Carmola; Chatterjee, Halliburton’s Army; Chatterjee, Iraq, Inc.; Chesterman; 
Cockayne and Mears; Cotton; De Nevers; Dunigan; Elsea; Feldman; Francis; Grant; Hoppe; Institute for 
Security Studies; Jager and Kummel; Joachim and Schneiker; Kinsey; Krahmann, “From ‘Mercenaries’ to 
‘Private Security Contractors’”; Krahmann, “Security”; Leander, Eroding State Authority; Leander, “The 
Market for Force and Public Security”; Leander, “The Paradoxical Impunity”; Lehnardt; Mandel; Maogoto; 
Musah; Newell and Sheehy; Pattison; Percy; Renou; Rosemann; Rosenau; Scahill; Simons; South; Turcan and 
Ozpinar; U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Hearing on Iraq Reconstruction; U.S. 
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Hearing on Management; U.S. House Subcommittee 
on National Security and Foreign Affairs; U.S. House Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, 
Intergovernmental Relations and Procurement Reform; U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services; Wakefield; 
Wallwork; Wouters; Zabci. 
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Private armies and soldiers-for-hire are not new phenomena. As noted by P.W. Singer 
in Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, most wars in the history 
of humanity have been fought by armies at least partially composed of foreign troops and 
individual mercenaries working under contract with a sovereign power. It was not until the 
rise of the modern nation-state that military force became a legitimated function of 
government. The 20th century—characterized in part by the direct link between military force 
and organizational forms of national government—was merely a temporary aberration in the 
history of military action. We have returned full circle to the predominance of private armies 
and soldiers-for-hire, but this return is now linked inextricably with the system of global 
corporate capital. In order to understand the current situation, we must turn our attention to 
another moment in the contemporary conjuncture: the mid-1990s, between the Persian Gulf 
War and the war in Kosovo. 
This time span stands as a milestone in the rise of PMSI for two primary reasons. On 
the one hand, this time period witnessed the growing use of private military contractors by 
African governments to put down internal rebellions and secure resource reserves. Second, it 
marks the rise of the private military and security industry as an auxiliary of nation-state 
sovereignty, and as an instrument of the force of global capital. In 1993, the government of 
Angola hired Executive Outcomes (EO)—a private military firm based in South Africa—to 
train the Angolan army, command them in battle, and lead air and commando raids against 
rebel uprisings in the country. International Defense and Security (IDAS) was also hired 
around the same time to defend “corporate diamond fields” and cut off rebel supply routes in 
Angola (Singer 9-10). Two years later, the government of Sierra Leone also hired EO to 
openly battle rebel forces within the country. Since that time, private military presence in 
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Africa and the Middle East has grown exponentially, with private military firms involved in 
conflicts and civil wars in Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Libya, 
Namibia, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda, just to list a 
few (Ash; Gettleman, Mazzetti and Hager; Greenhill; Leigh and Brower; “A Look Back at 
Congo Independence”; “Masons Form a Lodge”; Mazzetti and Hager, “Secret Desert Force”; 
McDougall and Smith; Nativi; Sengupta, “Simon Mann”; Singer). In nearly every conflict or 
war in Africa since 1993, private military firms have been directly involved—involved in 
training, arming, planning, logistical support, and even open combat—more often than not on 
both sides of the same conflict (Singer). The presence of PMSI in Africa signals not only the 
instability of sovereign nation-states on the continent, but also the links between PMSI and 
global capital in controlling labor production and resource extraction. 
The rise of PMSI at this time was not limited to Africa. Concurrent with these 
developments, private military companies were also beginning to be contracted for 
operations involving both the United States and international organizations. In 1995, Military 
Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI)—a private military firm based in Virginia—
was hired by the Croatian army in an advisory capacity to develop battle plans for use against 
Serbian forces. When conflict once again broke out in the Balkans in 1999, a private military 
firm was employed to provide support for the U.S. and NATO troops engaged in the conflict. 
This time, however, the employer was the United States Department of Defense, who 
contracted Brown Root & Services to construct military facilities, provide catering services 
to troops, and maintain “vehicles and weapons systems” (Singer 6). The examples of Angola, 
Sierra Leone, and Kosovo merely point to the incipient rise of the private military and 
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security industry as an auxiliary of (and even substitute for) nation-state sovereignty and as a 
method of control for the system of global capital. 
Today, private military and security firms have a presence on every continent with the 
exception of Antarctica (Singer). As of February 2012, there were 20,254 private security 
firms employing approximately 1,780,875 people (Institute for Security Studies). Of these, 
only 307 companies had signed the International Code of Conduct for Private Security 
Service Providers.57 Of course, these numbers only apply to those companies registered with 
the Private Security Authority in South Africa; they do not include unregistered companies 
nor do they include private military firms that do no self-identify as private security even if 
they are owned by the same corporate structure. The lack of public accountability for PMSI 
in regards to corporate structure and ownership complicates any attempts to determine the 
true number of companies that comprise this industry (RIA Novosti). 
One of the primary expressions of corporate sovereignty as the transference of 
coercion (as part of sovereignty) from the nation-state to the corporation is the system of law 
that allows for its material realization. Following Hardt and Negri’s Empire, I consider PMSI 
(as both tied to and unbound by nation-state sovereignty) as producing “a new notion of 
right, or rather, a new inscription of authority and a new design of the production of norms 
and legal instruments of coercion that guarantee contracts and resolve conflicts” (Hardt and 
Negri 9). PMSI has become indispensable to the military operations (that is, to the inscription 
of power) of nation-states. In order to assess the relationship between PMSI and the national, 
international, and supranational legal structures, it helps to begin by looking at the 
contractual obligations between private military companies and national governments.  
                                                 
57 More information regarding the Code of Conduct is provided in later sections. 
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I look first at the United States, whose incorporation of PMSI into the national 
military apparatus began in earnest with the outsourcing of convoy protection in Iraq in 2003 
(Tobin). As of 2009, the United States government was employing around 600 private 
military and security companies, with over 350,000 individual contractors operating in Iraq 
and Afghanistan (“Private Army in the News Again”). Since that time, private military 
companies have essentially become the de facto military force for the United States, without 
the legal restrictions placed on the national military. 
 As noted by Jeremy Scahill, “you no longer need to depend on nation-state allies to 
provide you with troops or other support forces. You can simply rent an army. And the 
reality is that U.S. taxpayers are now funding what is essentially a shadow army” (qtd. in 
“Private Army in the News Again” para. 9). This shadow army is now responsible for a wide 
array of military functions formerly the exclusive domain of the state, including rendition and 
interrogation, drone strikes, intelligence gathering and analysis, embassy and diplomat 
protection, and military actions (Cobain and Quinn; “Private Army in the News Again”; 
Tobin). But private military companies are only beholden to providing the services agreed to 
in their contracts. Because of the unclear legal definition concerning the difference between a 
mercenary and a private military or security contractor, these companies are not bound by 
U.S. law (“Soldiers Who Fight for Money”). As such, they can only in rare circumstances be 
prosecuted for crimes or abuses committed in the servicing of their contracts. The few 
prosecutions that have occurred have been directed at specific individuals, rather than at the 
corporations that employ these individuals (Risen).  
For a specific example of this, consider the legal issues surrounding the company 
formerly known as Blackwater, which changed its name to Xe Services after Blackwater 
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guards killed seventeen unarmed civilians in Baghdad in 2007 (Associated Press), and again 
changed its name to Academi in 2011 after the United States government charged the 
company with a $42 million fine (Sengupta, “Blackwater Founder”) for hundreds of 
violations of U.S. law, including the unlicensed training of foreign troops in Jordan, 
“violations of United States export control regulations, [...] illegal weapons exports to 
Afghanistan, making unauthorized proposals to train troops in South Sudan and providing 
sniper training for Taiwanese police officers” (Risen A8). In addition, five former executives 
of the company were indicted for bribing Iraqi officials, as well as “weapons and obstruction 
charges” (ibid). Paying the fine allowed the company to resume winning contracts from the 
Department of Defense. During the investigation, however, Xe set up more than thirty shell 
companies or subsidiaries to circumvent their temporary legal suspension (Risen and 
Mazzetti). 
Between 2001 and 2009, Blackwater and its fifteen subsidiaries earned $1.5 billion in 
contracts with the Pentagon and the CIA (“Dogs of War Back as States Cut Spending”). In 
2010, Erik Prince (the founder of Blackwater) sold his shares in Xe to the private equity 
firms Forte Capital Advisors and Manhattan Partners following reports linking the company 
to CIA contract killings (Tobin). Prince then relocated to the United Arab Emirates to avoid 
federal investigation (“What Does the New Year Hold”). The company, now known as 
Academi, owns “one of the largest private stocks of heavy weapons, a fleet of planes, 
Blackhawk helicopters, ships, armoured vehicles, shooting ranges, and its U.S. bases train 
30,000 soldiers and police officers a year” (“Dogs of War Back As States Cut Spending” 
para. 9). Its 2011 contract with the Department of Defense for counterterrorist operations in 
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Afghanistan was worth $17.6 million (Snider), almost enough to pay off half the fine levied 
against it.  
Contracts between private military firms and the United States government are 
funded by tax dollars; the public, however, has no control over these contracts. Moreover, the 
companies with whom the government does business are not bound by the legal and juridical 
structures of the nation state. With its 7,000-acre complex located in the United States, its 
aviation and maritime divisions, and its intelligence capabilities, Academi constitutes not 
simply a shadow army, but a shadow state. This state transcends not only national juridical 
structures and codes, but international ones as well. With the example of Academi, we can 
see how PMSI is becoming “a new sovereign, supranational world power” enabled by then 
freed from national laws through the process of corporate contracting (Hardt and Negri 10).  
Much has been written about the actions of Blackwater employees in regards to the 
killing of unarmed civilians and the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib. For a more systemic 
indication of the sovereignty of PMSI, I turn now to the case of Kathryn Bolkovac. As an 
employee of the private security company DynCorp assigned to the UN Police Task Force in 
Bosnia in 1999, Bolkovac uncovered the widespread involvement of DynCorp employees, 
UN mission personnel, and national diplomats in the human sex trafficking of teenage girls. 
After bringing this information to her superiors in DynCorp, Bolkovac was fired 
(Applebaum). No legal action was taken, and DynCorp continued under contract with the 
U.S. government in Afghanistan and Iraq (“Director Wages War”). While these examples 
only concern two corporations, they point to a larger systemic issue in regards to the 
relationship between PMSI and the law.58  
                                                 
58 For further examples regarding other companies and other national legal structures, refer to Ash; “British  
   Are No Strangers to Guns for Hire”; Gettleman, Mazzetti and Schmitt; Greenhill; Simons; Kelly; RIA  
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The international community is equally incapable of controlling the industry. This 
regulatory vacuum is due in part to the ambiguous legal definition of what a mercenary is. As 
noted by Jose Luiz Gomez del Prado (Chairman, United Nations Working Group on the Use 
of Mercenaries), the “mixture of private contractors, security guards, soldiers of fortune, guns 
for hire, [and] employees of private military companies” are not bound by the international 
laws against mercenary action (“Soldiers Who Fight for Money” para. 5). PMSI is not 
recognized as a mercenary force because it operates through legally recognized contracts, as 
well as a corporate structure that is inextricably interconnected with the system of nation-
states and global capital. Although efforts are underway to clear up the murky legal status of 
PMSI, the reluctance of national governments to participate in these efforts (spearheaded by 
the United Nations) hinders any regulatory action. An International Code of Conduct for 
Private Security Service Providers (ICoC) has been drafted. As of 2011, there were “307 
signatory private security companies to ICoC from 51 different countries” (Institute for 
Security Studies para. 4). The number is now thought to be around 650. The ICoC, however, 
is not legally binding and provides no oversight mechanism; PMSI is left to essentially 
regulate itself (International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers).  
This situation becomes all the more troubling when viewed in relation to the material 
assets of the companies and corporations that comprise PMSI. I have already noted the 
corporate holdings of Academi (formerly Blackwater). Control Risks (a private security firm 
based in London) operates with an annual profit of 19.1 million British Pounds (BP) (Tobin). 
Bancroft Global Development’s contracts with the Pentagon for supplying military 
equipment to Uganda and Burundi is worth $45 million alone (Gettleman, Mazzetti and 
                                                 
   Novosti; Tobin. 
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Schmitt). Reflex Responses signed a deal worth $529 million with the United Arab Emirates 
in 2011 (Mazzetti and Hager, “Head of Private Military Firm” 7); this deal was for 
establishing a training facility, dealing with labor unrest, and conducting “counterterrorism 
and internal security missions” (Hager and Mazzetti 8). Between 2006 and 2011, the British 
government paid 240 million BP to private military companies to take over warzone 
intelligence functions; of that, 73.3 million BP were paid to G4S alone (Savage). In 2012, the 
government of South Africa paid 350 million Rand to various firms for the guarding of 
government buildings, medical clinics, libraries, and community halls (Jordan). The Russian 
government plans to spend around $645 billion on deals with private military firms by 2020 
for the procurement of armaments and military hardware (RIA Novosti). The private security 
industry as a whole saw business increase 50% in 2012, even after a 54% increase in 2011 
(Tobin). These contracts point to enormous amounts of capital that are being transferred from 
taxpayers and nation-states to PMSI. And the global power of the industry enabled by 
massive capital accumulation is creating the material conditions for the transformation of 
sovereignty.  
To put the issue into stark relief, consider this fact. As it stands, the United States 
military (as well as that of several European nations, most notably Great Britain) would be 
incapable of functioning without contracting out key core responsibilities—including 
security, logistics, intelligence gathering and analysis, transportation, housing, unmanned 
drone strikes, and even routine combat operations—to private military and security firms. 
Though the decline of nation-state sovereignty might bring joy to some, consider what is 
rising in its place: an industry founded on war-for-profit with absolutely no accountability to 
any national, international, or supranational authority; this is an industry whose primary 
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purpose is to trade military and security expertise for money, beholden only to the system of 
global capital and conflict. The last bastion of nation-state control is ownership of the means 
of coercion. The private military and security industry is now on the verge of wresting 
ownership of coercion from the state. During his farewell address, President Eisenhower 
warned against the growing power of the military-industrial complex. He believed that this 
complex threatened democracy; he could not have envisioned that it could threaten the 
nation-state itself.  
But this is not simply about the corporate takeover of the military functions of the 
nation-state; this is about the militarization of everyday life. Private military and security 
forces have been contracted to guard university admissions exams in Nigeria (“UTME”); 
football matches in Great Britain (“Linfield”); the recent elections in Russia (Kamalova); and 
government buildings, medical clinics, libraries, and community halls in South Africa 
(Jordan). A few years ago, IKEA was found to have employed private security firms to 
obtain personal information on employees and shoppers who had instigated litigation against 
the company in France (Chrisafis). During the Occupy Wall Street demonstrations in New 
York City, private security forces worked alongside the NYPD to clear Zucotti Park 
(Moynihan). Of course, private policing of public space is not a recent development. What is 
new, however, is the transnational corporate structure within which private security operates; 
so, too, is the extent and reach of such industry. 
This brings us to the militarization of everyday life. The United Kingdom is 
considering transferring non-core police services to the private sector (“Spectrum of 
Services”). Such privatization of police forces has already begun in West Midlands, where 
plans are underway to privatize such services as criminal investigations, suspect detention, 
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incident management, neighborhood patrols, management of high-risk individuals, the 
disruption of criminal networks, collection of CCTV evidence, and the guarding of crime 
scenes (Walker). Erik Prince (the founder of Blackwater) recently released a game for the 
Xbox 360 video game console (Snider). This game, which is played via its compatibility with 
the Microsoft Kinect bio-recognition system, is a “‘first-person shoot-em-up’ in which 
players adopt the persona [sic] of mercenaries protecting U.N. officials in what reviewers 
have called a ‘hostile north-African territory’ [i.e. Muslim region unfriendly to American 
interests] “ (G. Adams 6). This is simply the first step in Prince’s plans to license 
Blackwater-themed products, “including high-end travel gear” (ibid). These seemingly 
disparate facts point to the increasing (and increasingly inextricable) role of PMSI in our 
daily lives. When considered in conjunction with my discussion earlier in this chapter about 
DARPA and the Singularity, these developments signal the increasing militarization of 
everyday life not only in regards to policing, but also the organization of social relations and 
processes of socialization themselves. 
All of this invests with new urgency Theodor Adorno’s claim regarding fascism as 
the logical end result of organized humanity. It might be thought of as sovereign power 
itself—hierarchical, totalized, immanent and eternal. Given the understanding of the 
relationship between fascism and sovereignty I have offered, the conjunctural manifestation 
of fascism we are now experiencing could culminate (if the Singularity actually arrives) in a 
palingenetic form of elitist ultra-corporism. The corporate elite view their corporeal existence 
as a phase of embryonic development that will (when they transmigrate into artificial 
intelligence) reproduce the features of their intelligence and wealth into a total system of 
networked digital eternity—a system in which the accumulated control of corporate 
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domination at the hands of technocrats will no longer have to passed to the next generation 
but can be preserved and expanded at will. We see this potential as well in the private 
military and security industry as discussed above. The emergent Fascist Sovereign of the 
Singularity is one of technocratic metaphysics and libertarian-authoritarian politics (i.e. 
libertarian for the oligarchs, authoritarian for the rest of us). The emergent Fascist Sovereign 
of PMSI is a permanent state of war as the condition of material existence. Taken together, 
this is Leviathan’s Utopia.  
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CONCLUSIONS: MOVING FORWARD IN FAILURE 
“When the going gets weird, the weird turn pro.” 
- Dr. Hunter S. Thompson 
 
 The last section of the preceding chapter offered some speculations on where we 
might be headed, given where we are currently. We need to turn back now to the material 
reality of contemporary crises. Before offering my concluding thoughts on the matter at 
hand, I feel it necessary to invoke the work of Bertram Gross, who researched so relentlessly 
and argued so persuasively about the rise of “friendly fascism” in America. One passage 
from Gross’s Friendly Fascism: The New Face of Power in America impacted me above all 
else:  
I fear any personal arrogance in urging this or that form of action—the arrogance of  
ideologues who claim a monopoly on truth, of positivists who treat half-truths as  
whole truths, of theoreticians who stay aloof from the dirty confusions of political and  
economic combat, and of the self-styled “practical” people who fear the endless clash  
of theories. I am afraid of the arrogance of technocrats as well as the ultra-rich and  
their high executives. Some of this arrogance I often find in my own behavior. I am  
afraid of blind anti-fascism. (Gross, 4) 
 
This perspective—of humility, of self-reflexivity, and of embracing the contingency of one’s 
own positions—is too often absent from academic work. Our profession inculcates within 
each of us (to varying degrees) a posture of hubris, certainty, and argumentativeness. We 
who think of ourselves as critical scholars are particularly prone to such posturing. 
 Though this may seem harsh, it is not my intention to indict or shame. I am as bound 
by the limited agency of my own abilities, shortcomings, and systemic position as anyone. 
However, we need a moment of humble reflexivity; we need to own up to our own 
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hypocrisy, our own complicity within the networks of fascist power. To rework slightly an 
adage from Leon Trotsky, the primary characteristic of a real critical scholar is the ability to 
look reality square in the face. We must put all of the positive aspects of our training, our 
expertise, and our position as scholars to collectively formulate potential solutions to this 
problem of power. No, we are not all fascists now. But that does not automatically qualify us 
as anti-fascist. So how might we figure out some solutions, some ways forward in failure? 
Because cultural studies identifies itself as both an epistemological and political project, I 
offer here some thoughts on both knowledge production and political practices.  
Epistemologically, two areas of concern need to be addressed. First, the analysis 
offered in the preceding pages needs to be expanded—empirically and theoretically. Building 
on this work, I plan to incorporate case studies concerning fake news (or, more accurately, 
monetized propaganda) and the global network of tax havens, as well as a consideration of 
other accounts of fascism (e.g. mediational, aesthetic, ritual, philosophical) that could not be 
addressed due to the limitations of the research process at this point. Second, we need to 
develop more research and pedagogical practices that are intentionally designed to work 
against the forces of fascism and corporate sovereignty. This requires a more widespread 
acknowledgement of the political nature of intellectual work, the institutional valuing of 
collaborative work in the humanities, and a commitment to public engagement through 
pedagogy. As a brief example, my colleague Megan Wood and I are collaborating to re-
establish the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (mentioned in Chapter 1). Rather 
than replicating the center as it existed, we hope to develop a model of research, public 
pedagogy and civic engagement that can respond to crises of the contemporary American 
context.  
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Politically, anarchists and socialists have been the most consistent opponents of 
fascism from the era of classical Fascism on and, as such, might provide some potential 
starting points for thinking through solutions. Although their perspectives are more varied 
than presented here, we might begin a discussion of solutions by considering some of their 
potential responses. A more militant anarchist perspective might suggest that the new slogan 
of the Left should be “agitprop and AK-47s.”59 The time has come to quit speaking truth to 
power; lie your ass off to it or keep silent. Facts clearly no longer have a place in American 
political discourse.60 Take a lesson from the Right and figure out how to produce propaganda 
that speaks to people’s everyday lives and elicits an emotional response to act. A more 
anarcho-socialist perspective might suggest that we should be focused on individual and 
communal health on more localized levels. Do calisthenics and cardio, lift weights and 
tighten your core. Eat your fruits and vegetables, have convivial conversations and dance 
parties with your friends, and have good sex. Put together a bug-out bag, arm yourself, and 
learn how to garden, hunt, fish, and survive in the wild if you do not already know how. We 
need collective organizations that can operate against (while within the framework of) the 
nation-state and the business corporation. Of course, as with so many aspects of an anarchist 
perspective, what these would look like remains bound to the particular agonistic and 
communal contexts through which such organizations could form. Although I am hesitant to 
attach such significance to these groups, Black Lives Matter and some variations of Occupy 
and anti-fa might provide some insight into this matter. 
                                                 
59 Agitprop—“obvious propaganda” intended to agitate an audience to social or political action (Safire 11). 
 
60 Of course, this statement might seem at first glance to render our attempts to re-establish the Centre for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies obsolete. After all, why attempt to establish a space for rigorous knowledge 
production if facts no longer matter? The point, however, is not to combat the post-fact or post-truth condition 
with more facts. It is to combat it by creating pedagogical, epistemological and political practices that can 
prevent the development of this condition in future generations. 
201 
 
 A socialist perspective might suggest that the corporate form is ideal for the collective 
redistribution of wealth. There are legal forms of a corporation beyond the private capitalist 
corporation. The Left needs to start exploiting the legal and economic benefits of the 
corporation in ways that do not replicate the neoliberal left’s crony capitalism and personal 
aggrandizement. And the redistribution of cultural, economic and political resources might 
best be achieved through 501(c)(3) corporations. Although I am not necessarily endorsing 
any of these groups, there are non-profit public policy organizations (e.g. the State 
Innovation Exchange and the Sanders Institute), campaign organizations (e.g. Justice 
Democrats and Brand New Congress) and think-tanks (e.g. Center for Media and Democracy 
and Data & Society Research Institute) that are involved in the work of creating more 
equitable modes of political representation and progressive modes of knowledge production. 
Corporations of this type could be linked in ownership structures to other corporate forms 
that can provide access to funding that is not beholden to purely capitalist interests. There is 
nothing whatsoever to suggest that ALEC is the only way a 501(c)(3) can operate; the 
problem lies not in corporate form itself, but its articulation to particular politic-economic 
agendas. 
 Moving from a socialist to a liberal perspective, two options might be suggested: 1) 
reverse the persona ficta (i.e. legal personhood) of the corporation through concerted legal 
and legislative agendas; or 2) revert to the limited charters of the early 18th century, when 
corporations were granted only temporary life-spans for circumscribed purposes. Both of 
these measures would require the reclamation or construction of popular sovereignty against 
that of corporate and nation-state sovereignty. Lacking effective modes of direct democracy 
under the representative electoral system of a federated republic (and given the unlimited 
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corporate campaign contributions sanctioned by Citizens United), the construction of such 
sovereignty seems highly unlikely or (at least) a long-term ambition that cannot solve in the 
short-term the very immanent crisis of American political life.61 
But these suggestions should only be viewed as entry points to conversations, and not 
as the only points of entry. At the end of the day, the only honest answer is “I do not know.” 
Our problems are collective; so, too, should our attempts to resolve them. Bob Dylan once 
joked that (although you can’t hear it) every one of his songs ends with “good luck.” This 
world is full of mystery; it does not lend itself easily to careful observation, much less to 
close analysis, and even less still to viable solutions. Beware the unintended consequences of 
your attempts to solve the crisis. Because there is a sort of ritual magic at work in the 
mechanisms and operations of power… And yet it remains elusive, revealing itself only 
through traces. Do good works; fight the good fights; enjoy the good times when you can. Be 
good to other people and good luck, good luck, good luck…  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
61 There is another perspective (admittedly strange and metaphysical) suggested by the above discussion that 
sovereignty is always about God and the emergent corporate God of the Singularity is the ultimate fascist. To 
deploy a problematic analogy, the gnostic version of Lucifer told you this long ago. Corporate sovereignty is the 
sovereignty of demiurges. Multinational corporations like Google, Apple, and Facebook are merely minor 
emanations of “the spiritual hosts of wickedness in the heavenly places” (the Letter of Paul to the Ephesians 
6:12). You cannot take Leviathan off its leash and then expect it to behave. Your only option is to put it down—
swift and merciless. 
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